FHEISM 



ni.; i" -t\i iA» 



LEAI 




MUtmmi 




Class 
Book 






.*»_ ^^^^W' i..' 



GopightN" 



COPYRIGHT DEPOSIT. 



THEISM 



(1) 



DR. TIGERT'S WORKS, 



A Constitutional History of American Episcopal Methodism. 

Svo; 414 pages. $1.50. 

The Making of Methodism : Studies in the Genesis of Institutions. 
Royal Svo; pp. xiv, 175. $1. 

Handbook of Logic: A Concise Bod}-- of Logical Doctrine, Includ- 
ing Modern Additions; Vvdth Numerous Practical Exercises. Sev- 
enth Edition, i2rao; 320 pages. $1. 

Systematic Theologyi A Complete Bodj' of Wesleyan Arminian 
Divinity, Consisting of Lectures on the Twenty -five Articles of 
Religion, by the late Rev. Thomas O. Summers, D.D., LL.D., 

Professor of Systematic Theology in Vanderbilt Universit5\ The 
Whole Arranged and Revised, with Introduction, Copious Notes, 
Explanatory and Supplemental, and a Theological Glossar3\ Roy- 
al Svo. In two volumes. 552, 572 pages. Each, $2, 

A Manual of Christian Doctrine. By the Rev. John S. Banks. Ed- 
ited, with an Introduction and Additions. i2mo; pp. xxi, 391. $1.50. 

The Preacher Himself: Homelv Hints on Ministerial Manners and 

Methods. i2mo; 200 pages. So cents. 

Passing Through the Gates, and Other Sermons. By the late 
Rev. Holland Nimmons McT3'eire, D.D., Senior Bishop of the 
Methodist Episcopal Church, South. With an Introduction by 
the Editor, giving an instructive, discriminating, and faithful esti- 
mate of Bishop McTyeire as a preacher. i2mo; 319 pages. $1. 

A Voice from the South : The Fraternal Address delivered before 
the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church, at 
Omaha, Neb., May 17, 1892. i2rao; 64 pages. Paper, 10 cents. 

The Journal of Thomas Coke, Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal 
Church, from September iS, 17S4, to June 3, 1785. Reprinted from 
the Armi7iiatt Magazine, Philadelphia, for Mav, June, July, and 
August, 1789. Carefully Conformed to the Original. Svo; 32 
pages. Paper, 50 cents. 

Theology and Philosophy, A Select Glossary of; Including Brief 
Biographical Notices of Eminent Theologians and Philosophers. 
Svo; 52 pages. Paper, 2X, cents. 

Original Status of ths Methodist Episcopal Church in America. 

Svo; 21 pages, 10 cents. 
Wandering Stars; or, Rationalism the Root of Sin. 8vo; 16 pages. 
TO cents. 

BARBEE & SMITH, Agents, 

Nashville, Tenn. Dallas, Tex. 



(ii) 



THEISM 

A SUEVEY OF THE PATHS 
THAT LEAD TO GOD 



CHIEFLY IN THE LIGHT OF THE HISTORY 
OF PHILOSOPHY 



BY 



JNO. J. TIGERT, LL.D. 

M 
80METIMB PROFESSOR OP MORAL PHILOSOPHY IN 
VANDERBILT UNIVERSITY 



" I presume I may say that we more certainly know that there 
is a God than that there is anything else without us."— liOCKE, 
Essay Concerning Human Understanding y Bk. IV., Ch. x. 

"We have not indeed a demonstrative knowledge of beings 
outside us, God alone excepted."— Leibnitz, Nouveaux Essais 
sur V Entendement Humain, Bk. IV., Ch. vii. 



Nashville, Tenn.; Dallas, Tex. 

Publishing House op the M. E. Church, South 

Barbee & Smith, Agents 

1901 



UBBARY Of CONGRESS I 

Two ©opies Received 

MAR 4 1907 

s_ Gopyrleht Entry 

OUSS /\ XXChNo. 

'copy b. 






Copyrighted 

By Barbee & Smith, Agents 

1901 



IV 



TO MY WIFE 

Bmella ^c^^eire Zlgctt 



(V) 



PEEFAOE 

Philosophy has been prevailingly theis- 
tic ; science, atheistic — without God. In no 
opprobrious sense is this said of science; 
its professed limitations plausibly and per- 
haps really, from the standpoint of mere 
method, exclude the express recognition of 
God, though Sir Isaac Newton, and some 
other physicists of his day, thought and 
wrote differently. Philosophy, if not always 
expressly a search for God, has, in its effort 
to understand reality as a whole, usually 
found him, issuing by the avenues of meta- 
physics on the high table-lands of theolo- 
gy with their limitless outlook. Science has 
rested in matter, force, and law; asking and 
giving little or no explanation of these data. 

Philosophy, when atheistic, whether tak- 
ing the form of the materialism of Democ- 
ritus, Leucippus and the ancient atomists, 

or that of Diderot and the French encyclo- 
* (vii) 



viii Preface 

pedists of the eighteenth century, or that of 
Haeckel and CHfford and modern Germans 
and Englishmen, has had, judged by its own 
standards, no orthodox standing in its own 
schools. Atheistic philosophy is an outlaw 
and an Ishmaelite. Science, when theistic, 
has in its own camp been suspected of here- 
sy and treachery. 

Xenophanes and Anaxagoras; Socrates, 
Plato, and Aristotle; Descartes, Spinoza, 
and Malebranche ; Leibnitz, Locke, and 
Berkeley; Kant, Hegel, and Lotze — great 
names in the history of philosophy — have 
been desperately in earnest with the problem 
of interpreting the universe in its ultimate 
terms; and thus have been led by many 
roads to a single terminus — God. This 
unanimity of philosophy, if not unnoticed, 
has scarcely been accorded its proper 
weight. A history of philosophic theism is 
to this day a desideratum which philoso- 
phers and theologians alike, in their haste 
to make new theistic philosophies, have 



Preface ix 

neglected to supply. The achievements of 
the past are by all odds more worthy of at- 
tention than the speculations of the pres- 
ent, except as these gather the ripe fruit 
that clusters on the tree of knowledge. 

The dependence of the world on mind is 
theism ; of mind on matter is atheism. The 
absolute independence of each — its isolation 
from the other — is an impossible philosoph- 
ical thesis. The worlds of mind and matter 
are not double over against each other in 
Cartesian opposition and separation. The 
conception of mutually exclusive worlds, ma- 
terial and mental, works smoothly enough, 
so long as a so-called purely physical phe- 
nomenon, remote from mind, requires to be 
inserted only in the physical series of our 
experiences, and to be explained in the 
terms of mechanics ; and so long as a pure- 
ly mental event, remote from matter and 
its properties of inertia and extension, re- 
quires to be inserted only in the psychical 
series of our experiences and to be explained 



X Preface 

in terms of the mental life; but as soon as 
we reach the hair-line boundary between the 
physical and the psychical, and in crossing 
that line the same event or phenomenon re- 
quires to be inserted in both the physical 
and the psychical series — as nerve vibration 
and brain change in the former, explicable 
in terms of matter and motion, and as sen- 
sation of definite quality in the latter, expli- 
cable only in terms of consciousness — men 
begin to cry aloud of inscrutable mystery, 
of the unthinkable, the absurd, the impossi- 
ble. We need not wonder at this mad flight 
to the inscrutable and this paralyzed amaze- 
ment in the presence of the impossible ; for 
the phenomenon which we seek doubly to 
classify and to understand is itself not 
double but single. Experience is one. Its 
seamless robe cannot be rent. If the phe- 
nomena of this one indiscerptible experience 
find their classification and explanation in 
matter and mechanics, materialism and athe- 
ism are true. If they find their classifica- 



Preface xi 

tion and explanation in terms of mind and 
purpose, spiritual reality and theism are 
true. To classify and explain in the terms 
of both series, material and psychical, is 
transparently absurd and has always been 
found impossible. 

One is sometimes startled by the theolog- 
ical confession that theism is indemonstra- 
ble. Once in a large assembly of ministers, 
consisting of all the Protestant pastors of a 
great city, among whom were college and 
seminary graduates, I heard the assertion 
of a doctor of divinity that the existence of 
God could not be proved pass unchallenged 
save for a solitary voice lifted in protest. 
The burden of proof lies on the theist as 
against the merely negative and skeptical 
atheist who declares that he cannot ration- 
ally resolve his doubts. On the other hand, 
the burden of proof lies on the positive and 
dogmatic atheist who declares there is no 
God. If neither the theist nor the dogmat- 
ic atheist can make a case, then something 



xii Preface 

like skeptical atheism, on the one hand, or 
a theism accepted on practical grounds, but 
confessedly without sufficient rational foun- 
dations, on the other, seems to result. I be- 
lieve with all my heart that the existence 
of God is demonstrable, and appeal to the 
gulf stream of the history of philosophy in 
vindication of my conviction. In this con- 
tention I am undoubtedly keeping the best 
of philosophical company. 

The only immediate source of our knowl- 
edge of mind is the human consciousness: 
in it also is to be found our immediate 
knowledge of reality. By analysis of the 
mind and its operations the categories of 
reality are to be found. If the mind is the 
product of the body, or of a material world 
operating through the body and aided by it, 
psychology is swallowed up in physiology 
and physics — as many in our day contend 
— and the case for theism seems to me to be 
lost. If the material world is through and 
through a double product of mind — on the 



Pi^eface xiii 

side of God a product of divine activity and 
intelligent efficiency, and on the side of man 
a product of organizing percipiency and 
rational power, which find in the world the 
intellect and meaning that God has put into 
it — the case for theism is made out. I am 
unable to see how it can be made out in any 
other way. 

The printed book is the fourth or fifth 
edition of my manuscript, which I have been 
working over in one way or another since 
1884-5. This method of composition has 
its obvious advantages and disadvantages. 
It is difficult to eliminate every trace of over- 
come standpoints while seeking to pre- 
serve remainders of truth. This method 
enables one, indeed, to distinguish between 
evanescent impressions, with a merely psy- 
chological and personal history, and perma- 
nent convictions grounded in the imperson- 
al principles of reason ; but it also robs the 
writer of that luxury of composition which 



xiv Preface 

belongs to one who flings off mature and final 
convictions in the white heat of a single 
casting which takes the exact form of the 
matrix. I have endeavored to incorporate 
from time to time the results of fresh litera- 
ture, my reading in philosophy probably 
having been somewhat wider since I ceased 
teaching than during that period. As a con- 
sequence, a better, though concise, state- 
ment of my view will sometimes be found 
in the somewhat numerous footnotes. I 
have also sought to confine to the footnotes 
more abstruse and recondite matters which 
readers who do not feel an intellectual ne- 
cessity for following every detail of the pres- 
entation or argument may often omit with- 
out serious damage to the text. 

I began my work as a teacher as a thor- 
oughly convinced natural realist of the Scot- 
tish school. In using Sir W. Hamilton's 
" Metaphysics " as a text-book with succes- 
sive classes in Vanderbilt University, I was 
compelled with reluctance, and even stub- 



Preface xv 

born resistance, to abandon position after 
position held by him and his school of natural 
dualism, until that ground was given up as 
untenable. My lectures degenerated into 
continuous criticisms and exposures of Ham- 
ilton's unsound positions and radical incon» 
sistencies. It was then that I began to break 
new ground in fields in which I found, and 
still find, such metaphysicians as Hermann 
Lotze, and such psychologists as George T. 
Ladd, my best general guides. Dr. James 
Ward's '^Naturalism and Agnosticism " is, 
among recent books, a most decisive sci- 
entific refutation of dualism. The problem 
which Descartes set for modern philosophy 
in his false isolation and opposition of mind 
and matter, and his impossible division of 
the one world of experience into incommen- 
surable halves, has, in these lectures of Dr. 
Ward's, received an exhaustive scientific 
solution, and the devil of materialism is at 
last in a fair way of being exorcised. I have 
allowed nothing to stand, however, of whose 



xvi Preface 

truth I was not convinced, and which, judged 
by my own intellectual history, would not be 
of some real value to some minds at some 
stage of their development. 

In passing the volume through the press, 
I have once more carefully revised the 
whole. The book is not perfect — far from 
it. No reader can be more sensitive to its 
defects than the author. But I have thought 
it not unpardonable to gather up the fruit of 
some years of toil in the academic chair as 
a contribution to the question it discusses. 

JnO. J. TiGERT. 

Nashville, 31 December^ 1900. 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER I 

PAGE 

Statement of the Question , i 

CHAPTER II 
Are Proofs Necessary and Possible? 6 

CHAPTER III 

Anselm's Argument : Statement and Refuta- 
tion 14 

CHAPTER IV 

The Cartesian Argument : Mankind's Posses- 
sion OF THE Idea of God 30 

CHAPTER V 

The Historical Argument: The Consensus 
Gentium 81 

CHAPTER VI 

The Argument for a First Cause : Its Alter- 
natives Considered 91 

CHAPTER VII 
The Nature of Cause 1 28 

CHAPTER VIII 

The Argument from Design: Character and 
Analysis 150 

(xvii) 



xviii Contents 

CHAPTER IX 

PAG« 

The Nature of Final Cause and Its Harmony 
WITH Efficient Cause — 167 

CHAPTER X 

Design in the Effect Proof of Intelligence 
IN the Cause » 183 

CHAPTER XI 

Some Additional Instances of Design Stud- 
ied. ..,...*..» •«•»«.•.. 4 . 193 

CHAPTER XII 
A Theistic Argument Restated 204 

CHAPTER XIII 
Of the Knowledge of " Things '*.,... » . . . 234 

CHAPTER XIV 
Professor Huxley and Bishop Berkeley . , .^. , 269 

CHAPTER XV 
The Theory of Knowledge: Idealistic ReaL' 
ism , 290 

CHAPTER XVI 
A Prescription for Modern Materialism.... 331 

Index 341 



THEISM 



CHAPTER I 

STATEMENT OF THE QUESTION 

Whether any or all of the arguments or- 
dinarily brought forward to prove the exist- 
ence of God could convey to those alto- 
gether destitute of the idea of a deity, ^rs/, 
the notion of God as a person, self-existent, 
eternal^ immutablej a spirit of infinite pow- 
er, wisdom, and goodness, the creator and 
upholder of all things, and, secondly^ satis- 
factory proofs of his existence, is a ques- 
tion which the curious may suggest, but 
which it is hardly possible to settle. It can- 
not be put to actual test, for some knowl- 
edge — a notion—of deity has been in the tjjiiversai' 
world from the dawn of history. This is ityofthe 
evidenced not only oy the ancient writings ^^ 
of the Jews, but by the earliest historical re- 

(0 



Theis'rn 



mains and the extant beliefs and customs 
of all peoples — Asiatic, African, Europe- 
an, American, Polynesian. Once projected 
within the sphere of human knowledge, once 
lodged among the thoughts of the race, from 
whatever source and in whatever manner, 
this thought or notion of God, however 
abused or distorted, has never been per- 
mitted to perish. Observe: universal his- 
tory is not here cited to prove the existence 
of God, but only mankind's general posses- 
sion of the idea of a God. 
ALarg-e The existence of God, with all the at- 

Coaciu- tributes which philosophy and Christianity 
alike ascribe to him, is a very large conclu- 
sion to establish; and the data and prem- 
ises conducting to it must be correspond- 
ingly comprehensive and gigantic. Though 
the facts and principles which constitute the 
several arguments for the divine existence 
might not necessarily conduct a wholly 
unenlightened person — if one destitute of 
the idea of God could be supposed — to the 



siou 



Statement of the Question 



knowledge of God, before unknown; yetj 
given even a hint of the divine existence, 
reason and nature and history afford abun- 
dant and satisfactory, not to say demonstra- 
tive, proofs that God is the best and only 
possible solution of the problem suggested 

by the survey of man and nature. It would 
•^ "^ Conceded 

be indeed a gigantic mind that could frame Limits of 

the s^i^antic premises of the syllogism which ^^^ Thesis 
^ ^ ^ ... tobeEstaD- 

would shut up the Infinite God in its con- ^L^t^^t 

elusion as a newly discovered and necessary 
result of a rational process ; but a much less 
highly endowed mind that had been already 
sprung to the utmost exertion of its powers 
by a patient investigation and analysis of the 
facts and principles which enter into these 
premises, though unable to reach and for- 
mulate the high conclusion, might clearly 
perceive the necessary relation of this con- 
clusion to the premises, if the conclusion 
were once suggested from without. It is 
one thing to master Newton's Princifia 
as a text-book, and quite another to be its 



Theism 



author. It is one thing to make a synthesis 
of the facts of nature and history and of the 
deliverances of reason, and declare God, be- 
fore an unsuspected solution of the problem 
of the world and of man, to be the neces- 
sary result, and quite another thing, the no- 
tion of God being already in possession, or 
the existence of God being given as a thesis 
to be established, to gather up the sufficient 
evidences of it. This latter, in the nature 
of the case, is all that can be undertaken. 

It is useless to inquire whether a human 
being, reared in isolation and receiving no 
communications from his kind upon theo- 
logical or religious subjects, but perfectly in- 
Animprac- structed in philological, philosophical, math- 

ica ean ^i;natical5 scientific, and historical learning- 
Useless ' ' ^ 

Test — so far as this could be accomplished with- 

out trespassing on the forbidden territory — 
would ever arrive at the knowledge of God. 
Such an experiment will never be under- 
taken. It would not be decisive if it were 
found that this person did not arrive at the 



Statement of the Question 



knowledge of God. For it is not necessary 
to hold that such acquirements would inevi- 
tably generate the idea of God, but only, if 
the notion of God were given, that these ac- 
quirements would afford indisputable proofs 
of his existence. But whatever the result 
in this hypothetical case might be, it is 
certain that the feat of rationally discov- "^^^ 
ering God has never been accomplished in ^^^^ 
the past. ^ The discoverer of God, though a 
greater genius than Euclid or Newton or 
Copernicus, has not recorded his name on 
the page of history. We have no reason 
to suppose that this is the route by which 
mankind came to the knowledge of God. 

1 Xenophanes, the founder of Eleaticism (born in 
569 B.C., and living to the age of ninetj-two), was the 
earliest Greek philosopher to combat the anthropomor- 
phism of Homer and Hesiod and to announce the doc- 
trine of the One, all-controlling Godhead (the Eleatic 
£v Kal TTCLv). God is all eye, all ear, all intellect; un- 
moved and undivided, he moves and rules all things 
bj his thought. See Schv/egier's " History of Philos- 
ophy" (Seelye's ed.), pp. 33, 34, and Ueberv^eg's " His- 
tory of Philosophy," I. 51-54, where all the philosoph- 
ical fragments preserved from Xenophanes are given. 



CHAPTER II 



Calder- 
wood*s 
Dictum 



Proofs 
Kecessary 



ARE PROOFS NECESSARY AND POSSIBLE i 

Professor Calderwood, of Edinburgh, 
whose '' Philosophy of the Infinite" is a lu- 
cid and conclusive refutation of the nascent 
agnosticism of Sir W. Hamilton and Dean 
Mansel, and of the full-blown fruit of that 
seed borne in Mr. Herbert Spencer's doc- 
trine of *' The Unknowable," indulges else- 
where in this dictum: ^'The reality of the 
divine existence is a truth so plain that it 
needs no proof, as it is a truth so high that 
it admits of none."^ This assertion natural- 
ly divides into two branches, against which 
I maintain the following theses : 

I. Proofs of the divine existence are nec- 
essary. The existence of God, though the 
deity may be the true and necessary answer 
to a human need and instinct^ is neither an 
innate knowledge, nor an inttcitive truth. 



1 '^ Moral Philosophy," p. 228. 



(6) 



Are Proofs Necessary and Possible? 7 
(i) It is not an in72ate or connate knowl- ^^lowiedge 

of tlie Bi- 

edge lodged in the mind of every person at vineExist- 
birth, for philosophy has long ago given up encenot 
as untenable the notion of -posttive concep- 
tions of objective realities as part of our orig- 
inal mental furniture. The native ^'God- 
consciousness" is a chimera. In the seven- 
teenth century Bishop Pearson was able to 
vi^rite : 

^*For although some have imagined that 
the knowledge of a deity is connatural to sisiiop 
the soul of man, so that every man hath a i*earsoiL 
connate, inbred notion of a God, yet I 
rather conceive the soul of man to have no 
connatural knowledge at all, no particular 
notion of anything in it from the beginning; 
but being we can have no assurance of its 
preexistence, we may more rationally judge 
it to receive the first-apprehensions of things 
by sense, and by them to make all rational 
collections. ... If all the knowledge which 
we have comes successively by sensation, in- 
struction, and rational collection — then must 



8 Theism 



we not refer the apprehension of a deity to 
any connate notion or inbred opinion; at 
least we are assured God never charp-ed us 
with the knowledge of him upon that ac- 
count."' 

There is no connate knowledge of things 
or existences^ but only an intuition of ^rin- 
ci^les^ which experience, on proper occa- 
sion, reveals in consciousness. 

(2) It is not an intuitive truth. The test 
of an intuitive truth is that it shall be of such 
a nature that the contradictory of it is not 
only false, but inconceivable. Such a truth 

T^c Divine 

„ .^ is self-evident and universal; so plain, in- 

not aa m- deed, that it neither needs nor admits of 
^tive proof, because it is incapable of intelligent 
denial: such are the axioms of mathematics. 
But atheism, antitheism, pantheism, material- 
ism, polytheism, agnosticism, are all in great- 
er or lesser degree contradictory of Christian 
theism ; and yet they are not only conceivable 
systems of the universe, but have been held 



1(C 



On the Creed," American edition, pp. 26, 27. 



Are Proofs Necessary mid Possible'^ 9 

and taught by men of unquestioned sanity; 
some of them, as pantheism, being especial- 
ly attractive to gifted and cultivated minds — 
such as that of Spinoza, If the first posi- 
tion, that " the reality of the divine existence 
is a truth so plain that it needs no proof," 
were correct, both atheism, or rejection of 
the divine existence, and skepticism, or 
doubt concerning it, would be excluded. 

A large section of the intellectual history of -^^^sh- 

peraljle 
mankind, as every student of the history of o^^gtacie 

philosophy and human opinions knows, con- 
stitutes the insuperable obstacle to the ac- 
ceptance of the statements It is a vice of 
many reasoners, when pressed to the wall, 
to declare their position to be an ^^ intuitive 
truth," indisputable and necessary. The 
intuitive truths are few, and the theist need 
not suffer the reproach which arises from 
the frequent flight to this city of refuge. 
As Pearson says, it is '^ a very irrational 
way of instruction to tell a man that doubts 
of this truth that he must believe it because 



10 Theism 



Proofs 



it is evident unto him, when he knows that 
he therefore only doubts it because it is not 
evident unto him." ^ 

2. Proofs of the divine existence are -pos- 
sible. Professor Calderwood is again wrong 
Possible when he asserts that this ''is a truth so high 
that it admits of none." This contention of 
his might be dismissed wdth a bare repetition 
of the statement that only intuitive truths 
are of this nature. But it is permissible to 
add that, if he w^ere correct in this opinion, 
Dr. Calderwood would not have found it 
possible straightway to adduce arguments 
having the ends of proof in view, and we 
should not be able, as we shall do in this es- 
say, to canvass the evidence. Moreover, he 
is self-contradictory when on the next page 
(229) he declares that the divine existence 
is finally ''accepted as the only adequate 
solution of the problem of finite existence. 
As already suggested, the raising of this 
problem belongs to a period of philosophic 



1 " On the Creed/' p. 2; 



Are Proofs Necessary and Possible? ii 

thought, and in seeking a solution of it the 
existence of a self-sufficient First Cause is 
accepted as adequate, and as the only ade- 
quate, solution." Twice Professor Calder- 
wood declares the divine existence to be the TheOaiy 
*^only adequate solution" of the problem of ^^ ^ 
finite existence. Now what is the nature 
and province of explanation? Is it not to 
find the least and simplest, but rationally 
necessary, assumption with regard to the 
nature and operation of a cause which will 
suffice to account fully for the effect? It 
follows, therefore, if the deity is '' the only 
adequate solution" of the problem of finite 
existence, that by the existence of the uni- 
verse, with its known characteristics as an 
effect, the existence of God is proved as 
its necessary cause. The acceptance of a 
given explanation as the *^only adequate 
solution " of a problem arising out of known 
facts, carries with it the acknowledgment 
that the facts are an exclusive and sufficient 
proof of the elements of the solution. 



12 Theism 



We know God after the same manner that 

^^^ we know m.an. We cannot immediately in- 

Snowledgfe ^ 

of God and spect by the senses the human spirit any 
Oi Man One j^^qj-^ than we can the divine. The Scrip- 
tures say, No man hath seen God at any 
tim.e. It is just as true that no man has 
seen another man at any time. By the 
speech and actions of a person, as displayed 
bv a human body, one is able to conclude the 
existence of a rational and volitional spirit 
which orders its own processes, controls the 
body, and is the real author of all those 
manifold expressions of which the body is 
the medium. So by the structure of the 
universe, including man, we may conclude 
the existence of God. It is a pleasure, 
Correct however, to accept as sufficiently correct 
^^ °^ in principle the following statement of Dr. 
Calderwood's: ^'The legitimate use of a 
discursive process is not in an attempt to 
reach the fact of the divine existence as a 
logical conclusion, but in testing the har- 
mony between the belief and the facts of 



Are I^roo/s Necessary and Possible? 13 

existence. This latter use of the reasoning 
process is in accordance with the scientific 
methods followed in all departments of in- 
vestigation."^ And, I may add, is in essen- 
tial harmony with the preliminary statement 
of the question already given. ^ 

1 " Moral Philosophy," p. 230. 

2 For a full discussion and refutation of the doctrine 
that the existence of God is an innate knowledge, or an 
intuitive truth, see Summers's ** Systematic Theology," 
I. 49-53' 



CHAPTER III 



Argfument 
Disreputa- 
ble 



ANSELM S argument: STATEMENT AND 
REFUTATION 

Since Kant's day the ontological argu- 
ment, as it is called, though not abandoned, 
Ontological has fallen into disrepute. Most men distrust 
a -priori demonstration when applied to such 
a subject as the divine existence. The nature 
of the argument I shall consider in the next 
chapter approaches more nearly that of the 
ontological, rejected as invalid in this chap- 
ter, than does any other included within this 
survey; yet it maybe possible to show some 
essential points of difference. 

The ontological argument was current 
among the schoolmen from the times of An- 
selm, archbishop of Canterbury (born in 
1033, died in 1109), often regarded as the 
first of the scholastics, and styled by Nean- 
der the Augustine of his age. Anselm's the- 
ological importance reposes securely upon 
(H) 



Anselm 



A nselm^s A rgtiment 1 5 

two great pillars: he was the original pro- 
pounder of the ontological argument for the 
existence of God, and he was the first to 
undertake a scientific statement of the doc- 
trine of atonement, with which his most cele- 
brated work, Cur DeusHomof occupies it- 
self. Though accorded little favor by Thom- Aquinas, 
as Aquinas, Albertus Magnus, Duns Scotus, ^^ ' 
and others, who relied chiefly upon various tus 
a posteriori arguments and inclined more 
and more to place the doctrine of God's 
existence with that of the Trinity among 
the dogmas of the faith ^ incapable of philo- 
sophical demonstration, but to be received 
on the authority of revelation, guaranteed in 
turn by the Church, this ontological or An- 
selmic argument acquired considerable cur- 
rency, and still has a strange fascination for 
some minds, for it promises much: nothing 
less than an a priori demonstv3.tion of the be- 
ing and attributes of God. Hegel, among il- Hegei 
lustrious nineteenth-century thinkers, seems 
well content with Anselm's view, affirming 



i6 



Theism 



Shedd, 

Flint, 

Lotze 



Aaselm's 
Argument 



the ontological to be the one satisfactory 
proof of the divine existence. Among pro- 
fessed theologians. Dr. W. G. T. Shedd, 
of the Union Theological Seminary, and 
Professor Robert Flint, author of two clas- 
sic volumes, '^Theism,'' and ''Anti-theistic 
Theories,'^ assign a force, almost or quite 
demonstrative, to the Anselmic argument. 
Hermann Lotze, toOj though denouncing 
Anselm's logic, accepts his conclusion in 
an eloquent passage, a part of which will 
presently be cited. 

Anselm's argument may be thus formu- 
lated. When we consider what the term 
God signifies— -or what the concept of the 
deity includes— -we evidently understand by 
it that which must be thought as the ^r^'dX- 
est—''aliqutdj quo nihil majus cogitari -po^ 
test^^ is Anselm's language. Even David's 
fool, who declares there is no God, must 
concede that the greatest possible thought, 
the notion of God, is in his heart. But to 
exist actually (in re)^ as well as in thought 



Anselms Argutnent 17 

(in intellectu)^ is greater than to exist in 
thought alone; therefore God, the concept 
of whom involves the element of the great- 
est possible existence 5 exists not only in 
thought, but actually, or, as Anselm phrases 
his conclusion, '^Existit ergo -proctd dubio 
altqutdj quo majus cogitari non valet^ et in 
tntellectu^ et in re^ 

Of Anselm's argument, as found in the 
second chapter of his Proslogion^ Dr. Shedd 
supplies us with the following transla- 
tion^ either his own or that of Maginnis 
(in the Bibliotheca Sacra^ 1851): ^'Sure- 
ly that, than which a greater cannot be 
conceived, cannot exist merely in the mind 
alone. For if we suppose that it exists 
only subjectively in the intellect, and not 
objectively in fact, then we can conceive 
of something greater, we can conceive of 
a being who exists objectively, and this is 
greater than a merely mental existence. If, 
therefore, that than which a greater cannot 
be conceived exists only in the conception or 



A Trans= 
lation 



1 8 Theism 



intelligence, and not outwardly in fact, then 
that very thing than which a greater cannot 
be conceived is something than which a 
greater can be conceived — which is self- 
contradictory. There exists, therefore, be- 
yond doubt, both in the mind and in reality, 
a being than v^^hich a greater cannot be con- 
ceived." ^ Such an argument the learned 
modern theologian proceeds at once to ex- 
pound and to indorse ! 

It is hardly necessary to tarry to expose 
itsFanacy ^^^ glaring fallacy of an argument which 
proceeds from existence in thought to exist- 
ence in fact. Gaunilo, a monk contempo- 
rary with Anselm, in his little work. Liber 
fro Insifiente (a defense of the fool), il- 
lustrated the futility of Anselm's argument 
by reference to a fabled island, filled with 
abounding riches and delights, and perfectly 
constituted for the happiness of its inhabit- 
ants. Confessedly this island is more excel- 
lent than any known land ; for if it is most 
iShedd, " History of Christian Doctrine," I. 233, 234. 



A nselm ' s A rgum ent 19 

-perfect^ there cannot even be imagined a 
Tiiore -perfect region. But even the known, 
imperfect lands exist in reality; therefore 
the most perfect cannot exist in conception 
alone, but must also exist in reality. Its very 
perfection involves its reality, since to be 
both in reality and in conception is better 
than to be in conception alone. Therefore 
this fabled island actually exists. 

Dr. Shedd concedes, as he must, that such Br. 
an argument from existence in thought to -^^^^^^^ 
existence in fact is invalid, but strives, both 
in his original exposition of Anselm's argu- 
ment and in his attempted refutation of Gau- 
nilo's objection, so to state the argument as to 
avoid the difficulty. Allowing that any ex- 
istence in thought does not imply existence 
in fact, he thinks an essentially different 
case is presented when he urges that nee- 
essary existence in thought carries with it 
necessary existence in fact. Let us hear 
him: 

** The force of this [Anselm's] argument 



20 Theisin 



depends entirely upon the characteristic of 
'necessity of existence.' This is an inte- 
gral part of the idea of the most perfect 
being, and does not enter into the idea of 
any other being. All other beings may or 
may not exist, because they are not the most 
perfect conceivable. Their existence is 
contingent; but that of the First Perfect 
is necessary. Hence the idea of God is a 
wholly U7iique idea, and an argument can 
be constructed out of it, such as cannot be 
constructed out of the idea of any other being. 
And one of its peculiarities is that it must 
have an objective correspondent to itself. 
. . In the instance, then, of any other idea 
but that of God, the mere idea in the mind 
is not sufficient to evince the ac^aal reality 
of the object. But in the instance of the 
solitary and totally unique idea of the ab- 
solutely Perfect, the mere idea is sufficient 
for this, because it contains the element of 
necessity of existence. 



"1 



1" History of Christian Doctrine," I. 232, 233. 



A nselm's A rgument 2 1 

After citing Gaunilo's objection. Dr. 
Shedd states the same argument somewhat 
more elaborately: 

'' But an objection of this kind fails to in- iiestate- 
validate Anselm's argument, because there 
is no logical parallelism between the two 
species of ideas. It overlooks the fact that 
the idea of the deity is wholly solitary and 
unique; there is no second idea like it. As 
Anselm remarks in his reply to Gaunilo, if 
the island above mentioned were the most 
-perfect thing conceivabhj then he would 
insist that the existence of the idea in the 
mind would be evidence of the existence of 
the island itself. But the idea of the island 
does not, like the idea of God, contain the 
elements of absolute f erf ectto7i of being, and 
necessity of being. And the same is true of 
the idea of a griffin, or of a chimera, or of 
any imaginary or contingent existence what- 
ever. The idea of a man or an angel does 
not carry with it that the man, or the angel? 
cannot but exist, and that his non-existence 



22 Theis7n 



is inconceivable. But the idea of God, as a 
being totally different from all created and 
contingent beings, does carry with it the 
property of necessary existence ; and there- 
fore an objection like that of Gaunilo, drawn 
from the province of contingent existence, 
does not hold. It is an instance of what Ar- 
istotle denominates /xera^ao-ts ets aXAo) yeVos — 
a transfer of what is true of one species to 
a species of totally different nature, as if one 
should transfer what is true of the idea of 
matter to the idea of mind." ^ 

Here the good doctor precisely defines 

the logical error in Gaunilo' s and similar 

Refutation objections. He transfers to necessary exist- 

ofDr. ence, says Dr. Shedd, an objection which 
Siedd -^ . -^ . 

holds good only in the sphere of contingent 

existence. Can this charge be sustained? 
Hardly. Let us recall to mind that Anselm 
does not begin Vs^ith the datum of necessary 
existence, but onl}^ with the datum of a con- 
cept which involves the element of neces- 

1 ** History of Christian Doctrine," I. 236, 237. 



A nselm ^s A rgmnent 23 

sary existence. The problem is to get from 
a necessity of thought to a necessary objec- 
tive existence. By common consent, we 
have only a necessity of thought in the 
premises: can we reach a necessity of fact 
in the conclusion? Not unless we manage, 
unconsciously or willfully^ to introduce an 
objective necessity of fact into the premises. 
This is what Dr. Shedd does, no doubt in- 
nocently, when he says that the ^Mdea of 
the absolutely Perfect « . . contains the 
elcfnent of necessity of existence,'' and the ^^.p 
^'idea of God , . , does carry with it the erty 
fjTo^eriy of necessary existence . ' ' By these 
words '^element'' and "^ "^ property '' our au- 
thor has been misled. The elements of a 
concept are thought-elements, not objects 
or things. The properties of thought are 
mental, not elements of objective realities. 
If I think God, I must think him as neces- 
sarily existent. But since the concept is 
itself in the mind, all its *' elements" must 
be there too. Anselm's argument, as Pro- 



24 



Theism 



Sheldon's 
State- 
ment 



Fnrther 
Discnssion 
of Princi- 
ples In- 
volved 



fessor Sheldon suggests, reduces to this: 
''The idea of God is the idea of the great- 
est conceivable being; to be in reality, as 
well as in conception, is greater than to be 
in conception alone; therefore the idea of 
God (as the greatest conceivable being) is 
the idea of a really existent being." ^ 

It may be conceded to Dr. Shedd that 
there is a difference betv/een that necessity 
of thought which must conceive a centaur 
as uniting the head of a man and the body 
of a horse, and that other necessity of 
thought w^hich must conceive the sum of 
the angles of a triangle to be equal to two 
right angles. The first concept is a free 
creation of the imagination — its elements 
are contingent. As a conventional work 
of imagination, the concept might have been 
made to include elements it does not now 
possess, or might have been so constructed 
as to exclude elements now attaching to it. 

iDr. Henrj C. Sheldon, " History of Christian Doc- 
trine," I. 329. 



Anselm^s Argument 25 

The imagination itself has a freedom that 
does not belong to the intellect. But the 
product of imagination is subject to the 
same laws of thought as a real object. Cer- 
tain conventional predicates having been 
assigned to the image, we may not deny it 
its marks, for that would be to violate the 
logical law of identity ; we may not assign it 
contradictory predicates, for that would be 
to violate the logical law of non-contradic- 
tion; we may not deny that every possible 
predicate is either present in or absent from 
the image, for that v/ould be to violate the 
law of excluded middle. 

But in the case of the triangle, there is a 
necessity in the nature of the concept itself 
which makes the sum of its angles equal to 
two right angles. The concept of a triangle 
is a necessary product of thought, and not 
a free product of imagination. It is con- 
ceivable that the triangle might be called by 
some other name — e. g-,, trilateral — but we 
should not thereby be able to eliminate any 



26 



Theism 



KecessaiT 
and Con- 
tingreat 
Existence 



of its mathematical elements or add any 
new ones. Now, to satisfy Dr. Shedd's 
critical distinction between '^ necessary ex- 
istence" and ^^ contingent existence,'' as he 
puts it (though the distinction should have 
been drawn between concepts including 
only contingent elements and those which 
involve necessary elements), it may be al- 
lowed that the concept of God falls in the 
same class with the concept of a triangle, and 
not in the same class vnth the concept of a 
centaur. If I conceive a triangle, I must con- 
ceive it as having angles whose sum is two 
right angles. Thatwouldbe true if there were 
no actual triangle anywhere in the universe. 
This necessity of thought does not involve 
the necessary objective existence of any tri- 
angle. It affirms simply that, if a triangle 
is constructed, it will have this property. 
Similarly, if I conceive God, I must con- 
ceive him as necessarily existent. This 
would still be true if there were no God. 
It is as true for an atheist as it is for a theist. 



A nselm ' s A rgmnent 2 7 

If I draw a circle., its radii must be equaL 
This is true, even if I draw no circle 5 or if 
it be impossible to construct a perfect cir- 
cle — /. e.<i if there is no circle. Once Dr. 
Shedd comes in sight of this truth, but 
quickly withdraws. ^^ In conceiving, there- 
fore, of a Being," says he, *'who is more 
-perfect than all others, the mind inevitably 
conceives of a real and not an imaginary 
being, in the same manner as in conceiving 
of a figure having three sides it inevitably 
conceives of a figure having three angles."^ 
No doubt. In conceiving God the mind 
inevitably conceives of a real being. In 
conceiving trilateral the mind inevitably 
conceives triangular. But in both cases we 
begin and end with conception. The con- 
cept of God includes the element of neces- 
sary existence. But the elements of con- 
cepts are not objective entities, but marks 
or notes—/. ^., thought-elements, at best 
necessary thought-elements. 

1" History of Christian Doctrine," I. 232. 



28 llieism 



Sant, Immanuel Kant promptly repudiated the 

Bowne, 

Lotze 



ontological argument as an illogical leap from 
the subjective to the objective, from the ideal 
to the real. Anselm's reasoning is manifest- 
ly defective. He starts with thought, and 
must end with thought. The true conclu- 
sion is that God Tnust be thought as actually 
existing, if thought at all. ^' There is not a 
shadow of cogency in this reasoning," says 
Professor Bowne, ''it only points out that the 
idea of the perfect must include the idea of 
existence; but there is nothing to show that 
the self-consistent idea represents an objec- 
tive reality." ^ " To conclude that because 
the notion of a most perfect being includes 
reality as one of its perfections," says Lotze, 
*' therefore a most perfect being necessarily 
exists^ is so obviously to conclude falsely that 
after Kant's incisive refutation any attempt 
to defend such reasoning w^ould be useless."^ 

1 Professor Borden P. Bowne, " Philosophy of (The- 
ism," p. 43. 

^Hermann Lotze, '' Mikrokosmus," Book IX., Chap. 



Anselm' s Argument 29 

IV. English translation, II. 669, 670. For the sake of 
his own reputation, it had been hoped that Dr. Shedd, 
before his death, would withdraw his commentary on 
Anselm's argument from his really able work. Of 
course everybody is liable to mistake, but that a fore- 
most American theologian should commit himself to 
the formal defense of a logical absurdity, and allov/ 
the defense to stand for years, is too bad. Professor 
Robert Flint, of the University of Edinburgh, in his 
**Theism," pp. 278-280, with considerable hesitation 
advances positions substantially identical with Dr. 
Shedd's. He allows, however, that Anselm's argu- 
ment "has commended itself completely to few," but 
alleges that "it may fairly be doubted whether it has 
been conclusively refuted." Kant's objection that ex- 
istence is not a predicate or quality^ — -i, e.^ does not en- 
large the intension of a concept — Dr. Flint views as 
^^ perhaps not incapable of being satisfactorily repelled." 
By these and similar equivocal expressions he always 
leaves open a door of escape. From the general drift 
of his article on "Theism" in the Encyclo^cedia Bri- 
tannica (ninth edition), I conclude that he would now 
hardly undertake to maintain this indorsement of An- 
selm in his Baird Lecture of i876» 



CHAPTER IV 



Conces- 
sions of 
Lotze and 
Bowne 



THE CARTESIAN ARGUMENT*. MANKIND S 
POSSESSION OF THE IDEA OF GOD 

As a fitting transition to the peculiar fea- 
tures of the Cartesian agument the follow- 
ing passage from Lotze may be quoted. 
Anselm, despite the transparent absurdity 
of his argument, is so evidently groping after 
a profound truth that Lotze feels constrained 
in justice to add to the condemnation already 
cited this acknowledgment: *'The way in 
which this is put seems to reveal another 
fundamental thought which is seeking for 
expression. For what would it matter if 
that which is thought as most perfect were, 
as thought, less than the least reality? Why 
should this thought disturb us ? Plainly for 
this reason: that it is an immediate certain- 
ty that what is greatest, most beautiful, most 
worthy is not a mere thought, but must be a 
reality, because it would be intolerable to 

(30) 



The Cartesian Argument 31 

believe of our ideal that it is an idea pro- 
duced by the action of thought, but having 
no existence, no power, and no validity in 
the world of reality. We do not from the 
perfection of that which is perfect imme- 
diately deduce its reality as a logical conse- 
quence; but without the circumlocution of 
a deduction we directly feel the impossibili- 
ty of its nonexistence, and all semblance of 
syllogistic proof only serves to make more 
clear the directness of this certainty. . . . 
Many other attempts may be made to ex- 
hibit the internal necessity of this conviction 
as logically demonstrable; but all of them 
must fail."^ This noble sentiment of the 
master finds an echo in the pages of his 
greatest American disciple: ''The [onto- 
logical] argument is nothing but the expres- 
sion of the aesthetic and ethical conviction 
that the true, the beautiful, and the good, 
which alone have value in the universe, can- 
not be foreign to the universe. The mind 

1 " Mikrokosmus," English Translation, II. 670. 



32 Theism 



will not consent to abandon its ideals. The 
ontological argument owes all its force 
to this immediate faith in the ideal. Its 
technical expression is due to the desire 
to give this faith a demonstrative logical 
form. The result is to weaken rather than 
strengthen it." ^ 
Descartes's The Cartesian argument for the divine 
ArgfimieiLt existence has often been identified with the 

not Identi- 
cal with Anselmic, but scarcely with justice to Des- 

Anseim^s cartes. It is true that one branch of Des- 
cartes's argument, or one of his arguments, 
if we separate his discussion into distinct 
logical processes, is identical with An- 
selm's. In the first part of his '' Principles 
of Philosophy," it is presented in language 
so closely resembling Anselm's that it must 
be supposed to be derived from this source. 
No new thought is introduced, and the ob- 
jections to Anselm's argument before ad- 
duced are also fatal to Descartes's, if con- 

1 Professor B. P. Bowne, " Philosophy of Theism," 
PP- 43. 44- 



The Cartesian Argument 33 

sidered independently of his other reason- 
ing^^ 

1 The original Latin edition of the " Principles of 
Philosophy," published in 1644, from which the French 
version was translated by Picot in 1647, is printed with 
side-notes like this volume — a very ancient typograph- 
ical device. Paragraphs xiv. and xv. of the First Part, 
"De principiis cognitionis humance," have these mar- 
ginal notes indicative of their contents: *' Ex eo quod 
existentia necessaria, in nostro de Deo conceptu con- 
tineatur, recte concludi Deum existere," and ** Non 
eodem modo in aliarum rerum conceptibus existen- 
tiam necessariam, sed contingentem duntaxat con- 
tineri." In the latter part of paragraph xiv., the par- 
allel triangular argument is used exactly in the man- 
ner of Anselm and Dr. Shedd's reproduction of him: 
"Atque ex eo quod, exempli causa, percipiat in idea 
trianguli necessario contineri, tres ejus angulos sequales 
esse duobus rectis, plane sibi persuadet triangulum 
tres angulos habere sequales duobus rectis; ita ex eo 
solo, quod percipiat, existentiam necessariam et seter- 
nam in entis summe perfecti idea contineri, plane con- 
cludere debet, ens summe perfectum existere." Para- 
graph XV., which is short enough to be quoted in full, 
also reproduces Anselm: '*Magisque hoc credet, si 
attendat nullius alterius rei ideam apud se inveniri, in 
qua eodem modo necessariam existentiam contineri ani- 
madvertat. Ex hoc enim intelliget, istam ideam entis 

3 



34 Theism 



In his third Meditation, Descartes pre- 
The Carte- sents his own argument, the Cartesian ar- 

sianArgu- , -. -. 

ment gument proper, whose vahdity we must 

Proper now proceed to investigate. But, first of 
all, it will be worth while to allow Descartes 
to state his own position: 

'' By the nature of God I understand a 
substance infinite, independent, all-know- 
ing, all-powerful, and by which I myself, 
and every other thing that exists, if any such 
there be, were created. But these proper- 
ties are so great and excellent that the more 
attentively I consider them the less I feel 
persuaded that the idea I have of them owes 
its origin to myself alone. And thus it is 
absolutely necessary to conclude, from all 
that I have before said, that God exists: for 
though the idea of substance be in my mind 
owdng to this, that I myself am a substance, 

summe perfect! non esse a se effictam, nee exhibere 
chimsericam quandam, sed veram et immutabilem 
naturam, quseque non potest non existere, cum neces- 
saria existentia in ea contineatur." — Reiiati Descartes 
Principia Philosofhice^ p. 4. (Ed. Amsterdam: 1B85.) 



The Cartesian Argu^nent 35 

I should not, however, have the idea of an 
infinite substance, seeing I am a finite being, 
unless it were given me by some substance 
in reality infinite. And I must not imagine 
that I do not apprehend the infinite by a true 
idea, but only by the negation of the finite, 
in the same way that I comprehend repose 
and darkness by the negation of motion and 
light: since, on the contrary, I clearly per- 
ceive that there is more reality in the infinite 
substance than in the finite, and therefore 
that in some w^ay I possess the perception 
of the infinite before that of the finite — that 
is, the perception of God before that of my- 
self, for how could I know that I doubt, de- 
sire, or that something is wanting to me, 
and that I am not wholly perfect, if I pos- 
sessed no idea of a being more perfect than 
myself, by comparison of which I knew the 
deficiencies of my nature. 



>? 1 



1 The original Latin runs : " Dei nomine intelligo sub- 
stantiam quandam infinitam, independentem, summe 
intelligentem, summe potentem, et a qua tum ego ipse 
turn aliud omne, si quid aliud extat, quodcumque extat 



36 Theis7n 



Here is a new argument, altogether dis- 

est creatum. Quae sane omnia talia sunt, ut quo dili- 
gentius attendo, tanto minus a me solo profecta esse 
posse videantur. Ideoque ex antedictis Deum neces- 
sario existere est concludendum : nam quamvis sub- 
stantise quidem idea in me sit ex hoc ipso quod sim 
substantia, non tamen id circo esset idea substantia 
infinitse, cum sim finitus, nisi ab aliqua substantia qure 
revera esset infinita, procederet. Nee putare debes me 
non percipere infinitum per veram ideam, sed tantum 
per negationem finiti, ut percipio quietem et tenebras 
per negationem inotus et lucis ; nam contra manifeste 
intelligo plus realitatis in substantia infinita quam in 
finita, ac proinde priorem quodammodo in me esse per- 
ceptionem infiniti quam finiti, hoc est Dei, quam mei 
ipsius: qua enim ratione intelligerem me dubitare, me 
cupere, hoc est, aliquid mihi de esse, et me non esse 
omnino perfectum, si nulla ideaentis perfectioris in mc 
esset, ex cujus comparatione defectus meos agnosce- 
rem." — Renati Descartes Meditatio7ies de Prima Pliiloso- 
jfJiia^ In quibus Dei Kmsteiitia^ et Aniince humancE a cor- 
pore Distinction demo7istrantur, Meditatio III. " De Deo, 
quod existat," p. 21. I am fortunate in possessing a 
set of the original collected Latin edition of D-es- 
cartes's works, printed at Amsterdam in 1685. The 
imprint is "Amstelodami, Ex Tvpographia Blaviana, 
M DC LXXXV." Descartes was born in 1596, and died 
in 1650. 



The Cartesian Argument 37 

tinct from the Anselmic. Man finds him- 
self in possession of the concept of an 
infinite, eternal, self-existent, immutable, 
all-knowing, all-powerful, all-good Being, source of 
Whence did man secure the materials for ^^^'^ 

Knowledg-e 

this concept? Evidently neither from the ofthein- 

analysis of his own nature nor from the con- ^"^^® ^^^ 

the Perfect 
templation of the objects of the external 

world, for these are finite, dependent, mu- 
table — in a word, imperfect. What is the 
source of man's idea of the Infinite and the 
Perfect, in the light of which he clearly rec- 
ognizes his own finitude and imperfection? 
Are we not compelled to acknowledge a 
true Infinite as the only possible source of 
this idea in us — the mark of the workman 
impressed upon his work, as Descartes him- 
self suggests? If it be objected that the idea of the 

idea of the infinite is a merely nep^ative one 

*^ ^ not Hega- 

derived from the finite by its negation, as tive 
darkness is the absence of light, or cold the 
absence of heat, or silence the absence of 
sound, or rest the absence of motion, Des- 



38 



Theism 



Ueberweg: 



I?oire 



cartes has already anticipated and satisfac- 
torily refuted the objector. Darkness and 
silence are nothings; but ''I clearly per- 
ceive there is more reality in the infinite 
than in the finite." Perhaps no competent 
thinker of the present day holds that our 
notion of the infinite is negative.^ Ueber- 
weg allows that Descartes ''justly denies 
that the idea of the infinite is a mere nega- 
tion."^ Ludwig Noire, the distinguished 
author of that brilliant sketch of the history 
of philosophy which serves as an introduc- 
tion to Max Miiller's translation of Kant's 
" Critique of Pure Reason," concedes Des- 
cartes's point with regard to the idea of the 
infinite in language which logically carries 
with it a full acceptance of the conclusion of 

^Some years after this sentence was written, I dis- 
covered that Professor Noah K. Davis, of the Univer- 
sity of Virginia, is an exception. See his article " In- 
finity," in The Methodist Review for September, 1894, 
pp. 20-31. 

2Dr. Friedrich Ueberweg, "History of Philosophy," 
II. 49, footnote. 



The Cartesian Argument 39 

Descartes's argument: ''AH serious think- 
ers, however, will agree," says he, ''that 
the idea of Infinity is not negative, that it 
cannot possibly he derived from any finite be- 
ings not even by the action of sense and rea- 
son, which are in their nature conditioned, 
and that accordingly the sources of the con- 
ception must be without and beyond the lim- 
its of rational knowledge. " ^ 

The soundness of Descartes's position soundness 

has commended itself to writers widely ^^ ^®^' 

cartes's 

separated in their philosophical views and position 
methods. To the names of Ueberweg and 
Noire may be added those of a few other 
men of like exact and extensive erudition 
and of acknowledged philosophical compe- 
tency. Dr. Calderwood, quoting from Pro- 

Calder- 
fessor Veitch's translation of Descartes's ^^^^ 

third Meditation a part of the passage al- 
ready cited, says: "Even if the clearness 
of our thought of God be no argument to 

iMax Mailer's translation of Kant's "Critique of 
Pure Reason," Introduction^ I. 132. 



40 Theism 



the reality of the divine existence, still the 
idea remains as a fact to be accounted for. 
I can explain, by simple combination of the 
attributes of different beings, how the idea 
of a centaur has been formed. But how 
shall we account for the idea of God with- 
in us? How has this conception been 
formed? Descartes has a strong position 
Cndwortii here.''^ Ralph Cudworth, the Cambridge 
Platonist, definitely accepts the Cartesian 
conclusion: '^We affirm that, if there 
were no God, the idea of an absolutely or 
infinitely perfect being could never have 
been made or feigned, neither by politicians, 

1*' Moral Philosophy," ninth ed., p. 227. This pas- 
sage stood in all editions to the thirteenth, but, with 
the whole discussion connected with it, has been with- 
drawn from the almost entirely rewritten fourteenth 
edition, evidently, however, from change of treatment 
and not from change of conviction. Speaking of the 
Cartesian position, he says, at p. 324 of the fourteenth 
edition: "Next to his own being, the existence of God 
is the grand certainty, for as doubt implies imperfec- 
tion, the human mind cannot be the source of the idea 
of an absolutely perfect being." 



The Cartesian Argument 41 

nor by poets nor philosophers, nor any 
other." ^ Leibnitz's position is well known. Leibnitz 
'^ I believe, indeed, with Mr. Locke," he 
says, "that, properly speaking, we may say 
that there is no space, time, nor number 
which is infinite, but that it is only true that 
however great may be a space, a time, or a 
number, there is always another greater 
than it without end ; and that thus the true 
infinite is not found in a whole composed of 
parts. It is none the less, however, found 
elsewhere; namely, in the absolute^ which 
is without parts. . . • The positive infinite j 
then, being nothing else than the absolute, 

^"Intellectual System of the Universe," Chap. v. 
One of Cudworth's own a friort demonstrations is re- 
duced, in Lowrey's " Philosophy of Cudworth," p. 107, 
to this form: ''Whatever we can frame an idea of in 
our minds, implying no manner of contradiction, this 
either actually is^ or else, if it be not, it is possible for it 
to be; if God be not, he is not possible hereafter to be; 
ergo^ he isP Those fond of investigating logical word- 
juggles may amuse themselves with this. The argu- 
ment Cudworth allows is convincing only "according 
to the capacity of the recipient.'* 



42 



Theism 



it may be said that there is in this sense a 
positive idea of the infinite, and that it is 
anterior to that of the finite." ^ The tes- 
timony of Kuno Fischer, a specialist in the 
critical investigation and exposition of Car- 
tesianism, will be considered at length at a 
later stage of the discussion. 

But from this digression among authori- 
ties of learning and weight, I must return 
to Descartes himself for a closer and more 
exact consideration of his teaching. In the 
'^ Discourse on Method," as well as in the 
'^Meditations" (III. and V.), the funda- 
mental place of this doctrine among the first 
principles of Cartesianism is definitely and 
The'^Dis- elaborately set forth.^ The '' Discourse on 



Descartes 's 
Doctrine 



course on 
Method »» 



Method," published in French in 1637, 

^A fragment of the year 1696 on Locke's Essay, 
translated from the French by Langley and prefixed to 
his English version of Leibnitz's Nouveaux Essais sur 
VBntendement Humain. Compare Book IL, Chapter 
xvii., of that work ; pp. 161-164 of Langley's translation. 

2Descartes's exposition of his proofs of the divine 
existence may also be found in the "Principles," Part 



The Cartesian Argujnent 43 

when Descartes was forty-one years old, is 
at once the intellectual autobiography and 
the philosophical confession of faith of the 
founder of modern philosophy and the 
mathematical precursor of Newton and 
Leibnitz. As such it is a spring of peren- 
nial interest. His design was not to teach 
others the precepts for the right conduct 
of their reason, but to describe the way in 
which he had consciously striven to conduct 
his own in the search after truth. ^ His tract 

I., paragraphs xiv.-xxii., partially cited in a preced- 
ing footnote (p. 33), and in the "Responsio ad Secun- 
das Objectiones," as annexed to the " Meditations," 
under the title " Rationes Dei existentiam probantes 
more Geometrico dispositse." But in these cases the 
order of statement is reversed, and the ontological ar- 
gument is thy[ust into the foreground. 

iNe quis igitur putet me hie traditurum aliquam 
methodum, quam unusquisque sequi debeat ad recte 
regendam rationem ; illam enim tantum quam ipse- 
met sequutus sum exponere decrevi. — Dissertatio de 
MetJiodo^ etc., p. 2 (Amsterdam ed., 1685). The Latin 
translation was made by Etienne de Courcelles in 1644 
under the supervision of Descartes, and thus has the 
character of a second and revised edition. See Des- 
cartes's prefatory note to the reader. 



44 Theism 



was put forth as a history of the intellectual 
processes by which he had reached such 
noteworthy results in physics, mathematics, 
and philosophy. He had been led to de- 
clare that a plurality of suffrages is no cri- 
terion of truth, if that truth is at all difficult 
of discovery; since such truth is much more 
likely to be found by one than by many/ 
Fartiv Part iv. of this Dissertation its author enti- 
tles, '' Reasons by which the existence of 
God and of the human soul is proved, which 
are the foundations of metaphysics" — Ra- 
Hones qiiibus existentia Dei et ani7nce hic- 
ramtce ^robatur, quce sunt Metaphysicce fu^i- 
damenta.^ Its comparative brevity adapts 
it more readily to my present purpose than 
the more elaborate " Meditations." In this 
fourth part, Descartes describes and ex- 

1 Ac denique advertebam circa ea quorum Veritas 
non valde facile investigatur, nulli rei esse minus cre- 
dendum quam multitudini suffragiorum ; longe enim 
verisimilius est unum aliquem ilia invenire potuisse, 
quam multos. — Diss, de Methodo^ p. lo. 

2 Ihid.^ p. 2o. 



The Cartesian Argument 45 

plains^ in the most na'ive and charming way 

imaginable, the intellectual considerations 

and processes which led him to the four 

first principles of his philosophy : ( i ) the cer- me Four 

tainty of his personal existence as a think- ^^^^^^^^^^ 

, ofCarte- 

ing subject; (2) the nature of the mind, sianism 
whose whole essence consists only in think- 
ing/ and which is altogether distinct from 
the body; (3) what is essential to the truth 
and certainty of a proposition as revealed 
in the grounds on which he held one, at 
least — the cogito ergo sum—\.o be true ; and 
(4) how he derived from the consciousness 
of his own imperfection and dependence the 
conclusion that there must exist a Perfect 
Being upon whom he was dependent and 

iThat Descartes employed "thinking" in the most 
comprehensive sense as equivalent to consciousness, in- 
cluding intellect, feeling, and will, is evident from a re- 
mark at the beginning of the Third Meditation: "Ego 
sum res cogitans, id est dubitans, affirmans, negans, 
pauca intelligens, multa ignorans, volens, nolens, im- 
aginans etiam etsentiens." — Meditationes de Prima Phil- 
osophia^ P- ^S- 



46 Theis7n 



from whom he received all that he pos- 
sessed. 
The Great- Of these four fundamentals of Descartes's 
^ metaphysics, three may be described as real^ 

one as formal. Three — the first, the sec- 
ond, and the fourth — lead us to real exist- 
ences and their nature. One, the third, 
is an initial attempt to define a criterion of 
truth — the criterion of clearness and dis- 
tinctness in the conception — which has since 
been enlarged and improved, notably by 
Leibnitz. The greatness of Descartes ap- 
pears, in part, in this, that his three real 
conclusions, concerning the existence and 
nature of two spiritual realities^ God and 
the human soul, more especially the latter, 
have sunk so deep and spread so wide in 
the popular intelligence of modern times 
that to the ^' common people " they appear 
self-evident.^ Men of our day spontaneous- 

^So Schwegler in his ''History of Philosophy": 
*' Descartes first proposed the principle of self-con- 
sciousness, of the pure, self-subsistent ego, or the con- 



The Cartesian Argument 47 

ly allow the reality of the human soul as a 
spiritual existence wholly distinct from the 
body, to which they also annex the proper- 
ty of immortality, another thought whose va- 
lidity Descartes asserted. With equal gen- 
erality and spontaneity modern unsophis- 
ticated men concede or assume the exist- 
ence of God. Philosophically these truths, 
in most intimate connection and dependence 
— for in the certainty of my knowledge of 
a dependent and imperfect self, which nev- 
ertheless possesses the conception of the 
Perfect Being, the certainty of my knowl- 
edge of God has its roots— were first sys- 
tematically expounded (^demonstrahantur ^ 
he would say) by Rene Descartes, and to 
him and his successors, who wrought on his 
platform, are largely due their universal com- 
prehension and acceptance in the modern 



ception of mind, thinking substance, as individual self, 
as a singular ego — a new principle, a conception un- 
known to antiquity." See Stirling's translation, p. 163. 
Compare Seelje's translation, p. 207. 



48 Theism 



world. Especially is this true, as I have 
said, of the Cartesian teaching concerning 
the philosophically valid independent and 
spiritual existence of the human soul and 
its essential nature as a conscious or think- 
ing being. Every minister of religion who 
ascends a pulpit may assume that the "com- 
mon people" before him, the men and 
women of unsophisticated intelligence, even 
though professedly irreligious, are immova- 
ble believers in God and their ov/n souls. 
These, I say, are truths he may assume; 
truths he is not required to -prove. When 
he enters upon processes of philosophical 
proof, he commonly weakens his position; 
for the popular conviction is at once pro- 
founder and clearer than the reasons that 
most men can allege on behalf of it. How 
largely this situation — particularly as to the 
reality and nature of the thinking mind and 
its distinctness from, and independence of, 
the body— is a debt which the world owes to 
Descartes, it would be difficult to compute. 



The Cartesian Argument 49 

Well does he deserve his universally con- 
ceded title and position as the founder of 
modern philosophy. If general and perma- 
nent acceptance is a guarantee of the co- 
gency of proof — acceptance of the con- 
clusion almost as self-evident, after the 
processes by which it was reached and the 
grounds upon which it stands are forgotten 
by all but special inquirers— then might Des- 
cartes, if he were alive to-day, be entitled 
to say of his y^oA\AOXi^^rohatur — it is proved. 
So intimately interwoven are these first prin- 
ciples of Cartesianism that I shall give a rap- 
id outline of them — based, however, upon a 
first-hand study ^ — that the reader may re- 
ceive a more vivid impression than historians 
of philosophy are wont to convey of the vital 

iThis chapter was written in 1887; but, while pass- 
ing the volume through the press, I have been led to a 
fresh study of the works of Descartes, resulting in the 
accumulation of materials which could not be com- 
pletely embodied in the text without recasting the entire 
treatment. These results I shall hope to present in 
an independent study of Cartesianism. 

4 



50 Theism 



Doul}t 



position of theism in the philosophy of Des- 
cartes. 
Umversai j^ Q^j. philosopher became convinced 
that he ought to reject as absolutely false 
all opinions which he could discover the 
least reason to doubt ;^ that he might as- 
certain v^hether anything remained after 
this process that v/as altogether, indu- 
bitable.^ (i) Since our senses sometimes 
deceive us, he was willing to allow that 
nothing existed in reality corresponding to 
their presentations.^ This position is fur- 
ther supported by the consideration that our 
apparent presentations in dreams are often 
as vivid as when we are awake ; yet is there 

1 Ilia omnia in quibus vel minimam dubitandi ra- 
tionem possem reperire, tanquam aperte falsa esse re- 
jicienda. — Diss, de MetJiodo, p. 20. 

2 Ut experirer an illis ita rejectis, nihil prseterea su- 
peresset de quo dubitare plane non possem. — Ibid,^ p. 20. 

3 Sic quia nonnunquam sensus nostri nos fallunt, 
quidquid unquam ab illis hauseram inter falsa nume- 
ravi. — Ihid,y p. 20. 



The Cartesian Argiiinent 51 

no corresponding reality. And (2) because 
some men err in reasoning, and fall into 
paralogisms (ac ^aralogismos adTnittere) 
even in easy geometrical demonstrations, 
Descartes, modestly allowing that he was 
as exposed to rational error as others, de- 
cided to reject as false all the reasonings 
he had hitherto accepted as demonstrations/ 
Thus the senses and the reason were alike 
put to shame — ruled out of court as incom- 
petent witnesses to truth. ' ' But, ' ' continues 

^ ^ ^ / Tlie First 

Descartes, ''immediately on this I observed principicof 
that I, while thus rejecting all other things ^^i«>sop^y 
as false, found it absolutely impossible to 
doubt that I myself meantime existed ; and 
as I was pondering that the truth of this 
proposition, / thinks therefore I am or exists 
was so certain and of such evidence that 
no ground of doubt, however extravagant, 
could be framed by the skeptics on which 

1 Illas etiam rationes omnes, quas antea pro demon- 
strationibus habueram, tanquam falsas rejeci. — Diss^ 
de MethodOy p. 20. 



5 2 Theism 



that truth might be impugned, I believed 
that I might safely accept it as the first 
principle of philosophy for which I was 
searching. 



?? 1 



Egfocogfito Thus, though both the evidences of the 
ergfo sum 

senses and the principles of the reason might 

be skeptically rejected — the first as variable, 
and therefore sometimes, at least, decep- 
tive, and the second as leading men, even 
with full conviction of truth, astray — there 
remained a single truth, ''Ego cogito ergo 
sum.'' thoroughly, certainly, and immediate- 
ly known, which it was utterly impossible to 
doubt, since it was dependent neither on the 
variable senses nor on the fallible reason. 

1 Sed statim postea animadverti, me, quia caetera 
omnia ut falsa sic rejiciebam, dubitare plane non posse 
quin ego ipse interim essem: Et quia videbam verita- 
tem hujus pronunciati, Ego cogito, ergo sum sive ex- 
isto, adeo certam esse atque evidentem, ut nulla tarn 
enormis dubitandi causa a Scepticis fingi possit, a qua 
ilia non eximatur, credidi me tuto illam posse, ut pri- 
mum ejus, quam quserebam, Philosophise fundamen- 
tum admittere. — Diss, de Metkodo, pp. 20, 21. 



The Cartesian Argument 53 

Thus Descartes did not, like the skeptics, 
doubt for the sake of doubt, but methodically 
and purposively for the sake of knowledge. 
Anselm, as the representative of scholastic 
faith, might with propriety and force de- 
clare. Credo ut zntelltgam ; and Abelard, as 
the apostle of a haughty and self-sufficient 
rationalism, might proclaim, Intelligo ut ere- 
dam; but Descartes, as the representative of 
modest but free philosophical inquiry, could 
add with equal right and pertinency, Dubito 
ut intelligaTu. The truth thus reached be- 
came the first principle of Cartesianism and 
the beginning of modern philosophy. 

2. Next Descartes began attentively to The Mind 

examine what he was. and observed that he 

from the 

was able to conceive that he might be desti- Body 
tute of a body, and likewise that no extend- 
ed and external world existed, nor even a 
place in which he should be. At the same 
time, he could not on these grounds be 
brought to the conclusion that he did not 
exists but contrariwise, from the very fact 



54 Theism 



itself that he could regard all other things 
as nonexistent without affecting his own 
being, it manifestly followed that as long as 
he could only think—-/. ^., be conscious — 
he continued to be. And, on the other 
hand, if only for a moment of time he should 
cease to think, although in the meantime 
both his own body and the extended world, 
and all other things which he had ever 
imagined, should be really existent, there 
would be no reason why he should believe 
that he existed during that moment of time. 
" Thereupon I concluded," says Descartes, 
"that I was a certain existence or substance, 
whose whole nature or essence consists only 
in this, that I should think, and which, that 
it may exist, has need of no place, nor is 
dependent upon any material or corporeal 
thing. So that I, that is the mind, through 
which alone I am what I am," he concludes, 
''is an existence wholly distinct from the 
body, and even more easily known than the 
body, which would still continue to be the 



The Cartesian Argument 55 

same that it now is, although the body 
should no longer exist.'' ^ 

In a word, the nonexistence of the body 
and of the world — ^whose existence Des- 
cartes found himself capable of doubting — ^ 
did not involve the nonexistence of the 
mind^ whose reality consisted in the process- 
es of thought— a'^i^^//^;^5j ajtrmans^ negans^ 
intelligens^ ignorans^ volens^ nolens^ tmagt^ 
nans^ sentzens—oi which he was immediate- 
ly conscious;^ while the cessation of con- 

ilnde intellexi me esse rem quandam sive substan- 
tiam, cujus tota natura sive essentia in eo tantum con- 
sistit ut cogitem, qussque ut existat, nee loco ullo in- 
diget, nee ab ulla re materiali sive corporea dependet. 
Adeo ut Ego, hoc est, mens per quam solam sum is 
qui sum, sit res a corpore plane distincta, atque etiam 
cognitu facilior quam corpus, et quse plane eadem, 
quce nunc est, esse posset, quamvis illud non existeret. — 
Diss, de Mcthodo^ p. 21. 

2 That "to think " and '*to be conscious^* are exactly 
equivalent with Descartes appears further in a passage 
from the " Principles of Philosophy," Part I., paragraph 
ix. : " Cogitationis nomine intelligo ilia omnia, qu^ 
nobis conciis in nobis liunt, quatenus eorum in nobis 



56 Theis7n 



scious thinking, even for a solitary instant, 
during which the body and the world and 
all other material things might be conceived 
as existing objectively and really, would 
leave him no reason to believe that the mind 
itself existed. Whence follows the conclu- 
sion as to, the nature of the mind which I 
have translated in the text, inserting the 
Latin in the footnote. 
TheCrite- 3. After this Descartes inquired in gen- 
^ ^ eral what is necessary that the truth and 

certainty of a proposition may be known: 
for, since he had now discovered one which 
he knew to be true, he thought he must 
thence be able to perceive, also, in what this 
certitude consisted. And as he remarked 
that nothing whatever is contained in the 
words '''Ego cogito ergo szwt^^ which could 
render him certain of their truth, except 
that he saw most manifestly that it was 

conscientia est: atque ita non modo intelligere, velle, 
imaginari, sed etiam sentire, idem est hie quod cogi- 
tare." (Ed. Amsterdam: 1685, p. 2.) 



The Cartesian Argument 57 

impossible that one should think who did 
not also exist, he believed that he might 
assume as a general rule (^ro regula gen-- 
erali) that everything which he very clear- 
ly and distinctly (dihieide et distincte) con- 
ceived was true. Thus, whatever the rea- 
son recognizes as true with the same irre- 
sistible conviction as the "cogtto ergo sum^^ 
may be safely accepted. 

4. Descartes now observed that since he ThsDMne 
doubted many things, he must thence infer ^^^^®^^® 
that his own nature was not at all perfect; 
for he very clearly recognized the truth that 
doubt is no such ground or mark of perfec- 
tion as knowledge. And when he was led 
to inquire further, whence he had it that he 
should think of a nature more perfect than 
his own, he clearly saw that he could not 
have this idea except from a being whose 
nature was in reality more perfect.^ In re- 

1 Clarissime etiam intellexi me hoc habere non posse, 
nisi ab eo cujus Natura esset revera perfectior. — Diss, 
de Methodo^ p. 2i. 



,8 Theism 



gard to sky, earth, light, heat, and a thou- 
sand other external objects, if these did in 
reality exist, he could discover in them 
nothing superior to his own nature; of 
which he could accordingly regard them as 
possible dependencies so far as it possessed a 
certain perfection. Or, if his impressions of 
external objects were illusory, then they pro- 
ceeded from nothing. ''But not thus could 
I judge," he continues, ''concerning the 
thought or Idea of a Nature more perfect 
than my own. For that I should receive 
this idea from nothing was evidently impos- 
sible. And because it is not more reasona- 
ble that the more perfect should proceed 
from the less perfect than that something 
should come from nothing, I could not 
conclude that I derived this idea from 
myself: accordingly it only remained that 
this idea had been placed in me by a 
being whose nature was more perfect; 
which also, indeed, contained in itself 
all perfections of which I could frame any 



lite Cartesian Argicment 59 

conception; that isj in a word, which was 
God."^ 

And to this argument for the reality of 
God as the only sufficient source of the idea 
of a greater perfection than his own which 
he found that he possessed, Descartes add- 
ed that, since he thus knew some perfections 
which he did not possess, he could not be 
the only being in existence, even though the 
^'cogzto ergo sum^^ did not of itself carry him 
further than a naked solipsism. On the con- 
trary, there necessarily existed another Be- 
ing more perfect than himself , upon whom he 
was dependent, and from whom he had re- 

1 Sed non idem judicare poteram de cogitatione, 
sive Idea Naturse quae perf ectior erat quam mea. Nam 
fieri plane non poterat ut illam a nihilo accepissem. 
Et quia non magis potest id quod perfectius est, a mi- 
nus perfecto procedere, quam ex nihilo aliquid fieri, 
non poteram etiam a me ipso illam habere; ac proinde 
supererat ut in me posita esset a re, cujus natura esset 
perf ectior; imo etiam quae omnes in se contineret per- 
fectiones, quarum Ideam aliquam in me haberem; hoc 
est, ut verbo absolvam, quse Deus esset.— Z>/^.9. de Melh- 

cdOy p. 22. 



6o 



Theism 



Analysis 

of the 
Argfoment 



Descartes *s 
Use of tlie 
Ontolog^cal 



ceived all that he possessed (a quo ^ende- 
re7n^ et a qico quid quid in me erat accepis- 
se?n). 

It is evident, on analysis, that Descartes 
here reaches the divine existence by a two- 
fold process: (i) the reality of the divine 
existence is the only sufficient explanation 
of man's possession of the notion of God; 
and (2) since man recognizes his own fini- 
tude, dependence, and imperfection, he can- 
not have his existence from himself, or from 
the material world, which he clearly knows 
as inferior to himself, but only from that In- 
finite, Independent, and Perfect Being, the 
conception of w^hom illuminating his own 
heart enables him to see his ovvU finiteness, 
dependence, and lack of perfection. These 
two processes combined may be called the 
anthropological argument — I find the term 
in Kuno Fischer. 

Having apparently completed his argu- 
ment, Descartes unexpectedly returns later 



Lrgument to the subject of the divine existence with 



The Cartesian Argimient 61 

the baldest statement of the ontological ar- 
gument. ''Recurring to the examination 
of the idea of a Perfect Being which I 
possess," he says, "I immediately saw that 
the existence of this Being was contained 
in the idea in exactly the same way in 
v/hich the equality of its three angles to two 
right angles is comprised in the idea of a 
triangle, or as in the idea of a circle the 
equal distance of all points of the circum- 
ference from its center; or even still more 
evidently; and that in consequence it is at 
least as certain that God, who is this Per- 
fect Being, exists, as any geometrical dem- 
onstration can be." ^ 

The correctness of this threefold analy- correct- 
sis of the Cartesian arsrument is expressly ^^^s of the 

^ . Threefold 

confirmed by the philosopher's own classi- Analysis 

fication in another place. When Descartes 

prepared the '^Meditations," "inqiiibus Dei 

lAc proinde ad minimum seque certum esse Deum, 
qui est illud ens perfectum, existere, quam ulla Geo- 
metrica demonstratio esse potest. — Diss, de Methodo 
P- 23- 



62 Theisin 



Existentia et anhncE huinance a corf ore Dts- 
linctio de7nonstrantur^^^ he subjoined sun- 
dry objections of learned men to these dem- 
onstrations of God and the soul, which he pur- 
posely secured that the replies of the author 
might appear simultaneously with them.^ At 
the close of the " Responsio ad Secundas 
Objectiones/' Descartes introduces a short 
treatise under the title " Reasons, proving 
the Existence of God and the distinction of 
the soul from the body, displayed after the 
manner of Geometry."^ After enumerating 
definitions, postulates, and axioms, Des- 
cartes gives under three separately formu- 
lated propositions his three distinct demon- 
strations of the divine existence. The first 
proposition is that the divine existence is 
known from the sole consideration of his 
nature — the ontological argument; the sec- 

^See title-page of the Amsterdam edition. 

2 Rationes, Dei Existentiam et animse a corpore dis- 
tinctionem, probantes, more Geometrico dispositse. — 
MeditationeSy p. 85. 



The Cartesian Argmnent 63 

cond, that the divine existence is demon- 
strated a posteriori from our possession of 
the idea of God; and the third, that God's 
existence is evident from the fact that we 
ourselves exist as finite and dependent be- 
ings, yet in possession of this idea of the 
Perfect/ If we give to each of these argu- 
ments a name, the first is clearly ontological^ 
the second anthropological^ and the third is 
an anthropological variety of the cosmologic- 
al, based upon the existence of man^ whose 
finitude, dependence, and imperfection are 
immediately recognized, instead of on the 
existence of the external world, concerning 
which it is possible to entertain a doubt. 

The question now arises as to a possible Descartes's 

explanation or vindication of Descartes's ^®^ * ^ 
^ Ontological 

employment of the ontological argument — Argument 
of which his anthropological argument in 
its two branches, it should be carefully ob- 
served, is entirely independent. As already 
intimated, both in the '^Principles" (see 

^ Meditationes^ pp. 89, 90. 



64 Theis7n 



above, pp. 42, 43, footnote) and in this geo- 
metrical arrangement of proofs, the ontolog- 
ical argument stands first and in apparent 
self-sufficiency and independence. In that 
case, it must certainly be rejected as inval- 
id. But in the ''Meditations" and in the 
''Discourse," it stands last, as if subor- 
dinated to the preceding anthropological 
argumentation — though, also, as we have 
seen, somewhat isolated. This fact has 
suggested to Kuno Fischer a possible de- 
fense of even this employment of the onto- 
logical argument; and before Fischer, Erd- 
mann had said, "As Descartes here and 
elsewhere always [ ?] places his deduction 
from what is contained in the idea of God 
side by side with that drawn from its nec- 
essary presence in us, it almost seems as if 
he intended the reader to combine the two, 
and say that the existence of God is certain, 
because God himself testifies to himself 
within us and demonstrates his existence."^ 

ij. E. Erdmann, "History of Philosophy," II. 15. 



The Cartesian Argument 65 

And Weber goes— indefensibly, as I think 
—beyond this when he adds the remark, ''In 
reality, the ontological argument [rooted. 
I suppose, he means in the anthro^ologicaP)^ 
is no more of an inference than the cogito 
ergo S2im. It is an axiom, a truth which the 
soul perceives immediately and prior to all 
reflection." ^ Erdmann's remark amounts 
to this, that if the idea of the Perfect One 
is not arbitrarily or independently framed by 
man, but on examination proves to be God- 
given— ''God himself testifying to himself " 
— then from the divinely originated or de- 
livered idea it is legitimate to deduce the 
reality and necessity of the divine existence 
— /. ^., the ontological argument, if rightly 
grounded in the anthropological? is good. 

Let us examine, finally, the Cartesian ar- Fischer's 
gument, in all its branches, with the help of -^^^'^y®'^ 
Fischer, the latest and most elaborate of cartesian 
its professed expositors. Professor Kuno -^^-uaisnt 

1 Alfred Weber, ** History of Philosophy/' p. 311, 
footnote. 



66 Thcis 



7n 



Fischer, of Heidelberg, perhaps the most 
eminent of contemporary German lecturers 
on the history of modern philosophy, has, 
indeed, given us the most exhaustive and 
critical history of Descartes and his school 
that has yet appeared. Says Fischer: ''The 
ontological proof of Descartes is funda- 
mentally different from the scholastic one, 
in spite of its parallelism v^ith it. This 
difference is so important that the usual 
failure to observe it is equivalent to a com- 
plete lack of insight into the system of our 
philosopher."^ The proposition Descartes 
sets outto prove, as we have seen, is that God 
/s the only sufficient source or cause of the idea 
of God — /. ^., the Infinite and the Perfect. 
Such an aim is widely removedf rom Anselm' s 
view that God's existence is demonstrable 
a -priori from the elements of our thought 
of him. According to Descartes, as from 

2 '< Descartes and His School," p. 350, under the cap- 
tion, "The Anthropological Proof as Foundation of the 
Ontological." 



The Cartesian Argument 67 

^'cogzto,'' "S74^m'' directly follows, so from 
"Deus cogttatur^'^ "Deus est^'^ is an imme- 
diate inference. It is true that Anselm's 
position might be represented by the same 
language; but Descartes means something 
totally different: if God is thought by us, 
God has given the thought; if God is the 
only sufficient source of the thought, God 
is. It is an argument from effect back to 
cause: this unique effect, the idea of the 
Infinite and the Perfect, demands a unique 
cause — nothing less than the Infinite and 
Perfect One will suffice for it. The prop- 
osition, "Detis cogitatur^ ergo Deus est^'' 
is regarded by Descartes as equally certain 
with his fundamental truth, "Cogtto ergo 
sum^^'' the yons et origo of our modern phi- 
losophy. Why this certainty? We shall 
let Kuno Fischer ansvv^er: 

''We must, therefore, require as the first 
condition of an ontological proof, that the 
idea of God is not an arbitrary, but a neces- 
sary, thought, inseparably bound and united 



68 Theism 



with our nature. If this necessity cannot 
be grounded in the nature of man, the on- 
tological proof, even in its starting point, 
is without foundation. From this it is evi- 
dent that it requires to be anthropologically 
grounded and vindicated. 

^'But even when that first condition is 
fulfilled, we are yet far from the goal. . . . 
So long as the idea of God is only my con- 
ception, produced by my thought, however 
necessarily, so long is the existence of God 
also only my idea. ... If the idea of God 
in me is to prove the existence of God, it 
must be more than merely my idea: it must 
not merely represent the existence of God, 
but in a certain sense be that existence itself. 
[Here Fischer's thought is closely parallel 
w^ith Erdmann's, if it be not derived and 
elaborated from it.] Suppose that this idea 
which I have were the expression of God's 
own nature, his immediate effect, and pro- 
claimed itself as such to me, then certainly, 
it would be a direct proof of the divine 



The Cartesian Argument 69 

existence. . . . As certain as I am of my- 
self, so certain ought I to be that this idea 
is not my product, but the effect of God in 
me. This is the point which is now to be 
proved, upon which everything in Des- 
cartes's doctrine of God directly depends. 
If it can be proved that the idea of God in 
us (i) is necessary, and (2) cannot be our 
effect, the point in question is made out. It 
must be shown that an imperfect being such 
as we are cannot produce the conception of 
a perfect being. In any case, the knowl- 
edge of our own imperfection and weak- 
ness, therefore the investigation of our own 
nature, our self-examination, must be the 
first step on the way to the knowledge of 
God. But it is not merely the first step, 
but also the light on the way. This light, 
which Descartes's doctrine of God and its 
ontological argument alone imparts, is en- 
tirely wanting to the scholastic proof. In 
the latter the important matter is that we 
conceive a perfect being: in Descartes's 



7o Theism 



argument the important matter is that we 
conceive a perfection which we ourselves 
do not have^ and because we do not have it, 
. . . In the ' ^^^//6^ ^rg^6? 5^//^,' the mind was 
absorbed in itself, in a monologue as it were : 
it had turned from the consideration of out- 
ward things, and at first won no other cer- 
tainty than that of its own existence. In 
the review of its ideas, one is discovered 
which excels all others ; and the first glance, 
as it were, betrays its divine origin. While 
all other conceptions are ever repeating to 
the lonely thinker, * Thou art, thou art, I 
am only a mirror of your nature, an effect 
of your power,' this alone proclaims to 
him, 'I am^ I reflect in thee another and 
far better nature than thine: I have not, 
therefore, sprung from thee, but from my 
archetype.' . . . This connection between 
^cogito' and 'Deus cogitatur,^ between the 
certainty of self and the certainty of God, is 
the point to be proved and illustrated, with- 
out which the doctrine of Descartes remains 



The Cartesian Argument 71 

misunderstood. ... In order to discover the 
methodical progress from the certainty of 
self to the certainty of God, we must take 
the expression of the first, the 'cogito^ or 
the 'sum eogttans,^ exactly in the sense in 
which the philosopher conceives it and es- 
tablishes it. His desire for truth requires 
self-examination, which results in the per- 
ception that we deceive ourselves in many 
instances, and, therefore, possibly in all; 
that we have no reason to regard any of our 
opinions as true; rather that we are in a 
state of universal uncertainty and complete- 
ly destitute of the truth. . . . The Carte- 
sian doubt is nothing else than the certainty 
of this defect^ of this our universal intellec- 
tual imperfection. In one and the same act 
doubt reveals to us our thinking nature and 
our defective intelligence. . . .Not for noth- 
ing follows the ^ cogito ergo sum, ' immediate- 
ly from the 'de omnibus dubito.'' I am my- 
self ^ that being whose existence is immedi- 
ately evident to me. / a7n myself^ the being 



72 Theis7ii 



PoiEt 



of whose possession of truth I doubt abso- 
lutely, as to whose intellectual excellence I 
am completely puzzled." 
The Vital Now comes the vital point of the Carte- 
sian argument; we both conceive a perfec- 
tion which we do not possess, and we dis- 
tinctly recognize ourselves as destitute of it. 
Fischer continues: 

''How does the idea of the imperfect arise? 
How do we attain to the knowledge of our 
own imperfection? It is one thing to he im- 
-perfect^ another to know that we are. In 
the one case, imperfection is a state in which 
I am involved; in the other, it is an object 
which I make clear to myself. This per,- 
ception, at least, is not imperfect, but is as 
perfect as it is true. That I am involved 
in self-delusion is an undoubted proof of 
m.y defects. That I break through its har- 
riers and -perceive my self-delusion is an 
undoubted proof of a perception present in 
ine^ without which I should continue in the 
darkness of delusion^ and the idea of ray 



The Cartesian Argunie?it 73 

imperfection xvould never occur to me, . . . 
There are no defects for idiots; either they 
find everything good, or they condemn with- 
out discrimination. Only the critic sees 
imperfections; they can be apprehended 
only in the light of the perfect, the light 
which illuminates that 'via eminentia^ on 
which man supposes he first finds the idea 
of the perfect. It is no wonder that he finds 
it since he had it already, and had to have 
it, when he perceived his own imperfection. 
. . . The relation is now reversed, and 
what seemed to be the inference is in truth 
the ground. From the idea of the perfect 
springs that of the imperfect; that is more 
original than this, therefore more original 
than the knowledge of our own imperfec- 
tions, of our own thinking being. In our 
certainty of God our certainty of self has its 
roots. The idea of God is not merely one 
among others, but is the only one of its kind, 
because it is the source of all light. It is not 
merely as clear and evident as the conception 



74 Theism 



of our own being, but far clearer, because it 
first illuminates this conception. ' It is of all 
our ideas,' says Descartes, ' the clearest and 
most distinct, and therefore the truest.' " ^ 

This is the distinctive Cartesian argument 
for the existence of God, in its anthropolog- 
ical and (subordinated) ontological elements, 
as clearly, acutely, and fully analyzed by 
Kuno Fischer. Every mind must appreciate 
its insight, its power, its cogency. The main 
argument is not ontological; it is now^here 
based upon the abstract consideration of 
thought as thought — it is not an attempt after 
the manner of Anselm to pass by a -priori 
analysis from thought to reality — but it rests 
upon the nature of a given thought as an 
effect; and even in its subordinate, ontolog- 
ical branch, if Erdmann and Fischer are 
correct in their interpretation, the deduc- 
tion of necessity of existence is from a 
God-given and God-fixed idea, which man 
did not originate, and which he cannot 

1 Fischer, "Descartes and His School," pp. 351-358. 



Tlie Cartesian Argument 75 

abolish or modify. It is therefore, in its 

main branch, an a -posteriori argument, TheArgu- 

from effect to cause, and one of the weisrht- , . . 

' ^ posteriori 

iest of its class. For this reason it would 
be well if the epithet '' ontological" could 
be dissociated from Descartes's leading 
theistic discussions, as everybody at once 
begins to suspect a snare when it is men- 
tioned. The title at the head of this chapter 
indicates the true character of the principal 
Cartesian argument: it is based on '* man- 
kind's possession of the idea of God." It 
may as a whole be designated the anthro- 
pological argument; if it be separated into 
two branches, the first is purely anthropo- 
logical, while the second is an anthropolog- 
ical use and application of what is general- 
ly styled cosmological reasoning, based on 
man's immediate consciousness of his fini- 
tude and dependence. (See above, pp. 
60, 63.) If the ontological argument is 
admitted to legitimate standing, as a third 
branch of Cartesian theistic reasoning, it 



76 



Theism 



What has 
Descartes 
Proved? 



can only be as subordinated to, and grounded 
in, the concrete anthropological argument. 

Descartes has proved beyond enlightened 
cavil, I think, that the idea of God, the Infi- 
nite and the Perfect, has come to man ab 
extra — from the Perfect One himself. The 
only question remaining is as to the manner 
of the insertion of this unique notion within 
the circle of mankind's experience. Shall 
we designate it an inward light of reason^ or 
an immediate and original revelation^ by 
which God has made himself known to his 
creature? Noire puts the emphasis on the 
right point when he says that our notion of 
the Infinite '' cannot possibly be derived 
from any finite being, not even by the action 
of sense and reason," and that this '^ con- 
ception must lie without and beyond the lim- 
its of rational knowledge." (See above, p. 
39. ) This language not inaptly describes the 
position of Descartes himself. By common 
consent, man cannot gather the idea of an in- 
finitely perfect being from his knowledge of 



The Cartesian Argument 77 

his own nature or that of the finite and depend- 
ent existences which come within the range 
of his experience. But he undoubtedly pos- 
sesses the notion of this perfect being, self- 
sufiicient in the mode of his existence, and 
infinite in all his attributes of wisdom, pow- 
er, and goodness. Since, then, experience 
and reason do not afford us the materials 
for constructing this notion, the conclusion 
is inevitable that the notion has been com- 
municated to the race ab extra^ and the 
only possible author of the communication 
is the Perfect One himself. If we distin- 
guish betvv^een the revelation and the rec- Revelation 
ord of it, between man as the recipient of 
it, and the writings of man which are the 
depository of it, then may Descartes enjoy 
the distinction of having penetrated, on the 
human side, the secret of the fact and phi- 
losophy of God's primary and ordinary rev- 
elation of himself to man. Revelation is 
thus shown to be a rational necessity, to ac- 
count for the intellectual riches of mankind 



78 Theism 



and the prevalence of the knowledge of God 
among all peoples from the earliest times. 
Man may not kindle a bonfire on the earth 
which shall illuminate the heavens ; but God 
may set his great lights in the skies which 
shall flood the earth with glory. These 
floods of glory can issue from but One 
Source. The origin of theism is thus by 
revelation, and its continuance in part his- 
torical and traditional. 

We need to recognize that revelation has 
a human and philosophical side; its com- 
munications conforming to the mental con- 
stitution, the needs, and the capacities of 
Lotze the recipient. " If reason is not of itself 

capable of finding the highest truth," re- 
marks Lotze, with a penetration remarka- 
ble even in his pages, '^ but on the contrary 
stands in need of a revelation which is ei- 
ther contained in some divine act of his- 
toric occurrence, or is continually repeated 
in men^s hearts^ still reason must be able to 
understand the revealed truth at least so far 



The Cartesian Argument 79 

as to recognize in it the satisfying and con- 
vincing conclusion of those upward-soaring 
trains of thought which reason itself began, 
led by its own needs, but was not able to 
bring to an end."^ As to the manner and 
process of this revelation — the philosophy 
of it — we may here content ourselves with 
a mere hint dropped by the same profound 
philosopher: ''We can hardly picture to 
ourselves the workings of God upon the 
heart otherwise than after this pattern: we 
cannot imagine the recognition of any fact 
as something that can be simply communi- 
cated, something that reaches the mind 
ready made and without any activity on its 
part, we can only imagine that occasion can 
be given to the mind to, as it were, produce 
such recognition by exercising this activity, 
and in this it is that every appropriation of 
a truth must consist. As sense in itself 
furnishes merely an impression, so also this 

i"Mikrokosmus,'* English translation, II. 660. I 
have italicized a few words. 



8o Theism 



divine influence would produce merely a 
feeling, a mood, a m.ode of affection; what 
is thus experienced becom.es a revelation 
onlv throuo;h some work of reflection which 
analyzes its content and reduces it to co- 
herence by clear notions that are capable 
of being combined with our ideas of the 
real world/' ^ This task will be undertak- 
en in later chapters concerning the only 
Sufficient Cause and the Divine Designer.^ 

i^Mikrokosmus," II. 662. 

2 The paraphrases and translations of Descartes in 
this chapter I have made directly from the Latin of 
the edition of 1685; perhaps, sometimes, with some- 
thing less than elegance, as I have had little occasion 
for such work since mj college days. This remark 
does not apply to the quotation on pp. 34, 35: I cannot 
recall whether I translated it myself while teaching, 
or, if it was borrowed, from what source it was taken. 



CHAPTER V 

THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT: THE CON- 
SENSUS GENTIUM 

The historical argument may be briefly 

and appropriately presented in immediate 

connection with the foregoing chapter. If 

the consensus gentiw^n^ the universal consent The 

of the nations of the earth, may be claimed ^ 

•^ Gentium 

for any truth, it is for that of the being of 
God; if the same authority is a sufficient 
basis for any human institutions whatever, 
the institutions of worship and religion re- 
pose securely upon this foundation. As a 
matter of fact, notorious in the annals of 
mankind, the knowledge of God has been 
universal as to both space and time — i. ^., 
among all peoples in every part of the world, 
and through all times from the beginning of 
history until the present, man has been a 
worshiper of deity. So vast is the volume of 
testimony to this point that, if here and there 
an ancient or modern traveler among the 
6 (8.) 



82 Theism 



debased races of Central Africa or South- 
ern America thinks he has Ughted upon 
tribes destitute of the notion of God and of 
even the rudimentary institutions of religion, 
we must for the present hold that his igno- 
rance of their language and customs, coupled 
with the temerity with which temporary so- 
journers often pronounce summary judg- 
ments upon the habits, language, and social 
institutions of the peoples who entertain 
them, has misled him. Before accepting 
his conclusions, we must wait for more light. 
At the worst, perhaps such proofs would 
only establish greater possibilities of deteri- 
oration in humanity and closer approxima- 
tions to animalitv and brutehood than had 
before been recognized. Closer acquaint- 
ance with such peoples, and the reconstruc- 
tion of their history from such data as might 
be extant among them, might revealfromhow 
great a height they had fallen. But, in such 
a surv^ey as is here attempted, it is obvious 
this question cannot be discussed in detail. 



The Histo7'ical Argument 83 

Man, we may safely assume, is a religious Man a 

animal. This is one of his distins^uishins: ^^J^s^^^^s 

^ Anisial 

peculiarities. No one would be so foolish 
as to preach to a congregation of the most 
intelligent brutes of God, Love, and Duty. 
The effort, however earnest, perspicuous, 
and protracted, must result in failure. No 
response to these fundamental ideas of 
morality and religion could ever be awak- 
ened in the bosom of the lower animals. 
But missionaries do not hesitate to proclaim 
the whole circle of gospel truths, exalted 
and profound as they are, to the most igno- 
rant and debased human tribes. They are 
always understood; and the gospel proves 
the power of God unto salvation to every 
one that believes. If the knowledge of 
God is not original and connate, but com- 
municated, the capacity for God is. In 
this sense the grossest forms of fetichism, 
the absurdities of idolatry, and the intrica- 
cies and immoralities of polytheism, stand 
as witnesses for the being of God. Man, 



84 



Theism 



Argument 

from 

Instinct 



as such, has a Godward tendency, a God- 
appetency — if this form of speech may be 
allowed — that must be satisfied by some re- 
ligious cultus, with its object or objects of 
veneration and worship. 

Closely allied to this historical argument 
from the universality of religious worship is 
the argument from instinct. The doctrine, 
sought to be established in this treatise, of 
God's historical and ordinary revelation of 
himself to man, is not inconsistent with man's 
instinct of worship. Implanted instinct fur- 
nished originally, and still furnishes, the sub- 
jective tendency to, rather the necessity for, 
worship; while revelation, according to the 
varying capacities of the recipients , is, though 
often corrupted, the only adequate source of 
man's knowledge of the object of worship. 
Among enlightened peoples this instinctive 
tendency is supplemented by rational consid- 
erations, and among Christian nations by the 
authority of recorded revelation ; but there 
seems to be no valid ground for discredit- 



The Historical Argument 85 

ing an original instinct at the basis of man's 
religious nature. The facts seem to demand 
it. If a definition of insdnct be asked for, 
it may be given in these terms : Instinct is 
the source of a habit or practice universally 
characteristic of a species, (i) which has not 
been acquired by direct and external com- 
munication from other members of the spe- 
cies; (2) which answers a real need in the 
life of the individual or of the species ; and 
(3) which is non-rational in its primal and 
impulsive exercise, though capable of ra- 
tional vindication. 

In the lower animals instinct is at a maxi- instincti 

, • • • Animal 

mum, reason at a minimum; m man reason 

is at a maximum and instinct at a minimum. 
Though it may be ultimately established that 
reason sinks to nil in the lower animals, it 
is certain that instinct is present in man. 
The human infant has more things to learn 
by experience, which his rational nature en- 
ables him to interpret and to profit by, than 
the young of any other animal ; yet his ex- 



and Human 



86 Theism 



istence depends upon his prompt surrender 
of himself to the control of certain instincts. 
These human instincts are blind, not ration- 
al. They are a striving after the necessary, 
when the necessity of the supply is not made 
evident either by reason or experience, just 
as is the case with the lower animals. In- 
stincts differ radically, therefore, from in- 
nate and intuitive truths, which are ration- 
ally self-evidencing. In claiming, therefore, 
as an original endowment of human nature 
the instinct of divine worship, it is not as- 
serted that the knowledge of God is connate 
or intuitive. This treatise opened with ar- 
guments to the contrary, satisfactory at least 
to me. It is certain that man has not al- 
ways been able to give to himself a rational 
account of his religious tendencies or to 
justify fully his worship of the divine. In 
the heart of the Christian civilization of the 
nineteenth century men and women, who 
undoubtedly believe themselves possessed 
of rather uncommon mental powers, are 



The Historical Argument 87 

rising up and declaring themselves adher- 
ents of the '* gospel of dirt." Yet others 
look upon religion as a species of insanity, 
and would substitute for it that pretentious 
form of infidelity styled, by an abusive use 
of the term, " humanitarianism'' ; neverthe- 
less, mankind at large continue to worship. 

In the case of the lower animals, or even instinct 
of plants, there has never been found an in- ^^ 
stance in which an implanted instinct or a 
real necessity of animal or plant nature did 
not find an adequate supply in the external 
*' environment," as the naturalists call it, in 
the actual constitution of things, as I prefer 
to say* Shall we say that man alone is de- 
ceived when he yields himself to the guid- 
ance of his highest and best instincts ? Shall 
we say that the chick, impelled by blind 
instinct to pip the shell, has had provided 
for him that fruitful and beautiful external 
world in which he may grow and thrive 
and be happ}^; and that for man has been 
provided no answering reality when he in- 



88 Theis7n 



the Two 
CMcks 



stinctively demands an object of supreme 
worship? ^'Are not ye of much more value 
than they?" 

Will the wise people of this generation 
tolerate a fable if it illustrates important 
truth ? 
Fable of Two chicks were snugly housed in eggs 

that lay side by side beneath the warm 
feathers of the sheltering mother. The day 
for pipping had come. During three long 
weeks the embryonic life had been slowly 
but steadily unfolding itself in those dark- 
ened little chambers. Through the thin 
shell walls the chicks held a brief colloquy 
preparatory to the most important and crit- 
ical exploit of their careers. One was an 
agnostic chick; the other a religious phi- 
losopher. Said the agnostic: ''I feel an 
irresistible impulse to-day to pip my shell; 
I have inward assurances that light and air 
and food and liberty and fullness of life 
lie beyond these walls that inclose me ; but 
experience teaches me nothing concerning 



The Historical A^^gument 89 

such things as light and air and food and 
liberty and fullness of life; moreover, they 
are incapable of rational demonstration; 
I cannot rationally renounce the guidance 
of experience and reason; so, on the whole, 
since I know nothing, I have concluded 
to do nothing; I shall not pip my shell 
to-day." Said the religious philosopher: 
''I, too, know nothing of the hereafter and 
the beyond; it seems all very strange that 
I should pip and break the shell that 
has been my only home; I do not under- 
stand this blind impulse that drives me 
to do a deed seemingly so irrational and 
suicidal; I cannot anticipate what is to 
come of it all, nor do I see how feet and 
wings and bill and eyes and ears are to 
come into play ; but the inward prompting 
is resistless; I shall pip my shell to-day — 
here goes!" 

A beautiful little chick fluttered out into 
light and life. The mother hen left her 
nest with her brood. When the house- 



90 Theism 



wife came to look after her fowls she found 
in the deserted nest a single egg. Curi- 
ous, she cracked it with her thimble, and 
there lay before her the stiff, dead body of 
an unhatched bird. It was our agnostic 
chick. 



CHAPTER VI 

THE ARGUMENT FOR. A FIRST CAUSED ITS 
ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED 

The cosmological argument for the being 
of God, or the argument based on the ex- 
istence of the world as we know it/ may be 

1 It is evident that the Cartesian (anthropological) 
form of the cosmological argument, being based upon 
man's immediate consciousness of his finitude and de- 
pendence, his knowledge that he is not self-existent and 
that he began to be at a definite time, has a decided ad- 
vantage over the common form of the argument, which 
must begin with proving that these propositions are true 
of the material world. To be sure Descartes's naive 
assumption that his nature is superior to all material 
objects (see above, pp. 58, 60), and consequently could 
not be derived from such inferior sources — though this 
view is amply confirmed by the profoundest philosoph- 
ical considerations of our times— might be summarily 
set aside by modern materialists, who build up body, 
nerves, and brain, with all their assigned functions of 
life, sensation, will, and reason, from the elements of 
external and extended matter. The Cartesian form of 
the argument, proceeding upon man's immediate con- 
sciousness of his personal and spiritual existence, with 

(90 



02 Theism 



The Syl- 
logism 



formulated in a syllogism. Though it may 
seem a little stiff, or even pedantic, I venture, 
for the sake of clearness and precision, to 
reduce it to that form, as follow^s: 

Major Premise ' Everything beginning to 

its limitations and dependence, allies itself naturally 
and closely with an idealistic philosophy, if it does not 
actually demand it. Though I have been long con- 
vinced that to allow the substantial and independent ex- 
istence of an extended and external world, apart from 
conscious and percipient minds, leads directly to mate- 
rialism and atheism, if this view is consistently carried 
through to its conclusions ; I am far from finding any 
difficulty in recognizing a true and universal objective re- 
ality, independent of the percipient in its origin and laws. 
Thus the ordinary cosmological argument is not invali- 
dated but strengthened. Indeed, at a later stage in this 
treatise, I shall endeavor to shov/ that this idealistic real- 
ism is one of the directest paths that lead to God, placing 
God, man, and the world in accessible and intelligible 
relations. In the text of this chapter, however, the 
more usual form of the cosmological argument is ad- 
hered to, in the common terms of its stateinent by 
natural realists, since I do not care, at this stage, to 
complicate the discussion by introducing distinctions 
which do not really affect the issue. 



The Argument for a First Cause 93 

exist, and every change in a previously ex- 
isting thing — /. ^., every event, whether an 
absolute commencement or a subsequent 
modification — must have a sufficient ground 
or antecedent cause. 

Minor Premise: The universe as a whole 
did have a beginning in time, and as now con- 
stituted consists of a system of changes. 

Conclusion: Therefore the universe must 
have a sufficient ground or antecedent cause. 

This is an ordinary syllogism of the first 
mood of the first figure, and if the premises 
be established the conclusion must be grant- 
ed. To the establishment of the premises 
I now proceed. 

The major premise rests upon, or rather The Major 
is an expanded statement of, a first principle 
of reason, namely, the principle that every 
event must have a cause. The premise, 
therefore, possesses the strictest necessity 
and consequent universality. For it no 
proofs are necessarj^ since it is self-evi- 
dent; for it no proofs are possible, since it 



94 Theism 



cannot be resolved into simpler or more sat- 
isfactory elements. I therefore pass at once 
to the establishment of the minor premise. 
TiieTviinor In the minor premise it is incumbent first 
Premise q£ ^ ^^ establish that the universe did have 
a beginning in time. If the universe did not 
have an absolute commencement, and is 
consequently self-existent^ and not depend- 
ent upon any antecedent cause or extra- 
mundane being for its existence, one of 

1 The true antithesis is, of course, between self-ex- 
istence and dependent existence, in which chronology 
and temporal sequence plaj no essential part. Crea- 
tion, in its true idea, excludes (i) the self-existence of 
matter or the universe (materialism) ; and also (2) the 
notion that the world is a "necessary, involuntary, and 
inevitable development of the nature of God " (panthe- 
ism). The true theistic conception involves (i) the 
absolute and unceasing dependence of the world upon 
the deity; and (2) that this dependence is upon a Per- 
sonal Will, in contradistinction to all notions of inev- 
itable development or involuntary emanation. Com- 
pare Lotze on **The Conception of Creation," in his 
"Philosophy of Religion," Chap, v., pp. 70-80 (trans- 
lated by Geo. T. Ladd). 



The Argument for a First Cause 95 



three propositions must be true. Either (i) 

the universe as at present constituted must The Logic 

be conceded to be eternal; or (2) the eter- 

^ ^ nation 

nity of matter must be acknowledged; or (3) 
the reality of an infinite regression of finite 
causes must be accepted. The state of the 
case may be represented by the following 
diagram : 

The Existent Universe. 



(i) Infinite and (2) Eternity of (3) Eternity of (4) Infinite re- 
self-existent -universe us matter. gression of 
First Cause nowconsti- finite 
(Theism). tuted. causes. 

If (2), (3), and (4) be disproved, by 
this process of exclusion, we shall have done 
much to place (i) on its proper basis — not 
to claim that we shall have done everything 
that tends to establish it. If, however, the 
material fallacy of incomplete disjunction 
has been avoided — i. ^., if the four preced- 



96 



Theism 



I. E3rpotli- 
esis of the 
Eternity 
of tlie Uni- 
verse as 
How Con- 
stituted 



ing cases are a complete enumeration of the 
possible alternatives — the disproof of (2), 
(3), and (4) is logically a sufficient estab- 
lishment of (i), without further considera- 
tion of the positive evidences for (i). But 
abundant positive evidence for the truth of 
( I ) exists — some of it already adduced, more 
of it yet to be presented. 

Let us examine, first, the hypothesis of 
the eternity of tJie ttniverse as now consti- 
tuted. This doctrine is not at the present 
day maintained by any competent authority. 
It is included in our investigation merely for 
the sake of scientific completeness. Geol- 
ogy can measure with approximate correct- 
ness the period since the earth assumed its 
present condition, and number and measure 
the previous conditions, annexing a history 
of each. The nebular hypothesis plausibly 
professes to be able to trace the genesis of 
the solar system itself, and, analogically, 
of other systems. Anthropology can date 
the appearance of man on the earth. In 



The Argument f 07' a First Cause 97 

short, all human sciences—geology, astron- consensus 

omy, anthropology^ philology, and history— ® 

611C6S 

may be regarded as constituting a consensus, 
and agreeing that man has been upon the 
earth for a period possibly not exceeding 
eight or ten thousand years, ^ and that the 
globe has been continuously habitable and 
has supported its existing fauna and flora 
for a period not greatly exceeding this. 
Something like this length of time can be 
allowed by the chronology of the Bible, 
particularly by that of the Septuagint, or 
Greek translation of the Old Testament Biblical 
begun in Egypt under the early Ptolemies ^^^^^'^^' 
(third centur}^ B.C.), which, as is well 
known, is considerably longer than that of 

^ Many authorities, it need scarcely be said, assign 
to man a much higher antiquity than this, the reducing 
of geological periods to terms of years being a rather 
precarious calculation. But all geologists place man 
in the latest of the great periods, Post-tertiary, or 
Quaternary ; and within that period, after the Pleisto- 
cene or Glacial epoch, they take up the Recent or 
Human period. 



Zf 



98 Th 



'leism 



the commonly received, or Masoretic, text 
of the Hebrew Bible/ But after all, the 
date of the commencement of the present 
state of things is wholly immaterial to the 
Unity of present issue. A commencement is al- 
Science lowed on all hands by every department 

and the Bi- ^ j j r ^ 

We of science, and any commencement is all 

that is essential to the argument. The hy- 
pothesis of the eternity of the various gen- 
era of animals and plants now occupying the 

iNo less an authority in anthropology than Profess- 
or E. B. Tylor hazards the conjecture that "as the 
Septuagint translation of the Bible was made at Alex- 
andria, it is not impossible that its giving to man a 
considerably greater antiquity than that of the Hebrew 
text may have been due to the influence of the Egyp- 
tian chronology." This, however, is a needless sup- 
position. Our oldest Hebrew MSS. date from a com- 
paratively late period in the Christian era, being more 
recent than the oldest MSS., such as the Sinaitic and 
the Vatican, of the New Testament. The shorter chro- 
nology is almost certainly due to corruptions of the text, 
to which numbers are especially liable. The longer 
chronology of the Septuagint, translated, as it was, 
from MSS. much more ancient than any we now pos- 
sess in Hebrew, is to be preferred. 



The Argzcment for a J^irst Cause 99 

earth cannot, therefore, be entertained for a 
moment. There is no infinite or eternal re- 
gression of the generations of mankind. Sci- 
ence and the Bible consent together. There 
was a jfr5/ man. 

I pass now to the hypothesis of the eter- ii« Hy- 
nity of matter. There seems to be a lin- ^t^g^^gj.. 
gering notion in the minds of many scien- Mtyof 
tific writers, as well as in those of other 
people, that there was originally some kind 
of primitive, undifferentiated, homogene- Primitive 
ous world-stuff. This doctrine, which has 
descended to modern times from some of 
the earliest and least intelligent speculations 
of Greek philosophy, is a very crude one, 
for it assumes the existence of a first ma- 
terial (^TTpwTT] vXy^ possessing no particular 
qualities, or qualitatively ml, which stands 
to the various forms of matter very much as 
a tree stands to a bed, a box, a desk, or 
other article fashioned out of it. Out of 
this primitive, qualityless world-stuff the 
various forms of matter as we know it are 

LOFC. 



World- 
stuff 



lOO Theisin 



supposed to have been fashioned by a proc- 
ess of differentiation and increasing hetero- 
geneity. Being ^er se^ which is no sort of 
being in particular, but all being in general, 
is thus accepted as the taproot of the tree 
of the universe. A mythical product of long- 
ago exploded realism^ lingers to befog the 

1 Realism, in its extreme Platonic form, taught that 
the genus has a positive existence antecedent to the 
individuals which compose it {7C7tiversalia a7ite re??i)^ 
the individuals participating in the numerically one 
and independent generic nature. Moderate, or Aris- 
totelic, realism teaches that the genus has existence 
only in the individuals which compose it {universalia 
in re)^ maintaining, however, the numerical unity or 
identity of the generic essence, e. g.^ humanity is a sub- 
stance numerically one or identical in all men. Ap- 
plying this doctrine to the highest generalization — 
the summum ge7ius — -namely, pure being, the doctrine 
of an actually existing undifferentiated world-stuff was 
reached as described in the text. Many physicists, 
destitute of philosophical training, entertain the doc- 
trine in a crude and crass form. And perhaps it would 
not be difficult to prove that Herbert Spencer himself 
is not altogether clear of it. For further exposition 
and refutation of realism, see Tigert's " Logic," pp. 

lOO-ToS. 



The Argument for a First Cause loi 

intellects of speculators, or unconsciously 
to vitiate the results obtained by many think- 
ers who assume some such idea as this de- 
scribed above without stopping to clarify or 
establish it.^ 

It is conceded that no force known to concessioa 
man is capable either of annihilating matter 
or of calling it into being. As Anaxagoras 
announced nearly five hundred years before 
Christ, ** Nothing can ever be said to be- 
come or depart, but each thing arises through 

1 In confirmation of this conclusion, set down many 
years ago, may be quoted an excellent book which has 
just come to hand: "Being, attenuated till it is alto- 
gether without attributes, substance, without any de- 
termination or characterization, force, or the persist- 
ence of force, gives no intelligible starting-point for 
the knowledge of reality. These are merely abstrac- 
tions, easy to reach, and worthless when we have 
reached them," — P. 17 of *' Theism in the Light of Pres- 
ent Science and Philosophy," by James Iverach, M.A., 
D.D. The fallacy of Spencer and others who reason 
in this way arises from mistaking merely mental ab- 
straction for concrete analysis. Dr. Iverach's book is 
the inaugural course of lectures on the Charles F. 
Deems foundation at New York University. 



I02 The 



zs7n 



ments 



the combination, and perishes through the 
disintegration, of preexistent things; hence 
it is more correct to call becoming combina- 
tion and departing separation." As far as 
science teaches, the sum of matter now in 
the universe cannot be increased or dimin- 
ished. But science knows nothing of this 
TheEie- primitive, undifferentiated world-stuff. On 
the contrary, it teaches that there are about 
sixty-six elements, or original, irreducible, 
and underivable constituents or forms of 
matter. Matter in the general, or that which 
is only matter, but not some particular form 
or kind of matter, is unknown to experience. 
Every atom of matter known to the physi- 
cist or chemist is either aluminium, bismuth, 
chlorine, fluorine, lead, mercury, nitrogen, 
silver, gold, sulphur, zinc, or some other 
element. So far as science tells us, all these 
must have been present in the primal fire- 
mist with which the nebular hypothesis be- 
gins the history of the solar and other cos- 
mical systems.^ 

1 Here I am glad to find myself again supported by 



The Argument for a First Cause lo 



The argument from this fact is as follows : Tiie Argm- 



If the material (materials) out of which the 
world is made is not some rough stuff, with- 
out any marks of intelligent design upon it, 
but on the contrary is a number of elemen- 
tary substances, whose combination with, 
and action upon, each other is determined 
by many precise, complex, and stable laws, 
as exhibited in the multiplied formulae of 
chemistry, then must these elements be de- 

Dr. Iverach, though he declares that the most recent 
science '* dreams of a preatomic state of matter"; on 
which he observes: "If there is a preatomic state of 
matter, it exists under other conditions than those 
which obtain on the earth, and our means of dissocia- 
tion are too limited to enable us to reproduce that con- 
dition of matter. For us, atoms are ultimate and can- 
not be brought to a finer shape. This, also, has its 
bearing on the intelligibility of the world which is a 
postulate of theism. The original stuff is made with a 
bias, and has an invincible tendency to aggregate itself 
into certain irreversible patterns. Chemical elements 
are formed which maintain their identity and continu- 
ity in all circumstances, and no amount of work which 
we can bring to bear on them can break them up into 
simpler forms." — "Theism," etc., pp. 21, 22. 



ment 



I04 



Thei. 



zsjn 



The Atom 
a Manu- 
factured 
Article 



scribed, in the words of an eminent scien- 
tist, Sir John Herschel, as ''manufactured 
articles." Before them went a creating pow- 
er and designing intelligence, which (w^ho) 
stamped upon them the laws of their being. 
Observe : the teleological argument, or ar- 
gument from design, is introduced at this 
point not to perform its own proper service 
(a use to which it will be put later), but to 
answer the negative purpose of disproving 
the eternity of m.atter. If the atom is a man- 
ufactured article, it has not existed from 
eternity, but is a product turned out by a 
manufacturer.^ 



1 Professor J. Clerk Maxwell, after suggesting sev- 
eral meanings that maj have been in the mind of Her- 
schel when he styled the atoms " manufactured arti- 
cles," says ** it seems more probable that he meant to 
assert that a number of exactly similar things cannot 
be each of them eternal and self-existent, and must 
therefore have been made, and that he used the phrase 
• manufactured article' to suggest the idea of their be- 
ing made in great numbers." Professor Maxwell him- 
self says: "Whether or not the conception of a multi- 



The Argument for a First Cause 105 

Dr. Chalmers makes a fatal, but quite Dr. Chai- 

1 . . ,,TTT mers's Fa- 

unnecessary, concession at this point: ''We ^aiconces- 

agree with Dr. Brown in thinking 'that sion 
matter as an unformed mass, existing with- 
out relation of parts, would not of itself 
have suggested the notion of a Creator.' 
... In the mere existence of an unshapen 
or unorganized mass we see nothing that 
indicates its non-eternity, or its derivation 
from an antecedent mind, while, on the 
other hand, even though nature should in- 

tude of being's existing from all eternity is in itself self- 
contradictory, the conception becomes palpably absurd 
when we attribute a relation of quantitative equality 
to all these beings. We are then forced to look be- 
yond them to some common cause or common origin 
to explain why this singular relation of equality exists, 
rather than any one of the infinite number of possible 
relations of inequality. Science is incompetent to rea- 
son upon the creation of matter itself out of nothing. 
We have reached the utmost limit of our thinking 
faculties when we have admitted that because matter 
cannot be eternal and self-existent, it must have been 
created." — See Maxwell's article, "Atom," in Encyclo- 
^cedia Britannica (ninth ed.), III. 44. 



io6 Th 



jezsin 



cline to the thought that the matter of this 
earth and these heavens was from everlast- 
ing, there might be enough in the "goodly 
distribution of its parts to warrant the con- 
clusion that mind has been at work with this 
primeval matter, and at least fetched from 
it materials for the structure of many a wise 
and beneficent mechanism. It is well that 
revelation has resolved for us the else im- 
practicable mystery and given us distinctly to 
understand that to the fiat of a great Eternal 
Spirit matter stands indebted for its exist- 
ence and its laws, as for its numerous col- 
locations of use and convenience. We hold 
that without a revealed theology we should 
not have known of the creation of matter 
out of nothing, but that by dint of a natural 
theology alone we might have inferred a 
God from the useful disposition of its parts. 
It is good to know what be the strong posi- 
tions of an argument and to keep by them, 
taking up our intrenchments there, and will- 
ing to relinquish all that is untenable. . . . 



The Argument for a First Cause 107 

For this purpose we would dissever the ar- 
gument founded on the phenomenon of the 
mere existence of matter from the argument 
founded on the phenomenon of the relations 
between its parts. The one impresses the 
understanding just as differently from the 
other as a stone of random form lying upon 
the ground impresses the observer different- 
ly from a watch. The mere existence of 
matter in itself indicates nothing. They 
are its combinations and its organic struc- 
tures which alone speak to us of a Divinity 
— just as it is not the clay, but the shape into 
vv^hich it has been molded, that announces 
the impress of a Designer's hand." ^ 

Here again we meet with the old, falla- 
cious conception of pure being, or of mat- Aristotle's 
ter without form, an idea at least as old as ®^^^^^^ 
Aristotle. Aristotle's four causes or princi- 
ples are matter, form, efficient cause, and 

A Dr. Thomas Chalmers, "Natural Theology," I. 
117-119. American Edition. New York: Robert Car 

ter. 1845. 



io8 Theism 



end, which in the last analysis are reduced 
to matter ivXi^) and form (efSo?). Of this re- 
duction some account will be given later, 
when the nature of the argument from 
design is reached. Within the realm of 
experience Aristotle recognized as impor- 
tant truth that every particular thing (oLma), 
every 'Hhis" ijol^ rt), is a totalitv or whole 
made up of matter and form — a ^vvoXov, But, 
while recognizing every particular exist- 
ence of which men have knowledge as a 
combination of matter and form, Aristotle 
proceeded to construct a philosophical hier- 
archj" of all existences. Of this hierarchy 
the lowest stage of being is a prime m.atter 
(7rpa)ry vXtj) which is totallv destitute of form, 
and the highest is form wholly separate 
from matter — the Absolute, Divine Spirit, 
designated variously in Aristotle's v/ritings 
as TTpi^Tov etSob (first form), -n-pojrov KLvovv (prime 
mover, or source of energy), voTyo-t? ro7;o-e(05 
(thought of thought, or reason of reason), 
elSog dSovs (form of form), etc. Form Aris- 



The Argument for a First Cause 109 

totle identifies with actuality (ei/epyeta), and 
matter with potentiality (8wa/xts). Thus he 
works out an approximately correct and com- 
plete notion of God as a creative and intelli- 
gent Spirit, the only possible source and ex- 
planation of designed existence, of which ev- 
ery atom must be allowed to be an example, 
since it is a complex of matter and form. 
But the existence of pure matter without 
form is an unwarranted philosophical as- 
sumption, made simply for the sake of sys- 
tematic completeness and having no basis 
in any fact of experience. Aristotle proba- 
bly saw this plainly enough, and so identi- 
fied this pure matter with mere potentiality, 
which is equivalent to Plato's not-being. 
But modern scientists are not generally 
gifted with Aristotelic insight, and so con- 
tinually assume the existence of a primitive, 
formless matter, to which idea it seems cer- 
tain there has never been any answering 
reality. 

Upon the fallacy of Dr. Chalmers, Dr. 



no Theism 



Br. Sum- Summers beautifully and conclusively re- 
marks: ^' There is only this difference be- 
tween the 'stone of random form' and the 
human body, so 'fearfully and wonderfully 
made' : the latter forces attention to its 
exquisite workmanship, while the former 
is liable to be overlooked; though, when 
subjected to chemical action in the lab- 
oratory, it is seen that ' this also cometh 
forth from the Lord of hosts, who is won- 
derful in counsel and excellent in working.' 
There is not an atom in the universe that 
does not discover the Creator's hand to the 
eye that is open to see it, as the shield of 
Pallas was so constructed by Phidias as to 
preserve the memory of the artificer as long 
as that wonderful work of art remained in 
existence." ^ 

in. Hy- Next in order I come to the hypothesis of 

pothesis ^^ iniinite repress of -finite causes. This is 

of Infinite -^ ^ ^ "^ 

Regress sometimes allowed, though wdth slight war- 

1" Systematic Theology," I. 65, 



The Argument for a First Cause iii 

rant, to be the most powerful rival of the the- 
istic doctrine. It is perhaps too readily con- 
ceded by Dr. Caldervvood, for example, Caider- 
that nakedly and abstractly this hypothesis .^° 
is logically thinkable. But his objections 
to its reality are powerful, if not conclu- 
sive. He says: ''The regress of finite 
causes, each of which shall be adequate 
to account for the measure of existence pre- 
viously recognized, is logically the nearest 
solution, and meets the first demands of a 
logical process, under the law of causality. 
To postulate a cause simply adequate to pro- 
duce known existence satisfies the imme- 
diate claim of intelligence. Accordingly, 
the truth of the conclusion may be accepted 
merely as implying conformity with the laws 
of thought, though there be no means at 
command for verifying the supposition as to 
the existence of such a cause. . . . Still, 
what is thus accepted, logically, but only 
hypothetically, is not conclusive. The in- 
tellectual requirement which raised the first 



112 Theism 



question now raises another as to the ex- 
istence of this hypothetical cause, and so 
must continue as long as, in strict conform- 
ity with logical rule, onl}^ limited existence 
is postulated* In this line, therefore, there 
is no logical landing-place which can be 
conclusive, and no logical warrant for stop- 
ping. Besides, as the second stage in the 
process is onljr hypothetical, and there 
is no discovery of actual existence, by the 
contemplation of which V\^e should have re- 
quired to raise a fresh question, there is noth- 
ing better than a logical ground for proce- 
dure. As, then, it is impossible for us to con- 
tinue the process to infinity, so it is impossi- 
ble to rest in the belief that the history of ex- 
istence has been progressively what the order 
of thought must be regressively. ... If , to 
escape the discomfort arising from the want 
of any solution of the problem, we suggest 
an infinite regression of finite causes, the 
suggestion is not only gratuitous, but we 
raise a new problem. On what ground are 



The Argument for a First Cause 113 

we to affirm infinity of existence? We have 
made an affirmation without trace of logical 
warrant. Our difficulties in carrying through 
an intellectual process bear witness to the 
limits of our thought, but provide no foun- 
dation for an hypothesis as to existence."^ 

In exposition of which, I ma}^ remark that Theiafi- 

human knowledp;e is divisible into three 

^ gress 

classes or sorts : ( i ) knowledge of first Satisfies 

principles througfh rational intuition; (2) 

^ ^ & ' \ y servation 

knowledge of matters of fact through low- nor Reason 
er or sense-intuition and self-consciousness ; 
and (3) reasoned knowledge, or knowledge 
by inference. The materials for reasoning 
must be derived from knowledge of either 
the first or the second order: these orders of 
knowledge are not the results, but the pre- 
requisites or foundations, of reasoning. Or- 
dinarily, materials for strictly universal ma- 
jor premises are derived from the first order 
of knowledge; materials for minor prem- 
ie Moral Philosophy," pp. 224-226. 

8 



114 Theism 



ises from the second order. Reasoning may 
be formally correct but materially empt}^ — 
as is the case with the reasoning in sup- 
port of the infinite regress. If truths of 
the first and second order be put into the 
syllogistic hopper and the grinding be 
properly done, the grist secured will be 
the truth also — reasoned truth. But if the 
syllogistic mill be set in motion with an 
empty hopper, the running machinery may 
make a great noise, but the result of the 
grinding will be — nothing. It is a mistake 
to suppose that everything demands, or 
is even capable of, proof. I could adduce 
no argument to prove my bodily existence 
in this room where I am writing, or my per- 
sonal existence as a thinking mind, that 
would compel any more cogent conviction 
of these facts than I have now from my 
immediate perception or consciousness of 
them. These are truths of the second order 
included in the sphere of sense-intuition and 
self-consciousness. Likewise, there are 



The Argument for a First Cause 115 

truths of the first order — axioms, primary 
laws of thought, ethical intuitions — which do 
not simply require no proof, but are abso- 
lutely incapable of it. Without these data, 
furnished by the higher and the lower in- 
tuition, logical proofs are impossible. There 
cannot be an infinite sorites or an infinite 
chain of pro-syllogisms and epi-syllogisms : 
the logical chain must hang from staples 
driven fast in the hard facts of observation 
or in the adamant of the eternal and immu- 
table nature of things. The '* infinite re- 
gress" lacks both of these staples: it is not 
demanded or supported by either observa- 
tion or reason, nor does it satisfy either, as 
will presently more fully appear. 

We have already seen how the traces of Fnrtiisr 
design in the constitution of the atom prove ^*^^^^^^^°^ 
a preexisting and intelligent designer. This 
consideration alone seems to shut off com- 
pletely the notion of an infinite regression 
of unintelligent and impersonal causes ; but 
it has also another application in this con- 



ii6 Theism 



nection. Design is evident, not only in 
the mutual adaptation of coexistent atoms, 
which enables them to enter into various 
unions with one another and to resist cer- 
tain other combinations, but also in the sue- 
cessions of cause and effect. In fact, a look- 
ing to the future is by many philosophers 
regarded as the distinctive and indisputable 
mark of the presence of design. If then 
upon examination we find in the series of 
causes and effects development and -progress 
toward -preconceived ends^ we may once 
more conclude the priority of intelligence. 
Evolution through cycles of time is proof 
of temporally dominant and persisting de- 
sign — of foresight, of providence; as con- 
temporaneous adaptations, and even spatial 
and mechanical harmonies, are proofs of 
intelligent power seizing and solving the 
problem and securing the result— as in the 
combining laws of the atoms. 
Diman's The late Professor Diman advances a 

Stat meat conclusive argument at this point, clinching 



The Argument for a First Cause 117 

it with the authority of Immaouel Kant: 
''What can be evolved from the idea of 
cause as it exists in our own minds? Does 
this idea demand finality, or is it satisfied 
with an endless series? In other words, 
does the same necessity of thought which 
requires us to believe in cause at all require 
us equally to believe in a first cause? The 
objector may urge: *I hold to causation, 
but why must I believe in a first cause? 
What greater difficulties are there in an in- 
finite succession of causes than in an origi- 
nal and self-existent cause ? Both are abso- 
lutely incomprehensible ; both raise difficul- 
ties which I cannot solve. But why compel 
me to choose one of these dilemmas rath- 
er than the other?' The objection at first 
sight seems plausible, but loses its force 
when we reflect that an infinite series does 
not make a cause, and cause is precisely 
what reason here demands. The real al- 
ternative does not lie between an infinite 
series and a first cause, but between accept- 



ii8 Theism 



ing a first cause or rejecting the idea of 
cause altogether. We are familiar enough 
with the notion of a proximate or secondary 
cause, and we may form the conception of 
an indefinite succession of real causes, yet 
all this does not satisfy our idea of cause. 
The only true cause is a first cause; when, 
therefore, the universe is thrown back upon 
an infinite succession there is a violation of 
the fundamental principle of reason. [We 
want a cause that is not also an effect, which 
is not true of any member of an imagined 
infinite series of finite causes.] For an infi- 
nite succession of causes rests, by the very 
hypothesis, upon no cause. Each particular 
cause rests indeed upon the next, but the 
whole rests on nothing. [A chain would 
not become self-supporting, or develop any 
tendency in that direction, by increasing the 
number of its links to infinity. ] 'The reason, ' 
says Kant, ' is forced to seek somewhere its 
resting point in the regress of the condition- 
al. If something exists, it must be admit- 



The Argument for a First Cause 119 

ted that something exists necessarily [and 
that which exists necessarily exists uncon- 
ditionally, and is therefore independent and 
self-existent] ; for the contingent exists only 
under the condition of another thing as its 
cause, up to a cause which exists not con- 
tingently/ Reason cannot stop short of 
this."^ Hence by a double insufficiency 
the infinite regress is set aside, (i) its facts 
are imaginary; (2) if granted, they do not 
satisfy the demand of reason* 

Similarly Mr. Herbert Spencer concludes Agreement 

that the First Cause must be ''totally inde- ^^^• 

spencer 

pendent," having ''no necessary relation to 
any other form of being," and "no neces- 
sary relation within itself-" "The First 
Cause," says Mr. Spencer, "must be in 
every sense perfect, complete, total: includ- 
ing within itself all power, and transcending 
all law. Or, to use the established word, it 
must be absolute."^ 

iDiman's "Theistic Argument," pp, 84, 85. 
2 " First Principles," p. 38. 



I20 



Theism 



IV. Hy- 
potliesis of 
Self -exist- 
ent First 
Cause 



Metaphys- 
ical Ot)jec- 
tion 



Calder- 
wood's 
Criticism 



The only remaining alternative — of the 
possible explanations with which we set out 
— is that of an infinite, self-sufficient, and 
eternal First Cause, now reached positive- 
ly by the preceding process of reasoning. 
But here we are met with the objection 
that we cannot argue logically from a 
finite effect to an infinite cause. We 
cannot postulate more in the cause 
than is required to produce the effect. 
Hence from a vast, but not illimitable or 
infinite, universe we can argue only to a 
powerful, but not to an omnipotent, God. 
Calderwood states this objection in its full 
force, and then advances to a criticism of 
Clarke (Dr. Samuel), which does not seem 
altogether just. '' To begin as Clarke did," 
says Calderwood, ''with the proposition 
that 'something has existed from eternity,' 
is virtually to propose an argument after hav- 
ing assumed what is to be proved." ^ 

It is unquestionable that something nov\r 



i " Moral Philosophy/* p. 226. 



The Argument for a First Cause 121 

exists — -at least I myself, a finite and de- 
pendent being, exist. Now the human 
mind immediately rejects as a self-evident 
absurdity the proposition that this universe , 
or anything, could have originated from 
nothing. £^x nihilo nihil fit. If there Reply 
was ever a moment in all the -past eter- 
nity when nothing whatever existed^ then 
it is totally incomprehensible why anything 
ever began to be. The fact that something 
is, therefore, is proof positive that some- 
thing has always been, and Clarke was fully 
justified in beginning with the affirmation, 
'' Something has existed from eternity.^' ^ 

The objection we are now combating is Corrected 
refuted by a more careful statement of the ^ ,,, ^ 

^ of tlie Cos- 

cosmological argument, now rendered pos- moiogicai 
sible by the preceding discussion, as fol- ^^^^^ 
lows: Since something is, and that some- 
thing is finite and dependent (eternity of 
matter or of the universe, and infinite re- 

1 '* Demonstration of the Being and Attributes of 
God/' p. 8. 



122 T/ieism 



gress of finite causes, being excluded by 
the preceding considerations), something 
must always have been, and that something, 
upon which all finite things depend, must 
itself be infinite and independent. This ar- 
gument founds not upon the extent of exist- 
ence, acknowledged to be finite, but upon 
the kind or nature of all existence known 
to experience— namely, its dependence. 
The infinite God is needed as much to ex- 
plain the existence of an atom or of a dew- 
drop as he is to explain the existence of a 
Force and sun or a system. I have already sufficient- 
ly shown that the infinite regress and the 
eternity of matter — either in its present form 
or as a sort of unformed, chaotic, first ma- 
terial — are excluded. If the notion oi force 
is introduced, the materialistic argument is 
not helped. A conclusive paragraph from 
Calderwood on this point may close our 
survey of the cosmological argument: ''The 
perplexity of the problem under a material- 
istic theory is not lessened, but increased, 



Matter 



The Argument for a First Cause 123 

when duality of origin is assigned by intro- 
ducing force in addition to material sub-- 
stance. Duality of existence, with coeter- 
nity of duration, involves perplexity suffi- 
cient to bar logical procedure [the perplex- 
ity of two absolutes or two eternals] . This 
duality of existence implies diversity of na- 
ture and mutual restriction; and these two, 
diversity and limitation, raise anew the 
problem which they were meant to solve 
[for an antecedent cause of this complex 
state of affairs must be found]. The ex- 
planation needs to be explained. Again, 
matter and force are postulated primarily to 
account for motion^ but in accounting for 
motion they are -proved insufficient to ac- 
count for existence. That which needs to 
have force exerted upon it in order to be 
moved is not self-sufficient, and the same is 
true of the force which needs matter on 
which to exert its energy."^ 

In addition to the reasoning from the con- 

1'* Moral Philosophy," pp. 235, 236. 



124 Theism 



stitution of the atoms adduced above to dis- 
ASciea- prove the eternity of matter, science fur- 

ic IS- riigj-^es another around for this conclusion, 
proof of ^ 

theEter- Suns are parting with their energy. The 

^^tyof earth, like the moon, will cease to support 
Matter ' ^ ' . 

Hfe, and will drop into the sun, which, not- 

v\^ithstanding such fresh supplies, will finally 
be extinguished. Such processes will con- 
tinue in the universe, so science teaches, 
until its energies are equalized and it be- 
comes a uniformly distributed mass with 
neither motion nor life. Now, if the primal 
fire-mist, with which the nebular hypothesis 
and the doctrine of evolution begin their 
account of the universe, had been eternal, 
it would long ago have finished the whole 
course of its development, the dissipation 
and equalization of energy would have been 
complete before the present, and a dispersed 
universe would now be that scene of desola- 
tion and death which physical science teach- 
es is the inevitable doom of all that is. 
I am aware of Kant's criticism and rejec- 



The Argument for a First Cause 125 

tion of the cosmological proof in his ^'Cri- Kant's 
tique of Pure Reason" — a foregone rejec- ,, 

tion demanded by his entire systemj which 
must set aside all rational -prooi^^ in order to 
throw the entire weight of theistic demon- 
stration upon Kant's peculiar moral and 
practical argument. This criticism I do 
not consider decisive. Kant, in the same 
'^ Critique/' allows that it ''has a certain 
persuasive force with the speculative not 
less than Vv^ith the common intellect" ; 
while in the '' Critique of Practical Rea- 
son" he declares: ''The determination of 
the causality of beings in the world of sense , 
from the very nature of the case, can never 
be unconditioned. Yet, for every series of 
conditions there must necessarily be some- 
thing that is unconditioned, and therefore 
there must be a causality which is completely 
self-determined." ^ 

Locke's use of cosmological reasoning in locke 
the celebrated tenth chapter of his fourth 

^ Watson's " Selections," pp. 276, 277. 



126 Theis7n 



book, where he asserts that ''its evidence 
is equal to mathematical certainty," and 
that ''there is no truth more evident than 
that something must be from eternity," is 
too familiar to need citation or analysis here. 

LelMitz (Compare the same book and chapter of 
Leibnitz's Nouveaux Essais,^ We must be 
careful, however, not to include more in the 
conclusion of the cosmological proof than 
the premises warrant; and to that end may 

Lotze listen to the friendly warning of Lotze: 

"Thus then the cosmological proof could 
only conclude from the conditionalness and 
conditioned necessity of all individual real 
things in the universe, to an ultimate Real 
Being which, without being conditioned by 
anything else, simply is, and simply is what 
it is, and finally may be regarded as the suf- 
ficient reason through which all individual 
reality is, and is what it is. And this way 
of looking at the proof clearly shows that it 
cannot of itself attain to the religious con- 
ception of a God, but only to the metaphys- 



The Argument for a First Cause 127 

ical conception of an Unconditioned."^ 
But surely an Unconditioned Real Be- wortii ani 
ing, which simply is^ without derivation of 
its existence or nature from any superior elusion 
source, and which is the Sufficient Ground 
of all reality, is a sufficiently valuable and 
comprehensive conclusion for this one form 
of proof to reach: the Intelligence, the Mo- 
rality, the Personality of this Unconditioned 
Real Being we may reach by other paths, 
as has already been done, in part, in the 
process of disproving the eternity of matter. 
In the next chapter, further considera- 
tions against the possibility of the infinite 
regress of impersonal and unintelligent 
causes will be presented — considerations 
growing out of an examination into the ulti- 
mate nature of cause, and leading to its de- 
termination as Personal. 

1 " Mikrokosmus," II, 666. 



Empiri- 

€isin 



CHAPTER VII 

THE NATURE OF CAUSE 

Hume's When David Hume, carrying forward 

Deductions , ... . ^ ^ . . 

from ^^ empiricism of Locke to its issues m 

Locke's a thoroughgoing philosophical skepticism, 
began his attack upon the commonly re- 
ceived doctrine of causality—/, e.^ the a 
priori judgment that every event must have 
a cause — he pointed out with truth that we 
have no -perceftion through the senses of the 
causal nexus: observation, or w^hat is loose- 
ly called experience, reveals only the ex- 
ternal succession of two facts, events, or 
phenomena. ''AH that lies behind bare 
and isolated phenomena is a mental prod- 
uct. No observation can discover sub- 
stance, cause, or power; and those who 
admit nothing but observation and its di- 
rect results mustj like Hume, deny their ex- 
istence in the external world." ^ 

1 Stuckenberg, '^ Introduction to the Study of Phi- 
losophy," pp. 124, 125. 

(12S) 



The Naht7'e of Cause 129 

Through this Scotch mist, however, shone Jesuits of 
the beams of two risinef suns. Hume's ^^^*^ 

^ Skepticism 

skepticism aroused Immanuel Kant *^^from iii oer- 

his dogmatic slumber,'^ and thus initiated ^^^^ 

Scotland, 

the brilliant course of German philosophy and France 
from Kant through Fichte and Schelling, 
Herbart and Hegel, to Lotze, Schopen- 
hauer, and Hartmann* At home it pro- 
duced the great school of Scottish philoso- 
phers from Reid to Hamilton, until recently 
still represented by Calderwood and Mc- 
Cosh. And this Scottish philosophy, pass- 
ing over into France, entered as an essential 
element into the eclecticism of Cousin and 
Jouffroy, and brought to a sudden halt the 
materialism and sensualism that were sweep- 
ing all before them. 

But, in particular, Hume's skepticism led Auaiysisof 

to a profounder doctrine of causality. Let ^^^®^*^<^**' 

^ ^ trine of 

me attempt to formulate what seems to be cause as 

the true doctrine, to which a large section of Personal 

the philosophical, and even of the scientific, 

world has either already given its adhesion 

9 



130 Theism 



or is rapidly tending. In this doctrine there 
is (I.) an a ^rwrz element, and (II.) an a 
-posteriori element. The a priori element 
is the mind's native judgment, universal and 
necessary, that every event or change must 
have a cause. But this a -priori element de- 
mands and declares simply the existence of 
cause : it gives no insight into the nature of 
cause. This is gathered a posteriori ; and 
yet not from the world of sense-perception, 
except by way of negation or exclusion . This 
a posteriori element is hence twofold: (i) 
negative, as Hume established, by sense-per- 
ception we know only sequences in exter- 
nal nature — observation does not afford a 
knowledge of cause; (2) positive, we rec- 
ognize ourselves as immediate and real 
causes, in our volitional control (^) of our 
minds and (<5) of our bodies. Therefore, 
since the only cause of which we have 
knowledge, or to which consciousness testi- 
fies, is will stimulated by sensibility and 
guided by intelligence, and these are of 



The Nature of Cause 131 

the essence of personality, we seem author- 
ized to conclude that the ultimate explana- 
tion of change in nature, of what is com- 
monly termed, even by science, secondary 
or physical causation, is also Will, moving 
toward ends and ideals, which afford ade- 
quate motivity in desire, and directed by 
intelligence — i. ^., a Personal Will, a Per- 
sonal Unconditioned Real Being — God. 
This conception of Cause, it will be shown 
in the sequel, is in essential harmony with 
some modern physical doctrines concerning 
the constitution of matter. 

Before proceeding, however, to deduce 
the consequences and to examine the col- 
lateral issues and evidences of this doc- 
trine, let us look a little more closely to its 
immediate foundations. For the sake of 
brevity, a condensed statement from Cal- Caider- 
derwood, which embraces the positive argu- g^g^tement 
ment, the citation of authorities, and the 
refutation of objections, may be quoted 
here: '*It is in our consciousness of self- 



132 Theism 



control for the determination of activity 
that we obtain our only knowledge of 
causality. Each one knows himself as 
the cause of his own actions. In the exter- 
nal world we continue ignorant of causes, 
and are able only to trace uniform sequence, 
as Hume and Comte have insisted. But in 
consciousness we distinguish between se- 
quence and causality. We are conscious 
of our own causal energy by knowing the 
origin of our activity in self-determination. 
(This was illustrated, though inconsistently, 
by Locke, 'Essay' II. xxi. 5. It was held 
by Maine de Biran, ' Nouvelles Considera- 
tions^^ P^-gs 363; and Cousin, 'Cours de 
r Histoire de la Philosophies' second course, 
L. xix., translated 'History of Modern 
Philosophy,' II. 206; and Mansel, 'Pro- 
legomena Logica,' 139; and is generally 
held by those who adopt the libertarian side. 
It is, however, rejected by Sir W. Hamilton, 
'Metaphysics,' II. 390; 'Reid's Works,' 
866; 'Discussions,' 612; and in this he 



The Nature of Cause 133 

finds a supporter in Mr, Mill, 'Examina- 
tion/ 357.) Regarding the question from 
the point of view afforded by the movement 
of the limbs, on which Maine de Biran had 
dwelt, Hamilton argues thus: * Between 
the overt act of corporeal movement of 
which we are cognizant, and the internal 
act of mental determination, of which we 
are also cognizant, there intervenes a nu- 
merous series of intermediate agencies of 
which we have no knowledge; and conse- 
quently we can have no consciousness of 
any causal connection between the extreme 
links of this chain.' — 'Metaphysics,' II. 
391 . That the management of brain, nerve, 
and muscle is not matter of consciousness 
is admitted, and consequently that we have 
no consciousness of causal connection be- 
tween volitions and the movements of these 
organs. But we are conscious of the sen- 
sation of movement, and we are conscious 
of observing the movements. How, then, 
does the case stand? I will to move my 



134 Theism 



arm, and both by sensation and observation 
I recognize the consequent movement. This 
is not direct consciousness of the causal 
nexus, but it is consciousness of the origi- 
nating force of the whole, the efficiency of 
which is tested by direct experiment and 
confirmed by results within our own con- 
sciousness. According to Hamilton's theory 
it is origin of existence w^e need to recog- 
nize in order to reach causality; and here 
we have consciousness of the origin of our 
activity. But the question is really to be 
settled elsewhere. Obscurity hangs over 
the intermediate stages in the case of bodily 
movements. But in the use of our mental 
powers — in the government of understand- 
ing and desire, for example — it is otherwise. 
Everything is within consciousness. By 
exercise of will we bring the intellect into 
use, and by continuance of volitional en- 
ergy we prosecute a course of reasoning. 
We are conscious of the fact of control, 
and, in immediate connection and depend- 



The Nature of Cause 135 

ence, we are conscious of the controlled 
exercise of mind. It is in this control of 
mental power that we have direct knowl- 
edge of the exercise of causal energy. * In- 
telligence endowed with will is causality.' 
(Kant, ^Metaphysic of Ethics,' third edi- 
tion, pages 64-70.) In the management 
of bodily organs the area of knowledge is 
widened only so far as volition is con- 
cerned, and is only mediate so far as the 
next act is concerned. On this subject see 
Chalmers's * Sketches of Mental and Moral 
Philosophy,' chapter iv., section 27, edition " 
1854, P^g^ ^^^ 9 Hazard on * Causation and 
Freedom in Willing,' page 7; and a valua- 
ble passage in Cairns's 'Treatise on Moral 
Freedom,' page 222."^ 

To the same effect may be quoted no sir John 
less a scientific authority than Sir John ^®^^^^^^'^ 
Herschel, whose clear and penetrating un- 
derstanding, so rare among merely physical 
inquirers, has served us so good a turn in 

1" Moral Philosophy" (ninth ed.), pp. 184, 185. 



136 Theism 



the preceding chapter. He declares: ''In 
the only case in which we are admitted 
into any personal knowledge of the origin 
of force, we find it connected (possibly by 
intermediate links untraceable by our facul- 
ties, but yet indisputably connected^ with 
volition, and, by inevitable consequence, 
with motive^ with intellect^ and with all 
those attributes of mind in which — and not 
in the possession of arms, legs, brains, and 
viscera — personality consists."^ 

It has been asserted above that this doc- 
trine is held by a very considerable section 
of the philosophical and scientific world. 
This assertion remains to be made good. 
Calderwood, it will be observed, says that 
this theory ''is generally held by those who 
adopt the libertarian side" in the contro- 
versy about the freedom or the bondage of 
the will, and enumerates a considerable 
number of authorities of the first philosoph- 
ical importance who assert and maintain this 

1*' Familiar Lectures on Scientific Subjects," p. 462, 



The Nature of Cause 137 

position. The doctrine that efficiency, or 
efficient cause, the only true cause hav- 
ing a basis in a -priori intuition, resides 
only in will, divine or created — lower intel- 
ligences, particularly man, having the power 
to use and to modify nature in conformity 
with fixed law, and to project original in- 
fluences and to introduce changes which 
perpetuate themselves in their consequences 
— and that the forces operating in the uni- 
verse are a never-ceasing exercise of the 
Divine Will, in which alone a sufficient and 

ultimate source of this energy can be found, Enumera- 
tion of Aii- 
is advocated by Dr. Samuel Clarke, Dugald thorities 

Stewart, John Wesley, Kant, Schopenhauer, 
Nitzsch, Julius Miiller, Maine de Biran, Cou- 
sin, Dean Mansel, Thomas Chalmers, Dr. 
Whewell, Dr. Carpenter, Channing, James 
Martineau, Hedge, Dr. Whedon, Dr. Sum- 
mers, Dr. Cocker, President Bascom, Prin- 
cipal TuUoch, Professor Cairns, Rowland 
G. Hazard, Sir John Herschel, Professor 
Grove, the Duke of Argyll, Alfred Russell 



138 



Th 



leisin 



spencer 



WincheU 



Schopen- 
liauer and 
Wallace 



Wallace, Richard A. Proctor, Professor Nor- 
ton, Alexander Winchell, and many others. 
Herbert Spencer concedes: '^ The force by 
which we ourselves produce changes, and 
which serves to symbolize the cause of 
changes in general, is the final disclosure 
of analysis."^ Winchell alleges that ^' this 
conception of supreme, intelligent power, 
enthroned at the fountain-head of phenome- 
na, and displaying its activity in force acting 
upon atoms and aggregates of matter, does 
not differ, so far as this qualification goes, 
from the conceptions set forth by Spencer, 
Huxley, Tyndall, and Du Bois-Reymond." ^ 
Schopenhauer reduces all force in nature 
to will. Wallace, in his ** Contributions to 
the Theory of Natural Selection," holds it 
certain that all matter is force, and proba- 
ble that all force is will. The German phi- 
losopher a»nd the English scientist reach the 
same conclusions by different processes 



1" First Principles," p. 225. 

2 "Reconciliation of Science and Religion," p. 258. 



The Mature of Cause 139 

based on different grounds. Zollner has 

placed their views in parallel columns, thus 

emphasizing their similarity. 

''The deep-seated instincts of humanity/' carpenter, 

says Dr. Carpenter, ''and the profoundest ^rove, and 

Norton 
researches of philosophy alike point to mind 

as the one and only source of power." ^ In 
his "Human Physiology" the same high 
scientific authority says: "Force must be 
regarded as the direct expression of that 
mental state which we call Will. All force 
is of one type, and that type is mind."^ 
"Causation," says Grove, " is the will, cre- 
ation the act, of God."^ Professor Nor- 
ton, of Yale, speaks of " a perpetual stream 
of force flowing from the Infinite Source of 
all power." ^ 

Fully to represent Dr. Cocker's view Br. cock- 

would be to transcribe his "Theistic Con- ^^*^^^" 

sition 

1 In Nature^ VI. 312. 

2 <* Human Physiology," p. 542. 

3 See his *' Correlation and Conservation of Forces," 
Youmans's edition, p. 199. 

4 Letter to Dr. Cocker. 



140 Theism 



ception of the World/' to which, in this 
connection, I gladly acknowledge indebt- 
edness. A sentence or two must sufEce. 
'^ Force is an attribute of mind or spirit, 
and of mind or spirit alone. Spirit force 
is the only force in the universe." ^'AU 
the forms of energy manifested in the uni- 
verse are only transformations of the one 
omnipresent force issuing from the one 
fountain-head of power — the Divine Will, 
The final disclosure of modern science is 
the convertibility and homogeneity of all 
forms of physical energy — ' a dynamical 
self-identification masked by transmigra- 
tion.' " ^^The Divine conservation of the 
world is the simjble^ universal^ uniforTn effi- 
ciency of God.^^^ 
WinciieU's Winchell, who, in his ^'Reconciliation of 
Analysis Science and Religion" (Articles iv., v., 
and ix.), has made a brilliant, though not 
uniformly sound, contribution to the doc- 



i^'The Theistic Conception of the M^orld," pp. 236, 

237, 243. 



The Nature of Cause 141 

trine of causalityj analyzes the '' genesis 
and constitution of our notion of causation 
in the existing universe '^ into eleven ele- 
ements, not all of which are really distinct. 
According to Winchell, (i) causation im- 
plies the existence of a real cause, an en- 
tity clothed v^ith causative efficiency, ex- 
cluding secondary causation; (2) causa- 
tive reality must be antecedent to all its 
effects; (3) the notion of causality implies 
correlative subjectivity and objectivity — in 
harmon57' with Aristotle, however, Winchell 
allows that ''in the realm of creative ac- 
tivity the objective datum is not actual, 
but potential," and that ''while only crea- 
tive efficiency exists, otherness is a mere 
capacity of existence, and yet effectuation 
must be directed objective ward''; (4) cau- 
sality implies the possession of conscious- 
ness by the causal efficiency ; (5) the cau- 
sal agent must be able to form a concep- 
tion of a specific nonexistent effect; (6) 
the consciousness of the principle of cau- 



142 



Theism 



Justifica- 
tion of 
Wincliell 



sality must arise— the possibility of con- 
necting efficiency with a given effect; (7) 
the effectuation of original causation implies 
the presentation of motive; (8) the efficient 
cause may discern a contingency or con- 
dition which stands in some relation either 
to cause or effect, and which may modify the 
amount or direction of the causal efficiency, 
or else the kind or amount of the effect; 
(9) the influence of the contingency on 
the motive must be cognized; (10) the 
causal agent must be conscious of a desire 
to direct efficiency toward the contemplated 
effect; (11) the consummation of the cau- 
sal act implies the exertion of zvill} 

This is little more than a psychological 
analysis of human volition or causality gen- 
eralized and applied in detail to the efficien- 
cy of the deity. It is a procedure not only 



1 Alexander Winchell, "Reconciliation of Science 
and Religion," pp. 101-117. His recapitulation (pp. 263, 
264 ) does not agree in every particular with this anal- 
ysis. 



The Nature of Cause 143 

legitimate, but necessary — guaranteed by 
the profoundest and latest results of the 
theory of knowledge in the account which 
that department of philosophy gives of the 
genesis of all the categories of reality, which 
are detected by the scrutiny and analysis of 
the conscious operations of our own minds. 
There may be more or less of bad psycholo- 
gy in it, on the one hand, or of bad theology, 
on the other, without vitiating the general re- 
sult. Consequently I need not concern my- 
self with these subordinate issues here. Dr. 
Winchell follows the right — the only — anal- 
ogy, and reaches results in harmony with the 
doctrine expounded and advocated in this 
chapter. In further exposition of the fourth 
element of his analysis, Dr. Winchell sums 
up the vital points of his position: ^'A cause 
without consciousness would sleep forever 
in potentiality. In order to become an ac- 
tual cause it must have knowledge of its 
own existence, and of the possibility, at 
least, of other existence, and the possession 



144 Theism 



of efficiency. It must have a further con- 
sciousness of all the relations subsisting be- 
tween cause and effect, and of all the con- 
ditions which modify its causal activity. 
This necessity excludes the possibility of 
any system which is a pure, unconscious 
materialism, or a pure, unconscious dyna- 
mism.'' ^ 

He concludes his discussion with this 
strong statement of the fundamental truth 
involved: ''Finally, the consummation of 
the causal act implies the exertion of will. 
There must be an executive determination 
of conscious efficiency toward the contem- 
plated effect which has awakened desire 
and purpose. All the other causative steps 
converge here. Will is the last condition 
of effect. Being the last condition, Will 
always implies intelligence and sensibility. 
' Will is the synthesis of reason and pow- 
er.' (Cocker)."^ 

1 " Reconciliation," etc., p. 105. 

^ Ibid,^ pp. ii7j 118. Drs. Wincheli and Cocker 



The Nature of Cause 



14s 



As a scientist, Dr. Winchell presents us Possible 
with the following: 



tious of 
Matter 
and Force 



Recapitulation of Possible Conceptions of Matter 
and Force, 

A. The dynamical conception of matter. 

B. The substantive conception of matter. 

I. Matter self-motive (hylozoistic). 
II. Matter not self-motive. 

1. Endowed v^ith force. 

(a) The force inherent (popular view). 
{h) The force delegated. 

2. A mere channel for transmission of force. 
{a) The force initial or peripheral. 

(aa^ One primordial impulse. 
{bh) Impulse constantly renewed. 
{h) The force proceeds from an immanent 
cause.i 



The dynamical constitution of matter, ac- Dynamical 
cording to which the ultimate atom is simply 
a center of force, Dr. Winchell did not regard Matter 
as scientifically established in his day, though 
Alfred Russell Wallace, and numerous oth- 



were colleagues in the faculty of the University of 
Michigan. 

1 "Reconciliation," etc., pp. 130, 131. 
10 



146 Theism 



er high scientific authorities, unhesitatingly 
embrace this view. If estabHshed, it would 
seem to lend confirmation to the theory here 
set forth, as does the kindred scientific truth 
of the correlation of forces. ^' Substance," 
the unformed material or TrpwTTy xtXiq upon 
which the ''form" or the attributes and 
laws of the atom are stamped, disappears, 
and the latest science of modern times 
comes around to the probable doctrine of 
Aristotle, and the certain doctrine of his 
master, Plato. Will, Mind, is the source and 
author, the creator and sustainer through 
and through, of every so-called material 
object. Of the several substantive con- 
ceptions. Dr. Winchell, for reasons which 
will be sufficiently obvious to the reflecting 
reader, rejects all save the last — namely, 
that matter is not self-motive, but, on the 
contrary, is a '' mere channel for transmis- 
sion of force," and that ''the force pro- 
ceeds from an immanent cause." Upon 
this view he dilates with genuine eloquence: 



The Nature of Cause 147 

'' This view is, that natural force has no 
existence except as the direct effort of the 
Supreme Will. It supposes matter to be 
absolutely inert and naked of energy. Ev- 
ery form of force is a particular mode of 
divine activity. Every movement and every 
change reveals directly the presence of the 
Supreme Power; and man is surrounded by 
an array of admonitions of the divine pres- 
ence the most awe-inspiring possible. Nay, 
man himself is the vehicle of the voice of 
God to his own sensorium. The changes 
of matter are in progress in our own bodies. 
Infinite agency permeates our very selves, 
assorting our nutrition, building us up, ef- 
fecting repairs, wasting our tissues, and car- 
rying us into the grave — nay, not forsak- 
ing us even there, but tenderly bearing the 
effete molecules which we can use no lon- 
ger into new situations and collocations, to 
subserve other predetermined uses in the 
economy of nature."^ 

^ " Reconciliation/' etc., p. 127. I was a pupil of Dr. 



148 Theism 



interac- Thorough science always issues in phi- 

losophy. Philosophy may be derided, but 



Science 



PMlosopliy 

and cannot be banished. Science, defining 

more clearly day by day its own funda- 
mental problems concerning matter, force, 
and their relations, is destined to become 
increasingly philosophical. Herschel and 
Wallace and Grove and Winchell already 
walk hand in hand with Kant and Schopen- 
hauer and Cousin and Stewart. Philosophy 
seems to fail of permanent solutions of her 
problems, because throughout her history 
she has handed her results over to an ever- 
enlarging science. Lavishly casting the 
richest gifts into the common treasury of 
knowledge, philosophy advances, first to 

Winchell's at the time of the publication of this book, 
and, having just awaked to a keen interest in the prob- 
lems of philosophy, I was deeply impressed both by 
the personality and the writings of this magnetic man, 
who indulged an inquisitive pupil in many prolonged 
private interviews. As a lecturer, he was a master of 
a sublime, if somewhat imaginative, eloquence, that I 
have never known surpassed in the school room. 



The Nature of Cause 149 

the realization, and afterwards to the solu- 
tion, of profounder and more difficult prob- 
lems. Her task is thus never done. The 
more she does the more she has to do. 

The doctrine of causality here presented Twofold 
has a twofold value for theism: i. It is an ^^. ^ 

this Boc- 

immediate proof of the Personality of the trine for 
Unconditioned Power that made and con- ^^^^ 
serves the universe. 2. It supplements the 
cosmological argument by its abolition of the 
whole realm of so-called secondary causes. 
The infinite regress itself would demand 
God at every step. 



CHAPTER VIII 

THE ARGUMENT FROM DESIGN: CHARACTER 
AND ANALYSIS 

Kameofthe The argument for the divine existence 
derived from the presence of order, contri- 
vance, adaptation, design, in the world, is 
commonly known as the teleological proof. 
Occasionally it has been called cosmolog- 
ical, since the word ''cosmos,'' like '^mun- 
dus''^ and ''universe,'' carries in it an im- 
plication of harmony. This term, however, 
is better reserved for the argument to which 
I have already applied it. The present 
proof may be simply designated the argu- 
ment from design. 

The proof from design in nature is level 
with the popular intelligence, and by the 
man of plain understanding has always 

Kant's been accepted as convincing. "This pres- 
ent world presents to us so immeasurable a 
stage of variety, order, fitness, and beauty, 

(150) 



Character- 
ization 



>> 



The Argument front Design 151 

says Kant, '^whether we follow it up in the 
infinity of space or in its unlimited division, 
that even with the little knowledge which 
our poor understanding has been able to 
gather, all language, with regard to so many 
and inconceivable w^onders, loses its vigor, 
all numbers their power of measuring, and 
all our thoughts their necessary determina- 
tion; so that our judgment of the whole is 
lost in a speechless but all the more eloquent 
astonishment. ' ' This profound reasoner and 
merciless critic, who unceremoniously sets 
aside all ontological and cosmological rea- 
soning as vicious, and eventually rejects 
the teleological proof, throwing the whole 
weight of theistic demonstration upon his 
peculiar form of the moral argument, never- 
theless concedes that the teleological proof 
will always deserve to be treated with re- 
spect. **It is the oldest, the clearest, and 
most in conformity with human reason. It 
gives life to the study of nature, deriving its 
own existence from it, and thus constantly 



152 Theism 



acquiring new vigor. It reveals aims and 
intention where our own observation would 
not by itself have discovered them, and en- 
larges our knowledge of nature by leading 
us toward that peculiar unity the principle 
of which exists outside nature. This knowl- 
edge reacts again on its cause — namely, the 
transcendental idea — and thus increases the 
belief in a supreme Author to an irresistible 
conviction. It would, therefore, be not only 
extremely sad, but utterly vain, to attempt 
to diminish the authority of that proof. 
Reason, constantly strengthened by the 
powerful arguments that come to hand 
by themselves (though they are no doubt 
empirical only), cannot be discouraged by 
any doubts of subtle and abstract spec- 
ulation. Roused from every inquisitive in- 
decision, as from a dream, by one glance 
at the wonders of nature and the maj- 
esty of the cosmos, reason soars from 
height to height till it reaches the high- 
est; from the conditioned to conditions, till 



The Argument front Design 153 

it reaches the supreme and unconditioned 
Author of all.''^ 

FamiHar passages from the Scriptures— The 
in Job (xxxvii.— xli. ), the Psalms ( viii., xix., ^^ ^ ^^^^ 
civ.), and Isaiah (xL 21-26 — a noteworthy- 
statement), in the Sermon on the Mount 
(Matt. vi. 25-32), and in the discourses of 
St. Paul (Acts xiv., xvii.)— assume the ar- 
gument as self-evident. Socrates, in the Socrates \ 
conversation with Aristodemus, as recorded 
by Xenophon,^ presents the argument from 
the organs of the human body so convin- 
cingly that Aristodemus assents that '^ man 

iThese two passages are taken from the " Critique 
of Pure Reason," Max Miiller's translation, II. 534-536. 
The language in which Kant rejects the argument is 
as follows: "But although we have nothing to say 
against the reasonableness and utility of this line of 
argument but wish, on the contrary, to commend and 
encourage it, we cannot approve of the claims which 
this proof advances to apodictic certainty, and to an 
approval ^n its own merits, requiring no favor and no 
help frorr^any other quarter." (MUller, II. 536.) Such 
claims noreasonable theist of to-day would set up. 

2'*Meniorabilia," I. 4; IV. 3, 13. 



b^ 



TImsm 



must be the masterpiece of some great Arti- 
Cicero ficer." Cicero/ in a passage derived from 
Aristotle, represents men dwelling in sub- 
terrean, illuminated habitations, adorned 
with statues and paintings, who, upon reach- 
ing the surface of the earth, are immediate- 
ly convinced by the face of nature, and 
particularly by the motions and offices of 
the heavenly bodies, of the existence of 
LordBacon the deity. In modern times Lord Bacon's 
comparison of final causes to vestal virgins, 
consecrated to God and therefore barren, 
has been misunderstood and falsely applied. 
Bacon meant to recall the science of his day 
to the search for efficient causes, a search 
which has ever since been the fruitful 
source of progress in the investigation of 
every realm of nature. That his word on 
this subject was not spoken in vain, the his- 
tory of science testifies. That Bacon did 
not regard efficient as excluding final caus- 
es is evident from his language in the essay 



'^De Naitira Deorum^ II. 



The Argumenl from Design 155 

on atheism: ''For while the mind of man 
looketh upon second causes scattered, it 
may sometimes rest in them and go no far- 
ther; but when it beholdeth the chain of 
them confederate and linked together, it 
must needs fly to Providence and Deity/' 

The creative energy of Aristotle's mind Aristotle 
is evinced by no fact more conspicuously 
than by this — that many topics which he 
was the first clearly to define and to intro- 
duce within the limits of methodical, ration- 
al inquiry, conscious of its problenls and 
the conditions of their solution, have main- 
tained themselves as questions of the first 
moment to this day* He was the founder of 
natural history, of empirical psychology, and 
of the science of rights. Moreover, not only 
was he the first to draw the attention of phi- 
losophers to the problems, but in numer- 
ous instances he furnished the final solu- 
tions which the world of mind has been 
content or compelled to accept as incapa- 
ble of improvement or further development. 



156 



Theism 



Of formal logic Kant said in the preface to 
the second edition of the " Critique of Pure 
Reason": ^^ Since Aristotle, it has been 
unable to advance a step." Well might a 
distinguished professor of philosophy in a 
Southern university choose as the theme of 
his inaugural discourse: ''Now abide Soc- 
rates, Plato, and Aristotle — these three; but 
the greatest of these is Aristotle." 

Both in his '^ Metaphysics" (I. 3) and in 
his ^'Physics" (II. 3) Aristotle makes a 



His Doc- 
trine in 
Physics 
andMeta- formal enumeration of the four principles 

physics (dpxcL6 or atrtat) which must guide the inqui- 
ries of the intelligent and systematic seeker 
after truth. ^' The causes," says he, '' are 
treated under a fourfold division ; of which 
the first cause we call the substance i^oWiay) 
and the essence; . . . another, the matter 
and the substrate (wo/cet/xevov) ; a third, that 
whence issues the beginning of motion; and 
a fourth cause, lying over against this last 
mentioned as its exact opposite, that on ac- 
count of which there is action, or the good 



The Argument from Design 157 

intended, for this is the end of all genesis 
and motion."^ Final cause is thus for Ar- 
istotle the most important of all. In the 
''Physics" this final cause is further ex- 
plained and illustrated : ''Yet another cause 
is the end {to riXo^) — that is, that on account 
of which {to ov eveKo) anything is done, as 

health, for example, is the end of taking a 
walk. "2 

^ In the text I have somewhat f reelj translated the 
following Greek of "Metaphysics," I. 3: Ta alrca Tieyerat 
TETpaxcj^f ^v filav [lev alrlav (pajiev elvac rrjv ovaiav^ koI to ri 
f/v elvaij . , . erspav de r^v vkqv Kal to viroKei/ievoVj TpiTTjv 6s 
bdev J] CLpxV "^VQ K-iVTjGetDg^ TeTapTrp Se T?jv avTiKSifxivT/v aiTtav 
Tavrri^ to ov evEKa Kal TayaOoVj TeXog yap yeveGEDg Kal Kcvyaecog 
TTauT^g TovT^ earcv. As is well known, Aristotle employs 
the term ovala in two senses: i. ovaia = to tl rjv elvac 
("the being of what a thing was "), or 77 KaTa tov loyov 
ovGLa^ the essence^ which is the objective correspondent 
of the concept and embodied in it. 2. ovoia = vIt] or 
vTroKeifievoVj the matter or substance which is the base 
of attributes or predicates. Unless this distinction is 
kept in mind, it will be hard to save Aristotle from the 
charge of self-contradiction. Cf. Ueberweg, " History 
of Philosophy," I. 157-161. 

2" Physics," II. 3: ETi G)g to Telog, tovto 6' sgtI to ov 
£V£Ka, olou TOV TTepiTTaTeiv 7] vyleca. 



158 Theisin 



tioa 



schoiasti- These four Aristotelian causes the me- 
. . di^val scholastics desi^cnated Material, Effi- 

on Ans- & ' 

totie cient, Formal, and Final {causa materialise 

efficiens^ formalism jinalis^ \ though Aristotle 
himself never employed adjective, but al- 
ways substantive, designations (i^'Ar;, apyr] klvt/- 
o-€a)s, etSos, reXo^^, In a mechanical product, 
which is external to its causes, all four of 
the principles may be sharply distinguished, 
iiiustra- This is the case with a house: the wood, 
brick, or stone used in its construction is 
the material cause; the plan in the mind of 
the architect, which guides in the disposi- 
tion of the materials and thus embodies 
itself in the house, is the formal cause; 
the actual builders — bricklayers, carpenters, 
etc. — are the efficient cause; and the pur- 
pose which the house is intended to serve is 
the final cause. 

From this illustration it will be readily 
seen that the formal and final causes, or the 
essential and telic, tend to coalesce. The 
pla7t guides the builder in his use of mate- 



The Argument from Design 159 

rials for the accomplishment of a purpose. 

Thus the purpose determines the plan. But Homology 

the teleolop^y of Aristotle has two very dis- 

^-^ '^ Teleology 

tinct branches — an internal and external, 
the essence and the purpose, the end of a 
thing as realized absolutely in its own per- . 
fection (entelechy), and the end as indica- 
ted in relative adaptations. "The immanent 
end of every object, by the recognition of 
which the Aristotelian doctrine of finality is 
radically distinguished from the superficial, 
utilitarian teleology of later philosophers," ^ 
is only partially reproduced by the modern 
distinction between homological and teleo- 
logical arguments, which is based on the 
difference between Type or Plan and End 
or Purpose (^rviro^s and tcAo?). Kepler had a Kepler 
correct apprehension of Aristotle's imma- 
nent or essential teleology, when, in the 
midst of his great astronomical discoveries 
he exclaimed, " O God, I think thy thoughts 
after thee!" The reverent Agassiz also Agassiz 

^Ueberweg, "History," 1. 162. 



i6o Theism 



tionality 
in Kature 



penetrated the secret when he declared that 
*' thorough classification is an interpretation 
TheRa- of God's thoughts." The rationality in 
nature — the true essence of the genera of 
nature — must be correctly seized by the 
human intelligence and embodied in the 
concept or class name which, thus objec- 
tively determined from without, frees itself 
from the personal whims or the arbitrary 
decisions of the individual thinker. The 
concept or class is entitled to recognition as 
permanent, real science only when the ele- 
ments of this objective essence, without 
omission and without addition, are lodged 
securely in the class name. The rationality 
is first in nature, then in human thought, 
and is finalty stored in language. This es- 
sential, objective, immanent teleology, which 
Aristotle was the first to grasp in its full 
significance, constitutes one of the most im- 
pressive proofs of the intelligence of the 
Author of nature, which might well occupy 
our attention throughout the remainder of 



The Argument front Design i6i 

this chapter; but the subject must be dis- 
missed with a single profound remark of 
Ueberweg's, '*The act of knowing, in so treberweg 
far as it is the copying in the human con- 
sciousness of the essence of the thing, is an 
a//^r-thinking of the thoughts w^hich the di- 
vine creative thinking has built into things : 
in action [divine and human] the preced- 
ing thought determines what actually exists, 
but in knowings the actual existence, in it- 
self conformable to reason, determines the 
human thought";^ and a kindred one of 
Schleiermacher's, '' To the proposition that ScWeier- 
thinking must conform to being, must be ^^ ^^ 
added another, that being must conform 
to thinking: the latter proposition is the 
principle and measure for every activity of 
the will, the former for every activity of 
thought/'^ 

^Ueberweg, "System of Logic," § i, p. 2. 

2 Schleiermacher, *'Dialektic,'* ed. by Jonas, p. 487, 
quoted by Ueberweg in his '* Logic." Compare Ti- 
gert's '* Logic/' p. 32, 
II 



1 62 Theism 



Scientific There is a strange misconception which 

^^^ dominates much of the current scientific re- 

jection of final causes. It is believed that 
whenever an effect is shown to be produced 
by efficient causes, operating according to 
mechanical laws, final causes are thereby 
excluded. In other words, efficient and 
final causes are supposed to be mutually ex- 
clusive: the presence of one is the certain 
index of the absence of the other. The 
uniformity of the action of mechanical, ef- 
ficient causes is held to be inconsistent with 
the supervision and control of a personal 
intelligence with reference to previously 
chosen ends ; and the interference of such 
a rational and volitional person is supposed 
to involve some break in the continuity of 
physical causation. The first section of the 
detailed discussion , with which the next chap- 
ter will be occupied, will be, therefore, the 
proof of the proposition : That efficient and 
final causes may and do cooperate in the 
-production of the same effect. 



The Argument from Design 163 

The teleological argument, as in the case Nature 
of the cosmological proof, which has pre- . ^-^x 
viously passed under review, involves both 
a rational and an empirical element. The 
rational element is the principle, universal 
and necessary (which would serve as the 
major premise of a syllogism, should one be 
constructed), that contrivance, adaptation, 
design, in the effect is proof of intelligence 
in the cause. The empirical element is the 
statement, based both on the everyday ob- 
servations and the scientific researches of 
men, that there are manifold instances of 
design in nature (which statement would 
serve as the minor premise of the above- 
mentioned syllogism). Little exception can Kant's 
be taken to Kant's presentation of the prin- ^^^^^^^ 
cipal points of the teleological proof: '^(i) 
There are everywhere in the world clear 
indications of an intentional arrangement 
carried out with great wisdom and forming 
a whole indescribably varied in its contents 
and infinite in extent; (2) the fitness of this 



164 Theism 



arrangement is entirely foreign to the things 
existing in the world, and belongs to them 
contingently only, that is, the nature of 
different things could never spontaneously, 
by the combination of so many means, co- 
operate toward definite aims, if these means 
had not been selected and arranged on pur- 
pose by a rational disposing principle, ac- 
cording to certain fundamental ideas; (3) 
there exists, therefore, a sublime and wise 
cause (or many), which must be the cause 
of the world, not only as a blind and all- 
powerful nature, by means of unconscious 
fecundity^ but as an intelligence, hy-yreedom ; 
(4) the unity of that cause may be inferred 
with certainty from the unity of the re- 
ciprocal relations of the parts of the world, 
as portions of a skillful edifice, so far as 
our experience reaches, and beyond it, with 
plausibility, according to the principles of 
analogy." ^ 

1 '* Critique of Pure Reason," Muller's translation, 
n. 536, 537- 



The Argufnent fro7n Design 165 

Both of the elements in the proof, men- skeptical 
tioned above, the rational and the empirical, 
have been attacked or denied. Hume, for Mm 
example, followed by Stuart Mill, objects 
that the assumption that nature turns out 
her products after the manner that man 
turns out his is unjustifiable. This objection 
may mean one of two things, either (i) 
that there are no real cases of design in 
nature, but only the appearance of it, every 
effect being simply a mechanical result fully 
accounted for by efficient causes ; or, it may 
mean (2) that though the world presents 
unquestionable instances of adaptation, it is 
presumptuous to attribute these adaptations 
to a designing mind. The second section 
of our argument, therefore, as developed in 
Chapter X., will consist of a critical defense 
of the rational principle against skeptical 
attacks, and the third (Chapter XL) of an 
exhibition of final causes in nature, with a 
refutation of their impugners. In this con- 
nection there must be a somewhat minute 



1 66 Theism 



examination of instances of design in (i) 
the mechanical and inorganic sphere, (2) 
the chemical, (3) the organic, (4) the in- 
stinctive, and (5) the intellectual. 

If physical causation, ordinarily so called, 
finds its only adequate explanation in the 
ceaseless efficiency of the Divine Will, as 
has been argued at length above in Chapter 
VII . ; and if final causes are explicable only 
by a final reference to the purposes of the 
Divine Intelligence, as will be shown in 
the next chapter; then the cooperation and 
union of efficient and final causes in the 
production of one effect will not appear 
stranore, since the universal Will and Intel- 
ligence are joined together in the absolute 
unity of One Divine Person. 



CHAPTER IX 

THE NATURE OF FINAL CAUSE AND ITS HAR- 
MONY WITH EFFICIENT CAUSE 

How the upholders of final causes could Finality 

1 , , J . r and Effi- 

ever nave been represented as impus^ners of . 

^ J^ o ciency 

efficient causes is passing strange. If a 
final could substitute an efficient cause, we 
should have an exception to the law of 
causation itself, which must be understood 
as affirming that every event or change must 
be due to active or efficient cause. Theists 
have always zealously asserted and main- 
tained the validity of this principle, without 
which the cosmological proof of the exist- 
ence of God comes to naught. That ev- 
ery event is due to an adequate cause, is 
the path to the only bridge by which we 
may pass from contingent to absolute ex- 
istence, from the finite to the infinite, from 
nature as a produced effect to God as a 
producing cause. All except a few belated 
natural realists, whose doctrine consistently 

(167) 



1 68 Theism 



carried out issues in materialism, also con- 
sent that it is the chief bridge by which 
we cross from mental states to objective 
existence; from knowledge, as the posses- 
sion of a mind, to the independent reality 
which accounts for the knowledge. The 
defenders of the theistic conception of the 
world would therefore be the poorest of 
tacticians, as well as the most inconsequent 
of reasoners, if the establishment of their 
contention with regard to teleology involved 
the destruction of their carefully chosen and 
stubbornly defended position in the field of 
cosmology. On the contrary, the vital in- 
terests of teleology demand the fullest possi- 
ble interpretation of the cosmological prin- 
Vaieatiae ciple of cause and effect. Teleology ''looks 
on nature with no private eye. . . . True 
to the law in its deepest and fullest con- 
ception, it enlarges the comprehension of it 
so as to say distinctly that the cause must 
be adequate to all that appeared in the ef- 
fect. . . . For an effect which reveals no 



The Nature of Pinal Cause i6g 

adaptation, the law might be satisfied v^ith 
a fortuitous or blind force ; but for one that 
exhibits a clear purpose or composite adjust- 
ment, it demands an intelligent cause. For 
a complex movement, with parts wisely co- 
ordinated and held steadily and unmistakably 
to a useful end, it requires a far-seeing and 
designing cause. . . . The full scope 
of the principle [of causality], therefore, in- 
cludes final cause, or design, in the aggre- 
gate causal action necessary for the rational 
explanation of the phenomena of nature." ^ 

The private eye of the upholders of dead An Alleged 

mechanism and the materialistic interpreta- ^^^^<^^- 

meat 
tion of nature pretends to see that their oppo- 
nents are in a predicament where one or the 
other of their chief theistic proofs, the cos- 
mological or the teleological, must be aban- 
doned. Efficiency excludes purpose ; pur- 
pose excludes the uniformity of mechanical 
efficiency. Cosmology, it is held, is, in its in- 
nermost spirit, atheistic, excluding teleology ; 

^ Valentine, " Natural Theology," p. 80. 



170 Theistn 



Chance 



and teleology, if personal, intelligent, theis- 
tic, must declare a war of extermination 
against rational cosmology. The gravity of 
this situation is a figment of the materialistic 
brain. The very brief examination I shall 
be able to give it will sufficiently indicate 
the worthlessness of the charge. 

We maybe helped to a better insight into 
the nature of purpose, and the compatibility 
of design and efficiency, if we accurately 
define the notion of chance. A chance 
event is certainly not identical with a cause- 
less event. Events cannot be properly clas- 
sified as caused and causeless. If some- 
times the term chance is loosely employed 
as if it signified the uncaused, it is not 
meant that the event came about without an 
efficient cause, but only that we are igno- 
rant of the cause. This, however, is not 
a scientifically justifiable use of the term 
" chance." 

Chance, in its proper sense, is opposed, 
not to the caused, but to the purposed. If 



The Nature of Final Cause 171 

I start out for an afternoon walk, my ac- 
tion is efficiently caused. If m}^ neighbor 
starts out for a similar purpose, his action 
is likewise efficiently caused, but in en- 
tire independence of me. If, without pre- 
arrangement, we meet and take our walk in 
company, the meeting is, in the proper sense, 
by chance. ''We cannot speak of acci- Mccosh 
dental occurrences^ but we may speak of 
accidental concurrences,^^ ^ Though the su- 
perstitious attached great importance to it, 
it w^as by chance that a great storm swept 
over London the night Oliver Cromwell died. 
Each event was the result of an independ- 
ent series of causes : the first of atmospheric 
conditions, the second of the physical con- 
stitution and habits of Cromwell. It is a 
mere matter of fact — of chance — that the 
two series of causes climaxed simultaneously 
in noteworthy effects. ''Facts casually con- jn^^'^^ 

joined," says the lawgiver of modern in- ^^^^ct 
statement 

iMcCosh, "Typical Forms and Special Ends in Cre- 
ation," p. 44. 



172 Theism 



ductive logic, ''are separately the effects of 
causes, and therefore of laws, but of differ- 
ent causes, and causes not connected by 
any law. It is incorrect, then, to say that 
any phenomenon is produced by chance; 
but we may say that two or more phenomena 
are conjoined by chance, meaning that they 
are in no way related through causation, 
that they are neither cause and effect, nor 
effects of the same cause, nor effects of 
causes between which there subsists any 
law of coexistence, nor even effects of the 
same original law of collocation."' 
xfie But my neighbor and I, finding that oc- 

Friendiy casionally we are thrown together by chance 
tAzm i^ our afternoon walks, and enjoymg each 
other's company, finally agree to meet at a 
set time and place ready for walking. Our 
walk in company is now the result of fore- 
sight, purpose, or intention. If some one 
living on the path along which we travel 



1 J. S. Mill, ''System of Logic," Bk. III., Chap, xvii., 
P- 373- 



The Nature of Final Cause 173 

formerly saw us walking separately for the 
most part, and very rarely together, now 
notes that every afternoon we walk in com- 
pany, he would be able safely to infer that 
the conjoint action was the result of agree- 
ment. The principle underlying this infer- 
ence is a very simple one. ''If we find Bain 
from observation," says Mr. Bain, ''that^ 
exists in one instance out of every two, and 
that B exists in one instance out of every 
three ; then, if A and B are wholly indiffer- 
ent to each other — neither connected nor 
repugnant — the instance of A and B hap- 
pening together will be (in the arithmetic of 
chances) one out of every six, on a suffi- 
cient everage. If, really, the two coexist 
oftener, there is connection; if seldomer, 
repugnance."^ So secure is this infer- 
ence that, as Mr. Bain declares, loaded 
dice are actually detected by a long series 
of throws. Actual trial has shown that in 
twelve hundred throws each side will turn 

1 Professor Alexander Bain, ** Logic," p. 316. 



174 Theism 



up very nearly two hundred times. ''Any 
great deviation from equality," concludes 
Mr. Bain, ''would be d^ proof oi loading."^ 
Design no If we recur to the case of the friendly 
Substitute pedestrians, we must concede that in the 
Efficiency uniform cases of designed meeting the ac- 
tion of each is just as completely determined 
by efficient causes as in the occasional cases 
of chance meeting. Design does not substi- 
tute efficiency, but depends upon it. The 
failure of any efficient factor would thwart 
the purpose. The absence of the purpose 
would leave all the efficient agents intact, 
but would render a uniform result, depend- 
ing upon the certain combination of the 
independent series of causes, impossible. 
Only by intelligent direction may independ- 
ent lines of efficient causation be made to 
cooperate for the attainment of a common 
end. Out of the principles clearly involved 
in this simple illustration may be drawn our 
definition: 

1 Professor Alexander Bain, *' Logic," p. 320. 



The Nature of Final Cause 17S 

A final cause is a foreseen end {jinis^ Definition 
riXos) intelligently predetermined and eflS- ^^^^^ 
ciently secured by the control or collocation 
of the agents which are fitted to bring it to 
pass. There is a threefold demand for in- 
telligence. Intelligence only can account 
for (i) the foresight, (2) the predetermina- 
tion, and (3) the collocation or coordination 
of the independent efficient causes. 

Eduard von Hartmann^ distinguishes four Hartmann 
elements in final causes: (i) the concep- 
tion of the end, (2) the conception of the 
means, (3) the realization of the means, 
and (4) the realization of the end. The 
order of conception is, first the end, then 
the means. The order of execution is, first 
the means, then the end. Moreover, the 
end, which is final in execution, is initial 
in purpose, according to the maxim. Quod 
j>rius est in intentione ultimuTn est in exe- 

1'' Philosophy of the Unconscious," Vol. I., Intro- 
duction, Chapter ii. 



176 Theism 

Doctrineof cutioneJ" '^Thus a final cause," says Paul 
Janet, to whom every subsequent worker in 
the teleological field must confess his in- 
debtedness, **is a fact which may be in 
some sort considered as the cause of its own 
cause; but, as it is impossible for it to be a 
cause before it exists, the true cause is not 
the fact itself, but its idea. In other words, 
it is a f orescent effect^ which could not have 
taken place without this foresight. ... In 
order that an act may be called a final 
cause, all the series of phenomena required 
to produce it must be subordinated to it. 
That phenomenon which is not yet pro- 
duced governs and commands the whole 
series, which would be evident^ incompre- 
hensible and contrar}^ to every law of cau- 
sality, if it did not preexist in some fashion 
and in an ideal manner before the combina- 
tion of which it is at once the cause and the 
result. , . . Thus, in one sense, the eye is 
the cause of sight; in another sense, sight 

^ Cf. Janet, '* Final Causes," p. 2. footnote. 



The Nature of Final Cause 177 

is the cause of the eye. We shall have to 
conceive, then, as Kant has said, the series 
of final causes as a reversal of the series of 
efficient causes. . . . "YYi^ mechanical ^o\xi\. 
of view consists in descending the first of 
these two series (from the cause to the ef- 
fect) ; the teleological point of view, or that 
of final causes, consists in ascending it 
again (from the end to the means)." ^ 

1 shall not go so far as to maintain that in 
every effect the operation of both efficient 
and final causes maybe detected or must be 
presupposed, though many writers of the 
first ability contend for this view — ^for ex- 
ample. President Noah Porter. ^ It is true Porter^s 

that the question ''Why?" is ambiguous, i^octrine 

1 • -11 /- • 1 i« Unproved 

and IS susceptible of either a telic or a 

strictly causal response. Why do the 
wheels of the steamer revolve? Because 
they are driven by the steam, is one an- 
swer; because they are the means for car- 

1'* Final Causes," pp. 2, 3, 4. 

2 " Human Intellect," § 608, pp. 594, 595. 

12 



178 Theism 



rying the boat with its passengers to their 
destination, is another. The first answer we 
always seek for: that in every instance we 
demand the second also is not so clear. 
''Take an eruption of a volcano: each 
stream of lava, each exhalation, each noise, 
each flash has its own cause, and the most 
passing of these phenomena could be de- 
termined a -prio^^i by him who knew accu- 
rately all the causes and all the conditions 
which have brought about the eruption ; but 
to think to attribute to each of these phe- 
nomena in particular a precise end is im- 
The True possible."^ Efficient cause is uniformly 
present as the ground of every change. 
Often it is accompanied with final cause — 
not as a substitute for, or a supplement to, 
its own energies, but as a dominant direc- 
tor. That is to say, the effect shows un- 
mistakable signs of (i) prevision of an end, 
(2) predetermination to realize it, and (3) 
preadjustment or coordination of independ- 



Doctrine 



^ Janet, " Final Causes," p. 6. 



The Nature of Final Cause 179 

ent efficient causes to secure it. Thus 
while in some cases we may detect efficient 
causes alone, and entirely satisfied with 
these may feel no call to seek for ends, and 
in others may demand and find both effi- 
cient and final causes, in none do we find 
final causes alone, independent of efficient 
causes and substituting them. On the con- 
trary, final causes always stand in a twofold 
relation to efficient: (i) a relation of domi- 
nancy in respect of their collocation and 
coordination; and (2) a relation of de^end^ 
ence in respect of the execution of the pre- 
ordained design. 

Finally, let us by one more illustration a Fresh 11- 
make clear to ourselves the harmonious co- ^^ ^^ ^^ 
operation of final and efficient causes. I 
form a purpose. This purpose may be that 
I will emigrate to a new state, purchase a 
thousand acres of land, clear, fence, and 
improve it, remove with my family thither, 
and rear my children, confident that by this 
plan I shall do the best possible for them 



i8o Theism 



and spend the remainder of iny days in 
peace and plenty. This is an exceedingly 
complex design. It takes decades, almost 
a lifetime, to carry it through. The forma- 
tion of the purpose Is undoubted. That in 
itself it has no efficient tendency to secure its 
realization is equally undoubted. Yet it is 
a conditio sine qua non of the realization 
of the scheme. By virtue of it the neces- 
sary agencies are selected and coordinated. 
Divers independent efficient causes are set 
in motion, along separate lines, which con- 
verge on the end to be gained. The achieve- 
ment is impossible without the presence of 
both classes of causes. Final cause is thus 
of the nature of a directing supremacy in 
the midst of, or going before, efficient caus- 
es, which nevertheless accomplishes its ends 
by means of their stability and uniformity. 
Indeed, the certainty with which man can 
carry his purposes into execution is in pre- 
cise ratio to the invariability of the efficient 
causes upon which he is dependent. Man's 



The Nature of J^tnal Cause iSi 

consciousness of the combination of final 
and efBcient causes in his own operations 
is, as Bacon would say, the *' prerogative ' ^ 
fact for the explanation of effects in nature 
like those produced by man. "li teleology 
has no place in the structures and functions 
of animals and plants/' says Mr. Thomas Herbert's 
Martin Herbert, in one of the most remark- 
able books of recent times, ^* if final causes 
are excluded from them — -and the most 
elaborate adaptation of means to ends gives 
no indication of design^ — -then there is no 
such thing as design in the activities of a 
man, or in those of a society • Conversely, 
if in human societies and individual men 
there is undeniably the employment of 
means to accomplish designed ends, as in 
the machinery of government, the process- 
es of manufacture, the intricate organiza- 
tion of the railway systems and the post 
office, and the innumerable purposive ac- 
tions of every life, it is equally undeniable 
that in the varied organs and functions 



1 82 Theism 



which contribute to the life of a tree there 
is also what answers to a final cause. If it 
be said that physical causation is adequate 
to produce the result in the last case, and 
that there is no scientific evidence of any- 
thing beside^ we have seen that this may be 
said with equal truth in all the other cases. 
If it is impossible to combine the action of 
intelligence with physical causation in the 
case of a tree, so it is in the case of all hu- 
man activities. If, nevertheless, we must 
predicate both agencies where human activ- 
ities are concerned, we cannot make their 
seeming incompatibility a bar in the case 
of other natural functions. The admission 
that in some way or other the action of in- 
telligence goes along with physical causa- 
tion in the case of men disqualifies us from 
refusing to admit that the two may cooper- 
ate in external nature."^ 

1 ''The Realistic Assumptions of Modern Science 
Examined," p. 215. Compare the statement of the al- 
ternative, pp. 225, 226, and p. 229. 



CHAPTER X 

DESIGN IN THE EFFECT PROOF OF INTELLI- 
GENCE IN THE CAUSE 

The limitations of space necessitate a Schopen- 
very brief review of the considerations which ^ ^ 
support this thesis. Fortunately to most of 
us the truth of the proposition is clear, al- 
most to the point of self-evidence. Scho- 
penhauer and Hartmann may discourse in 
learned jargon of unconscious intelligence 
or unconscious will; but for the profoundest 
philosophy, as well as for the popular ap- 
prehension, ''unconscious intelligence" is tfacon- 

a contradiction in terms* Consciousness ^^T 

telUgezLCe 

and mind are coextensive. Materialistic 
prattle about ''unconscious cerebration'' or 
" conscious brain centers** has done much 
to make such contradictory notions possible. 
Though brain is the most intimate organ of 
mind, it possesses no more consciousness 
than other parts of the body. All matter is 

(^83) 



i84 



Theism 



unconscious. All mind is conscious, though 
there are varying degrees of consciousness, 
from the utmost brilliancy of illumination to 
the densest obscurity. With this simple iter- 
ation of fundamental truths I shall have to 
dismiss, for the present at least, the objec- 
tions derived from the systems of philoso- 
phy expounded by Schopenhauer and Hart- 
mann. 

Evolution It would be interesting to trace at length 
the bearings, real or supposed, of recent 
forms of the doctrine of evolution on teleo- 
logical science. But here, again, the bare 
citation of some pertinent declarations of 
avowed and able evolutionists must suf- 

H^^igy fice. Professor Huxley strikes the key- 
note: '' There is a wider teleology which is 
not touched by the doctrine of evolution, 
but is actually based on the fundamental 

Owen proposition of evolution." Professor Rich- 

ard Owen insists that '' natural evolution, 
through secondary causes, by means of slow^ 
physical and organic operations through 



Design Proof of Intelligence 185 

long ages, is not the less clearly recog- 
nizable as the act of an all-adaptive Mind, 
because we have abandoned the old error 
of supposing it the result of a primary, 
direct, and sudden act of creational con- 
struction."^ Alfred Russell Wallace, who Wanace 
divides with Darwin the merit of the in- 
dependent origination of the theory of 
natural selection, asks: ^*^Why should we 
suppose the machine too complicated to 
have been designed by the Creator so com- 
plete that it would necessarily work out 
harmonious results ? ' ' ^ My present purpose 
does not demand any judgment upon the 
tenability of the hypothesis of evolution: the 
foregoing quotations sufficiently indicate 
that, even supposing it to be proved true, 
its leading advocates believe it compatible 
with teleology, the support, indeed, of a 
vaster intelligence, a more comprehensive 
teleology, than the older doctrine. 

1 Quoted in Schmid's " Theories of Darwin," p. 222. 

2 " Natural Selection," p. 280. 



1 86 Thehm 



MiUSeif- Mr. J. S. Mill repeats Hume's argu- 
refuted mentu^n ad tgnoranttam^ contained in his 
'^Dialogue Concerning Natural Religion." 
Hume's objection reduces to this, that we 
cannot conclude that because houses, ships, 
and watches are the result of intelligent con- 
trivance, nothing other than mind can ac- 
count for like effects in nature. Such a 
conclusion Mr. Mill styles, in one place, 
''an outrageous stretch of inference.'' I 
am not concerned to maintain the great 
English logician's consistency, and so may 
condemn him out of his own mouth. '' The 
particular combination of organic elements 
called the eye," says he, in the ''Essays on 
Religion," "had, in every instance, a be- 
ginning in time, and must, therefore, have 
been brought together by a cause, or causes. 
The number of instances is immeasurably 
greater than is, by the principles of the in- 
ductive logic, required for the exclusion 
of a random concurrence of independent 
causes, or, speaking technically, for the 



Design Proof of Intelligence 187 

elimination of chance. We are therefore 
warranted by the canons of induction in 
conckiding that what brought all these ele- 
ments together was some cause common to 
them all; and, inasmuch as the elements 
agree in the single circumstance of conspir- 
ing to produce sight, there must be some 
connection by way of causation between the 
cause which brought these elements together 
and the fact of sight. , . . The natural se- 
quel to the argument would be this : Sight, 
being a fact not precedent but subsequent 
to the putting together of the organic struc- 
ture of the eye, can only be connected with 
the production of that structure in the char- 
acter of a final, not an efficient^ cause. ^' 

It will be noted that in this passage Mr. 
Mill distinctly concedes that the true alterna- 
tive of design is not efficiency, but chance. 
This point has already been fully elaborated, 
and need not detain us here. But, acting on 
Mr. Mill's hintj we may very well conside-r 
the mathematical reasoning which excludes 



1 88 Theism 



the '' random concurrence of independent 
causes" for the production of such an or- 
Hart- gan as the eye, Eduard von Hartmann, in 

Mathe- ^^^ ^^ Philosophy of the Unconscious,"^ in 
matics which speculative results are obtained and 
exhibited according to the inductive meth- 
ods of the physical sciences, enumerates 
no less than thirteen of the most important 
conditions of vision, as follows: i. Special 
nerves issue from the brain of such a nature 
that each stimulus affecting these nerves is 
perceived as a sensation of light. 2. These 
nerves terminate in a very sensitive nervous 
tissue, called the retina. 3. Before the ret- 
ina is placed a camera obscura. 4. The 
focal distance of this camera is adapted to 
the indices of refraction from air into the 
ocular humors (except in the case of aquatic 
animals). 5. By means of various contrac- 
tions this focal distance is alterable for most 
persons from a few inches to infinity. 6. 
The quantity of light admitted is regulated 

^ I. 50, 51. 



Design Proof of Intelligence 189 

by the contraction and dilatation of the iris, 
affording an additional aid to clear vision by 
the cutting off of the peripheral rays. 7. 
The segments of the rods or cones continu- 
ous with the nerve-endings form a mosaic, 
so contrived that each segment changes 
light waves of definite wave-lengths (color) 
into stationary waves, and thus produces in 
the corresponding nerve-fiber the physiolog- 
ical color- vibrations. 8. Binocular vision 
conditions the perception of solidity and 
gives the third dimension of space. 9. Both 
eyes may be simultaneously moved by means 
of special nerves and muscles, but only in the 
same direction, thus unsymmetrically with 
reference to the muscles. 10. As the clear- 
ness of the visual pictures increases from 
the periphery to the center of the eye, an 
otherwise unavoidable distraction of the at- 
tention, by all the objects within the field of 
vision, is prevented. 11. The reflex turn- 
ing of the visual axis to the brightest point 
of the field of vision facilitates education by 



1 90 T]ieis7n 



the medium of sight and the formation of 
the ideas of space. 12. The constant flow 
of tears keeps the surface of the cornea 
transparent and removes the dust. 13. The 
secluded position in the bony socket, the 
lids, the eyelashes and eyebrows, protect 
the organ. ^^AU these thirteen conditions," 
argues Hartmann, '^are necessary for the 
existence and maintenance of normal vi- 
sion; they are all there at the birth of the 
child, although the occasion for their exer- 
cise has not yet been afforded; the circum- 
stances preceding and accompanying their 
origin are accordingly to be sought in pro- 
creation and the life of the fetus. The phys- 
iologist, however, it may safely be said, 
will never succeed, with the least show of 
probability, in exhibiting the sufficient cause 
for the origin of all these conditions in the 
blastoderm of the fertilized ovum and the 
material fluids which supply it: one cannot 
see why the child should not develop even 
without optic nerve or without eye at all. 



Design Proof of Intelligence 191 

Suppose now, however, that we fell back 
upon our ignorance, although that is a bad 
ground for positive probabilities, and as- 
sumed a tolerably high probability for the 
development of any of the thirteen condi- 
tions from the material conditions of em- 
bryonic life, say jo (^ probability which but 
a small portion of our most certain knowl- 
edge possesses), still the probability that all 
these conditions follow from the material 
relations of the embryonic life is only 0.9^^ 
=0.254. The probability, therefore, of a 
spiritual cause being required for the sum 
of the conditions =0.746, i. e.^ almost |. 
In truth, however, the several probabilities 
perhaps =0.25, or at the most 0.5 [instead of 
0.9 as assumed above], and accordingly the 
probability of a spiritual cause for the whole 
=0.9999985 or 0.99988 — /. ^., certainty." 

This may be regarded as a successful ap- 
plication of the reductio ad absurdum to the 
hypothesis that coordination, contrivance, 
design in the effect does not necessarily 



192 Theism 



imply intelligence in the cause; and here 

we may rest the case. *' How often," asks 

ArdiMshop Archbishop Tillotson, ''might a man, after 
TiUotson , ^ 

he had jumbled a set of letters in a bag, 
fling them out upon the ground before they 
would fall into an exact poem, yea, or so 
much as make a good discourse in prose? 
And may not a little book be as easily made 
by chance as this great volume of the world ? 
How long might a man be sprinkling colors 
upon canvas with a careless hand before 
they would happen to make the exact pic- 
ture of a man ? And is a man easier made 
by chance than his picture? How long 
might twenty thousand blind men, which 
should be sent out from the several remote 
parts of England, wander up and down be- 
fore they would all meet upon Salisbury 
Plain, and fall into rank and file in the ex- 
act order of an army ? And yet this is much 
more easy to be imagined than that the in- 
numerable blind parts of matter should ren- 
dezvous themselves into a world." 



CHAPTER XI 

SOME ADDITIONAL INSTANCES OF DESIGN 
STUDIED 

It was proposed, in the last place, to give 
a somewhat detailed examination of the in- 
stances of final cause exhibited in the vari- 
ous departments of nature. But space re- 
mains for only a few cases. The most cursory 
reader of modern works on botany and zo- 
ology cannot fail to remark how completely 
the language of teleology has taken posses* 
sion of these sciences. ^' Even plants," re- Bowae 
marks Professor Bowne, in his satirical way^ 
*' do the most acute and far-sighted things 
to maintain their existence. They special- 
ize themselves with a view to cross-fertiliza- 
tion, and make nothing of changing species 
or genus to reach their ends. A supply is 
often regarded as fully explained when the 
need is pointed out; and evolution itself is 
not infrequently endowed with mental attri- 
^3 (193) 



194 Theism 



butes. Such extraordinary mythology arises 
from the mental necessity for recognizing 
purpose in the world; and as it would not 
be good form to speak of a divine pur- 
pose, there is no shift but to attribute it to 
* Nature ' or ' Evolution ' or ' Law,' or some 
other of the homemade divinities of the 
day." ^ If one should think this the boast- 
ful language of a closet philosopher, over- 
confident because ignorant of science, he 
needs but to turn to the pages of Charles 
Darwin to encounter affirmations so strong 
that to the unscientific they seem extrava- 
Darwin's gant. " The more I study nature," says Mr. 
Darwin, ''the more I become impressed 
with ever-increasing force with the conclu- 
sion that the contrivances and beautiful 
adaptations slowly acquired through each 
part occasionally varying in a slight degree 
but in many ways, with the preservation or 
natural selection of those variations which 
are beneficial to the organism under the 



Concession 



1" Philosophy of Theism," Preface, p. vii. 



A dditional Instances of Design 195 

complex and ever-varying conditions of life, 
transcend in an incomparable degree the 
contrivances and adaptations which the most 
fertile imagination of the most imaginative 
man could suggest with unlimited time at 
his disposal,'' ^ Of a certain genus of plants 
Mr. Darwin inquires: ^'How then does na- 
ture act? She has endowed these plants 
with what must be called, for want of a bet- 
ter term, sensitiveness, and with the re- 
markable power of forcibly ejecting their 
-pollinia to a distance. Hence, when cer- 
tain definite points of the flower are touched 
by an insect, the 'pollinia are shot out like 
an arrow, which is not barbed, but has a 
blunt and excessively adhesive point. The 
insect, disturbed by so sharp a blow, or after 
having eaten its fill, flies sooner or later to 
a female plant, and, whilst standing in the 
same position as it did when struck, the 
pollen-bearing end of the arrow is inserted 
into the stigmatic cavity, and a mass of pol- 

1 '* Fertilization of Orchids," p. 351. 



196 Theism 



len is left on its viscid surface. Thus, and 
thus alone, at least three species of the 
genus catasetum are fertilized."^ Here is 
a coordination which binds together the veg- 
etable and animal worlds, between which 
no link of causal efficiency can be supposed 
to exist: the only adequate explanation is 
found in the doctrine of final cause as al- 
ready expounded in this treatise, 
inorgfanic The existence of teleology within the 
realm of the inorganic is denied by many. 
Were this true, the argument would be 
complete without it. It will be remembered 
that w^hile the universal presence of efficient 
causes was asserted, a like claim was not 
set up for final causes. A single case of 
undoubted design in nature is adequate 
proof of the existence of intelligence in the 
author of nature, just as the presence of a 
single flint arrowhead is sufficient evidence 
of the presence of man at some time in a 
now uninhabited island. Thus the argu- 

1" Fertilization of Orchids," pp. 212, 213. 



Additional Instances of Design 197 

merit from design is cumulative. When 
all the evidences are gathered together the 
argument, as Kant concedes, becomes ir- 
resistible. 

But a rational science can hardly consent The Atoms 
to the exclusion of teleology from the inor- 
ganic sphere. The atoms are ''manufac- 
tured articles." Whatever view science 
may finally adopt as to the ultimate consti- 
tution of atoms, dynamic or other, their 
mutual adaptations by which they enter 
into union for the formation of material 
bodies still remains a fact. Intelligence is 
the soil, and design the root, of the tree of 
the universe. 

Let us glance at a single peculiar phe- 
nomenon of the inorganic world. Increase 
of temperature augments the volumes of 
bodies, while decrease of temperature is 
followed by contraction of volume. This is 
the general rule. But water affords a re- The Freez- 
markable exception to it. Water, obeying ^^^ ^ 
the general law, contracts as its tempera- 



Theism 



ture is lowered until it reaches 39° or 40° 
Fahrenheit or 4° Centigrade , when expansion 
sets in and continues until it freezes at 32°. 
A volume of water at 37° is not so heavy as 
a like volume at 39°. And so the given vol- 
ume becomes increasingly lighter as the 
temperature sinks to the freezing point. 
Consequently the surface layers of water, 
which are both colder and lighter than the 
lower portions, easily freeze, while the body 
of the liquid remains at about 39^ or 40°. 
The prerogative of interpreting this singular 
fact might not be readily conceded to any 
other than a professional scientist: we may 
attend, therefore, to the commentary which 
no less an authority than Professor Josiah 
Parsons Cooke, of Harvard University, of- 
fers upon it. '^The surface water," says 
he, '^as it cools below this temperature 
[39°] remains at the top, and in the end 
freezes; but then comes into play still an- 
other provision in the properties of water. 
Most substances are heavier in their solid 



A dditional Instances of Design 1 99 

than in their liquid state; but ice, on the 
contrary, is lighter than water, and there- 
fore floats on its surface. Moreover, as ice 
is a very poor conductor of heat, it serves 
as a protection to the lake, so that, at the 
depth of a few feet at most, the temperature 
of the water during winter is never under 
40°, although the atmosphere may continue 
for weeks below zero. If water resembled 
other liquids, and continued to contract with 
cold to its freezing point ; if this exception 
had not been made, the whole order of na- 
ture would have been reversed. The cir- 
culation [which exists above 40°] would 
continue until the whole mass of water in 
the lake had fallen to the freezing point. 
The ice would then first form at the bottom, 
and the congelation would then continue 
until the whole lake had been changed into 
one mass of solid ice. Upon such a mass 
the hottest summer would produce but lit- 
tle effect. ... It is unnecessary to state 
that this condition of things would be utter- 



200 Theis7n 



ly inconsistent with the existence of aquatic 
plants or animals, and it would be almost as 
fatal to organic life everywhere ; for not 
only are all parts of the creation so indis- 
solubly bound together that if one member 
suffers all the other members suffer with it, 
but, moreover, the soil itself would to a cer- 
tain extent share in the fate of the ponds. . . 
Thus, then, it appears that the very exist- 
ence of life in these tem.perate regions of 
the earth depends on an apparent exception 
to a general law of nature so slight and lim- 
ited in its extent that it can only be detect- 
ed by the most refined scientific observa- 
tion."^ 

In the organic world examples of design 
abound on every hand. We have already 

1" Religion and Chemistry," revised edition (1886), 
pp. 149-151. My friend, Dr. R. S. Hyer, has called to 
my attention that cast iron, bismuth, and antimonj' 
are also exceptions to the rule. See Ganot's "Phys- 
ics," 14th ed., p. 328; and TyndalPs *' Heat," pp. 109, 
no, where a somewhat caustic, but scarcely conclu- 
sive, criticism of the argument is presented. 



Additional Instances of Design 201 

considered, as far as our limits will allow, 
that marvelous organism, the human eye. 
Intellect, imagination, and emotion are kin- TiieFHgiit 
died to a white heat and fused together 
when one reads that minutely exhaustive and 
accurate description which the duke of Ar- 
gyll gives, in his ' ' Reign of Law, ' ' of the so- 
lution which nature (as we commonly say) 
gives to the mechanical problem involved 
in fulfilling the structural conditions which 
make the flight of birds possible. Space 
will not permit its reproduction here. A 
perusal of it will satisfy the critical reader 
that the undevout ornithologist, no less than 
the undevout astronomer, is mad. 

The instincts of the lower animals form instinct 
an exhaustless field for the investigations of 
the teleologist, A single instance must close 
this chapter— the bee's construction of a 
honey cell. The equilateral triangle, the 
square, and the regular hexagon, are the 
only regular figures which can be joined 
together in the same plane without inter- 



202 Tkeisni 



slices; and of these the hexagon includes 
the largest space in comparison with the ex- 
tent of the inclosing lines, since the pro- 
portion of area to periphery increases as 
the polyglon increases in the number of its 
sides. The bee's cell, it is found, assumes 
the form of an hexagonal prism. The deter- 
mination of the form and inclination which 
must be given to the partitions closing the 
bottom of the cells is a much more difficult 
problem. Reaumur proposed to Konig, pu- 
pil of the celebrated Bernouilli, the solution 
The Bee or of this problem : ''To find the construction 
Ms Maker q£ ^^ hexagonal prism terminated by a pyra- 
matician ^id composed of three equal and similar 
rhombs (the whole of given capacity) such 
that the solid may be made with the least 
possible quantity of materials." This was 
requiring him to determine the angles of the 
rhombs that should cut the hexagonal prism 
so as to form with it the figure of the least 
possible surface. ''Maraldi," says Mr. J. 
Hunter, an eminent authority, "had pre- 



A dditional Instances of Design 203 

viously measured the angles of the rhombus 
and found them to be 109° 28' and 70^ 32' 
respectively; but Konig was not aware of 
this until after he had solved the problem, 
and assigned 109° i& and 70^ 34' as the an- 
gles, when he had sent him the ' Memoirs 
of the Academy of Science ' for 1712, con- 
taining Maraldi's paper; and Konig was 
equally surprised and pleased to find how 
nearly the actual measurement agreed with 
the result of his investigation." ^ 

''The measurement of Maraldi," con- 
tinues Mr. Hunter, ''is correct, and the 
bees have, with rigorous accuracy, solved 
the problem, for the error turns out to be in 
Konig' s solution." 

Is not this a satisfactory proof that the 
maker of the bee is a mathematician? 



'^Encyclo;pcBdia Britannica^ Ninth Ed., Art. "Bee." 



CHAPTER XII 

A THEISTIC ARGUMENT RESTATED^ 

The Two Experience, or knowledge bv the senses, 

furnishes us with innumerable instances of 
Expeneace 

the uniform succession of given events. 

This is all (if so much) that the senses tell 
us. Criticism of this apparently simple and 
unitary experience might develop the fact 
that it also is capable of analysis, the events 
alone being given by the senses, while the 
temporalit}^ or succession is contributed by 
the mind. The temporality is none the 
worse for this parentage : but for the pur- 
poses of this treatise I may pass over this 
ultimate analysis. It is worth while to no- 
tice, however, that the most primitive sen- 
sations cannot become available as elements 
or units of intelligible experience until some 
mental factor is added: the empirical and 

ilf any one should choose to designate the princi- 
ples and method of this chapter as essentially Lotze- 
an, he would not be very far wrong. 

(204) 



A Theistic Argument Restated 205 

the transcendent, the product of the senses 
and the product of the intellect, are bound 
up together in the units of true experience. 

The ordinary reflection of everyday life me Causal 
uniformly develops the notion of an inner J^^s:^®^^ 
connection, commonly denominated causal, 
between many of these regularly recurring 
antecedents and consequents. This is also 
in obedience to a mental demand, namely, 
the demand for a ground^ that shall suffi- 
ciently explain this uniform temporal suc- 
cession. This idea of an inner causal con- 
nection between events is often generalized 
in the judgment, '' Everything has a cause." 

This proposition is evidently too broad. 
For, firsts there are rational truths, indis- Rational 
putably valid, like those of mathematics, "^"^^^^ 
which, even when by analysis a better un- 
derstanding of them can be gained, are pro- 
duced by no cause. Certainly, at least, not 
until we reach the last and highest reaches 
of inquiry in a sober ontology, does any 
demand press upon the mind for a further 



2o6 Theism 



elucidation or explanation of self-evident 

and necessary truths. They appear self- 

TheTJneoii- sufficient. But, secondly^ not even every 

actual existence requires an act of causation 
and Un- ^ 

caused to account for it. It is only the changes 
which take place in the realm of the actual 
that require a cause. The mere ''being" 
of any existence is legitimately explained 
when it is regarded as completely uncon- 
ditioned, and hence eternal. When by ex- 
amination of the characteristics of a given 
''being," it is discovered that it is impos- 
sible that its existence should be uncondi- 
tioned, inquiry after its origin begins. But 
all such inquiries must end in the recog- 
nition of some unconditioned, i, e., un- 
caused, being. The little boy who inquired 
of his mother, "Who made God?" may 
be pardoned, and even regarded as a nas- 
cent metaphysician; but the grown man 
who gleefully propounds this conundrum to 
the theist but creates suspicion of his moral 
earnestness and sanity, and lends another 



A Theistic Argument Restated 207 

support to the Psalmist's conclusion that the 
atheist is a fool. The infinite regress^ it is Theinfi- 
clear, rests upon a fictitious universal: for ^eggonce 
the conditioned we must supply conditions, More 
for the caused, causes. But reason rests 
finally only in the Unconditioned and Un- 
caused, raising no further demand. 

Further: it can be shown to be incorrect changes 

to attribute a given chancre or event to a ^^^ ^^ ^^ 
^ ^ a Single 

single cause. Even Hamilton and the Scot- cause 
tish school saw and expounded this clearly 
enough. It would imply that one causal 
antecedent could by its own agency pro- 
duce out of itself a sort of ready-made 
effect, which could then be detached and 
transferred to a second being through emp- 
ty space. 

In the application of the causal judgment 
to the phenomena of experience, we do not 
actually fall into this mistake. We recog- 
nize the fact that the effect which a given 
antecedent, A^ produces, is not brought 
forth at all, except as A stands in a perfect- 



20^ Theism 



ly definite relation, x^ to a second reality, B. 
The effect, therefore, clearly does not de- 
pend upon a discretion^ so to speak, lodged 
in u4, bat (i) can be produced only when 
the condition of the definite relation to B is 
fulfilled, and (2) must be produced when 
this definite relation exists. 

Moreover, the effect varies as A sustains 
the definite relation, x^ to B or C or D. The 
effect is, therefore, very obviously depend- 
ent upon the joint natures of A and B^ or A 
and C, or A and D ; and B^ C, and D are 
just as much entitled to be considered caus- 
''Passive es asyl. Locke's phrase, ^^ passive power," 
Power" ^^g ^^^ ^ contradiction in terms, but his 
mode of recognizing what passivity is; in 
fact, to transform it into activity. The '' ac- 
tive power" which appears to be self -gen- 
erated by the agent is after all induced by 
its relation to something else: the *' passive 
power" which appears to be induced by the 
action of another agent is after all the prop- 
er self-action according to law of the being 



A Theistic Argument Restated 209 

we regard as patient. "Agent" and "pa- 
tient/' "active" and "passive," are hence 
superficial distinctions according to appear- 
ances, but have no sufficient real or meta- 
physical difference. - 

Once more: when for the definite rela- 
tion, x^ between A and B is substituted an- 
other definite relation, y^ the effect again 
varies. On the basis of all that has gone 
before we may now formulate the dual law of Dual Law 
variation in the operation of causes, simple ^ ^"^'' 
enough but not always attended to, namely, 
that effects vary ( i ) according to the nature 
of the beings {A.B^C^D^ etc. ) which stand 
in relation, and (2) according to the chan- 
ges in the characters of the definite relations 
{x^ y^ z) in which they stand. 

Finally, we must not omit to notice that Reciproci- 
every effect is reci-procal^ that is, (i) it con- ^^ 
sists in some change in both of the cooper- 
ating agents, and (2) as a necessary conse- 
quence the relation between them is modi- 
fied. Both expend: both receive: neither 
H 



2IO Theism 



Usage 



remains in the strictest sense the same: 
both the terms of the relation having 
changed, the relation itself alters. 
Lingruisitic Let US now look at some familiar illus- 
trations of these principles. The linguistic 
usage of everyday life, or even the idioms 
which have become imbedded in language, 
both of which vary, often in a contradictory 
manner, as we pass from one human tongue 
to another, cannot be relied upon to corre- 
spond with scientific accuracy to this meta- 
physically exact description of the true re- 
lations of causes and effects. Language is 
not always logical: much more rarely is it 
cystallized metaphysics. Often the entire 
ground of an effect — as vegetation — is found 
in a single cause — a grain of corn ; and the 
cooperating causes — moisture, heat, soil — 
are represented as conditions. This is ar- 
bitrary, and varies with the point of view of 
the speaker; for one scientist will speak of 
the corn as the cause, and of the moisture, 
heat, and chemical constituents of the soil as 



A Theistic Argument Restated 21 1 

the conditions; while another, just as con- 
sistently, inasmuch as it answers his pur- 
pose of intelligibly describing phenomena, 
will designate the soil, water, and heat as 
the causes of plant life, while the seed is 
regarded as a passive something upon which 
the efficient causation of these agents is ex- 
ercised. We know, of course, that the soil 
is exhausted by the crops raised upon it, 
whence arises the necessity for the scientific 
rotation of crops in all farming worthy of 
the name, and for the renewal of the soil by 
the application of various fertilizers. But 
sometimes the total observable effect is con- 
fined to one of the cooperating agencies, 
though the other in every case really under- 
goes some change. In this case, the latter 
is commonly regarded as an ^^ agent," as 
''cause," as '' active," as '' efficient," since 
it exhibits no change ; while the former is 
named ''patient," "effect," "passive," 
"object," since the observable changes 
are confined to it. Of course, as we have 



212 Theism 



abundantly seen, all these distinctions are, 
as matter of objective fact, unjustifiable and 
untrue. 

Two Now in every event there are really two 

lems things to be explained : ( i ) its character or 
"content," namely, why this particular ef- 
fect, and not some other, follows; and (2) 
the much more profound and difficult and 
hitherto almost unsolved problem of how it 
is possible, or why it is necessary, for any- 
thing whatever to happen simply because 
two distinct elements stand in a given definite 

The First relation. The first comparatively elementa- 
ry problem has doubtless been satisfactorily 
solved in what has already been said with 
regard to (i) the changing characters of the 
elements that may stand in relation, and 
(2) the varying relations in which they may 

The Second stand. But we do not yet understand how it 
is possible or why it is necessary that one 
thing should act upon another at all. We now 
inquire not how or why this cause produces 
this effect, but why any cause produces any 



mentof the 
ProtJlem 



A Theistic Argument Restated 213 

effect. Or, if some effect is assumed by 
our very use of -the term cause, we must rid 
ourselves of this entanglement of the wil- 
derness of language, which, refusing menial 
offices, is forever rising up with its bludgeon 
to dash out the unwary metaphysician's 
brains. To dodge this blow, let us once 
more alter the statement of our problem. 
Why are phenomena concatenated and re- Fuustate- 
lated and interlaced and all bound up to- 
gether at all? Why is not everything iso- 
lated? Or, if their coexistence involves 
some sort of relation, why do they not 
simply continue forever standing in this re- 
lation, whatever it may be? Why should 
these coordinate and coexistent relatives 
take on the character of antecedents, of 
causal antecedents, and straightway beget 
a consequent, which is not content to exist 
as a consequent, but has changed both of 
the antecedents and altered the relation be- 
tween them ? Why should this kind of thing 
go on continually throughout the universe, 



214 Theism 



so that all its widely separated phenomena 
are linked together in one vast system of 
changes, which we can designate only as 
the universe — namely, ad unuTii versum^ that 
which is turned back into one. Why should 
it be true ( i ) that the total state of this uni- 
verse in any moment is the total outcome of 
its total state in the previous moment, and 
that (2) while in a sense the same, the 
whole differs from moment to moment, roll- 
ing on in endless cycles, in comparison with 
which the mythological parallel of the stone 
of Sisyphus is but child's play? Why should 
not rather the whole vast machine stand 
stock-still, forever fixed in a given set of 
crystallized relations ? How or why is it pos- 
sible or necessary that any change or flux, 
and a vast and almost illimitable system of 
changes and fluxes according to law, should 
set in and be maintained? The cause of 
change, this is what we seek, and this is the 
problem we shall now attempt to solve. 
In the opinions of the unsophisticated, 



Transiefis 



A Theistic Argument Restated 215 

and even in scientific treatises, we are told 
of the ^'passing over" of an '^influence" 
from one element or agent to another (cau-- causa 
sa transzens^ injluxus -physicus). Many seek 
thus to persuade, or do really deceive, them- 
selves that efficient causation is explained. 
Let us see if the explanation explains* 

At once two fatal objections to this sa- Two Fatal 
pient suggestion may be offered : ( i ) it is ^^^ ^^^^ 
not possible to define what it is that is here 
represented as ^'passing over" from one 
agent to another; and (2) if this definition 
could be given, it would still remain unin- 
telligible how causation actually takes place* 
Having followed Descartes's advice to an- 
alyze our difficulties into simpler parts, 
when possible, we may seek to realize the 
force of these two objections to this plausi- 
ble explanation, 

I . If we regard that which * " passes over ' ' The Fii^t 
as a real element, Cj which detaches itself 
from A and attaches itself to B^ this seems 
a possible way of construing to our imag- 



2i6 Theism 



ination, if not to our intellect, the process 
of causation. It indeed describes accurate- 
ly many apparent effects produced by the 
elements of nature through this method of 
behavior. When by evaporation water (<::)5 
with all its properties, passes over from the 
earth (^) to the atmosphere (^), the ef- 
fect produced is that these aqueous proper- 
ties disappear from the earth, which dries 
off, and appear in the atmosphere, which 
becomes damp. This is not, however, a 
true case of efficient causation. It is a mere 
transfer of the water from the earth to the 
atmosphere. If that which passes over is re- 
garded as a ^' state, ^'influence," ''efficien- 
cy," "force," i. ^., something which can- 
not exist independently, then it remains true 
that qualities cannot exist separately from 
the things to which they belong. A ''state," 
*' influence," or "force" can never be de- 
tached from the agent or element A , so that 
it may exist even for an instant between A 
and B as ap independent state, altogether 



A Thetstic Argument Restated 217 

separate from any element, or as a state by 
itself, and then attach itself to B. 

2. But if this passing over of a state from The second 
one element to another could be made intel- 
ligible, we should still be unable to under- 
stand the familiar but miraculous process of 
efficient causation. The only result would 
be that c would be removed from A to B^ and 
the real difficulty, why B must straightway 
begin to perform on that account — that is, 
how c could produce an effect in B — would 
remain as unintelligible as ever. As before 
observed, the transfer of an element from one 
point to another, as of the match from the 
box to the pile of shavings, may often enough 
be observed, and frequently is an indispen- 
sable condition, without which no change 
would take place, the shavings failing to 
ignite without the contact of the lighted 
match; but this does not explain efficient 
causation, which begins only after the trans- 
fer has taken place. 

The philosophical doctrine of occasionak 



2lS 



Theism 



Occasion- 
alism 



Its Special 
Value 



ism sought to escape all these difficulties by 
altogether denying the existence of efficient 
causation in nature. Since it is clear that 
efficiency cannot pass from one element to 
another, the occasionalists taught that this 
interpretation of nature ought to be given 
up, since it is unthinking, meaningless, and 
absurd. The course of nature must then 
be considered simply as a temporal succes- 
sion of independent events, each of which 
is only the occasion, not the cause, the sig- 
nal, not the agent, for the happening of 
something else. Without the agreed-upon 
flag or light displayed at the railway station, 
the engineer would not stop his train. But 
nobody supposes that the flag or light effi- 
ciently brings to pass the stoppage of the 
engine. According to occasionalism, then, 
there is no causal nexus between any two 
changes or events whatsoever: nothing ever 
efficiently brings to pass anything else. 

Now, in some sciences occasionalism ev- 
idently has a special .value, namely, when 



A Theistic Argument Restated 219 

it serves the purpose of restraining the in- 
quirer from directing fruitless efforts toward 
a region which can be shown to be beyond 
investigation according to the methods of 
that science. The rise of the Baconian phi- 
losophy, and still more recently of the Posi- 
tivism of Comte (which regards all causes 
as inaccessible and beyond the domain of 
true science, which must therefore content 
itself with formulating the mere laws of the 
succession of phenomena), has imposed 
some restraints upon the arrogancy and 
wildness of the scientific imagination, in- 
ducing modesty and calmness, even though 
the systems of these philosophers must be 
viewed as shallow and false metaphysics. 
Still, the suggestion of occasionalism serves 
a useful purpose, as intimated above. For interac- 
example, when psychology attempts to ex- tionofsoui 
plain the interaction of soul and body; how 
a change in bodily condition, as the vibration 
of a nerve, can possibly effectuate that state 
of consciousness which we call a sensation ;• 



220 Theism 



or how a change in the states of the soul, as 
the ^^ putting forth" of a volition, can pos- 
sibly move the mass of matter which we call 
the body, and thus introduce a series of 
changes into the external world itself — the 
soul becoming a true first cause : these are 
questions which psychology as a special 
science cannot answer. The problem must 
be turned over to the general science of 
metaphysics, which, in explaining how any 
element whatsoever can exert causal effi- 
ciency upon any other, will have also told 
us how the particular agent the soul is able 
to influence the body, and vice versa. The 
interaction of soul and body is, however, 
one of the best examples of the intellectual 
difficulties which must be surmounted in 
reaching an intelligent solution of the prob- 
lem of efficient causation, 
xhe As an example, it possesses these decided 

Problem advantages* (i) that every mind instantly 
recognizes in it the precise nature of the 
difficulty to be overcome, and (3)k that from 



A Theistic Argument Restated 221 

time immemorial, since man began con- 
sciously to direct his attention to the mys- 
teries of his own complex nature, and par- 
ticularly since Descartes exactly formulated 
it as the business of modern philosophy, all 
philosophers have recognized it as a problem 
awaiting satisfactory solution. But, in truth, 
the interaction of soul and body is not itself 
a distinct problem, to be separately solved 
by a psychological explanation, but is only 
a single instance of the interaction of dis- 
tinct elements, to be explained by a general 
metaphysical solution of how it is possible 
that any individual element whatever should 
exert a causative influence upon any other. 
There is doubtless a science of pomology, 
and pomologists may be very learned and 
useful people in their way, but Sir Isaac 
Newton is not to be reckoned as a member 
of this guild. When he lay in his garden 
and saw that traditional apple fall, he did 
not seek an explanation by means of recon- 
dite researches into the nature of apples. 



222 



Theis7n 



Occasion- 
alism In- 
sufficient 



God 



He betook himself to a consideration of the 
principles of general physics, and thus dis- 
covered and promulgated the law of gravi- 
tation, leaving to pomologists the task of 
perfecting their own important science. 
Similarly, psychology, warned by the hy- 
pothesis of occasionalism off the forbidden 
territory of the causal interaction of soul 
and body, has busied itself with working 
up the actual parallelisms between bodily 
and mental states, whether bodily or mental 
state were the antecedent. This is the only 
work it could do. 

But occasionalism is itself an insufficient 
explanation of the general metaphysical 
problem, and needs itself to be explained. 
Until it can point out exactly how an event, 
a^ can become the signal or occasion of a 
distinct event, ^, it cannot be received as 
having penetrated the unknown land of effi- 
cient causation. 

This demonstration has always been at- 
tempted by ascribing efficiency to God as 



A Theistic Argument Restated 223 

the real ground or cause of these recip- 
rocally conditioning elements and events. 
From the isolated, finite, individual, A^ 
there could never proceed a conditioning 
influence upon another isolated, finite, in- 
dividual, B ; only God, as the sufficient 
ground of all things, could supply these suf- 
ficient, reciprocal, causative influences. 

After this Columbus-like voyage of dis- TwoHy- 

PO'ttLSSCS 

covery, we are now getting in sight of land. 
Still, two hypotheses are possible at this 
juncture. Since God is the immediate Au- 
thor of all the changes that take place in 
individual entities, it may be said that, as 
he is omnipotent, he may arbitrarily connect 
with a the consequence, 3, and with a second 
precisely similar a the consequence, c. But 
the uniformity of nature, or the falling out 
of consequences according to law, suffi- 
ciently refutes this hypothesis, and such 
arbitrary and unregulated interposition of 
the deity has found no philosophical de- 
fenders. 



224 Theism 



^^ The second hypothesis is the celebrated 

JLeibnitzian doctrine of preestabHshed har- 



Harmony 



mony, according to which the entire course 
of world-history has been preadjusted. 
Since it cannot be afRrmed that the ma- 
chine of the universe does stand stock- 
still, it may be at least maintained that the 
whole schedule of its apparent coordina- 
tions through causal efficiency has been 
fixed from the beginning. In the particu- 
lar case of the interaction of souls and 
bodies, out of a practically infinite number 
of souls and a like number of bodies, the 
deity joined together that soul and that 
body in which all the bodily changes (nerve 
vibrations) would be perfectly mirrored 
in the soul (sensations, percepts) and all 
the states of the soul (volitions) would be 
perfectly responded to by the body (exter- 
nal physical acts). Leibnitz's famous il- 
lustration is that of two clocks, constructed 
exactly alike in all particulars, so that, 
though each is entirely independent of the 



A Theistic Argument Restated 225 

other, both always indicate exactly the same 
time. 

But the absentee God of preestablished Leitjuitz^s 
harmony is no more efficient than the ab* ^ ^^ 
sentee God of common deism. Leibnitz's 
clocks fail to explain, for the machinery of 
the clocks is able to run at all (produce ef- 
fects), and to run together, only because it 
conforms to principles of fixed mechanical 
causation according to law, and so begs the 
question by assuming causation according 
to law, quod erat dentonstrandum. *'But,'' 
asks an inquirer, *' cannot the deity do as 
much as a clock-maker— make a machine 
that will run by itself? " This inquirer for- 
gets that every man-devised and man*made 
machine, however simple or however com- 
plex, equally involves harmony with, and 
obedience to, a previously established and 
mathematically definite system of mechan- 
ical causation. What could the clock-maker 
do without this? How does the universe- 
maker sustain this system, without which 
15 



226 



Theis'tn 



Hypothet- 
ical Har- 
mony 



Concnrsns 
Dei 



his world falls to pieces and comes to chaos 
and nothingness ? The abysses of this ques- 
tion cannot be illuminated even by so bril- 
liant an illustration as Leibnitz's twin clocks, 
since the system of mechanical causation 
needs itself to be sustained. 

Another theory teaches only a universal, 
hypothetical harmony. God has only de- 
termined, according to this doctrine, that if 
a certain change, a^ occurs in the thing, N^ 
then a certain other change, h^ shall always 
happen in the thing, M, This also is fetitio 
-princi^ii. For if the individual entity, M^ 
is to have the change, ^, whenever the en- 
tity, N, is affected with a^ then M must 
somehow become aware, so to speak, of 
N' s being affected with a^ in order to dis- 
tinguish it from the case of a" s absence — 
that is, either the entity, M^ or its quality, 
a^ must somehow produce an effect in N^ 
which, once more, is the very thing we are 
trying to understand. 

Finally, the concursus Dei^ or constant 



A Theistic Argument Restated 227 

assistance of God, is asserted, by which it 
is brought about that a given effect, b^ al- 
ways follows its cause, a. Now, if this hy- 
pothesis is meant to be an immediate ap- 
peal of the case to the realm of the inex- 
plicable and supernatural, perhaps it might 
be permitted to pass on the ground that 
God's ways are not our ways, and that the 
deity can do whatever he will. But then we 
abandon the task philosophy has set itself. 
Considered as a philosophical explanation, 
the doctrine of the concitrsus Dei does not 
eliminate the notion of efficient causation, 
but contains it twice over. For that God 
may attach every effect to its cause, every 
b to its a, and every d to its c, it is neces- 
sary that a and c should exert some effect 
upon God, and that a affect the deity dif- 
ferently from c; and then it becomes nec- 
essary for God to respond in one way upon 
a to produce 3, and in another way upon c 
to produce d. And so all attempts at ex- 
planation inevitably lead to the ctrculus^ for 



228 Theism 



•• 



we are asking for the cause of causes, the 
causa causarum^ which assumes the point at 
issue, whenever even the deity is made to 
act upon substantive entities which are inde-- 
-pendent of himself , 
rhings" If, therefore, efficient causation, or cau- 
sal interaction, is to be explained, the inde- 
pendent, isolated existence of self-subsisting 
entities called ''things" must be denied. 
The universe of existing, finite '^ things " is 
in an absolute sense one^ and only in a rela- 
tive sense Tnany : in this unitary world, causal 
interaction does not alternate wdth inaction, 
but changes and effects appear as individ- 
ual forms within the one sphere of all-em- 
bracing and efficient causation. All ' 'things' ' 
are dependent and relative realities or exist- 
ences. A state a which is an affection of 
A must likewise be an affection of B^ with- 
out any passing over of any sort. In other 
words, every particular ** thing" is nothing 
more nor less than a specific result of the 
definite energizing of the Infinite One ac- 



A Theistic Argument Restated 229 

cording to laws which he has himself or- 
dained, permanently maintained throughout 
finite time, or begun and suspended at his 
will. The preservation of the universe, or 
its existence from moment to moment, is a 
continuous and immediate divine act. ''My 
Father worketh hitherto." A real unity in 
a Person underlies the phenomenal unity of 
the world, and justifies the assumption that 
it is a universe. '' Intelligence endowed 
with will," says Kant, ''is causality." 

This Infinite One is both transcendent Theinfi- 
and immanent. He is transcendent because ^ J^ ' 

scendent 
his being does not consist of the sum of the and imma- 

finite existences which he produces. Nor is 

he the "stuff" from which dependent things 

are made. They are dependent; he is the 

only independent and absolute Person; in me 

no sense whatever does he depend on them •^^®^^^*® 

^ Persoa 

or realize himself through them, as every 
form of pantheism must hold. He is im- 
manent, as the Hebrew and Christian Scrip- 
tures teach, because he is the omnipresent 



2 20 Theism 



6 



and ceaselessly operating Power through 
whom all finite things exist. Nor are we in 
the least danger of slipping into pantheism. 
For pantheism denies the personality and 
freedom of God, and consequently the true 
personality and freedom of man; the dis- 
tinction between good and evil, of course, 
disappears also. On the other hand, when 
seif-sui)- we accord independent self-subsistence to 
sisting: *' things,'' we have unwittingly granted a 
postulate which logically leads to material- 
ism and atheism. This is the matrix from 
which the atheistic tendencies of much 
modern physical science really proceed; 
and, in contending for a so-called ^'real- 
ism," whose consequences they do not 
themselves fully apprehend, many Christian 
philosophers^ have unconsciously permitted 
their own thought to be saturated by a nat- 
uralism which is really atheistic. Not ' 'sub- 
stance," dead, motionless, without predi- 

lAs Dr. Samuel Harris in his "God: Creator and 
Lord of All." 



A Theistic Argwrnent Restated 231 

cates, though itself the seat of all proper- 
ties, the unknown and unknowable support 
of all that is known, unsupported and inex- 
plicable itself and explaining nothing; but 
" action," a living fountain of exhaustless 
power, is the essence of being, as maintained 
alike by the best physics and the best met- 
aphysics. That which simply '^ is." and does 
nothing, is for us as if it were not. It is 
nothing.^ *'Pure being=nothing." Every 

iDr. James Ward, professor of philosophy in the 
University of Cambridge, England, and author of the 
article ** Psychology " in the Encyclo^cedia Britannica^ 
thus speaks of "substance" in his latest work: "What, 
then, is the source and the validity of this conception 
of an unchangeable substratum as applied to things? 
All that we know of anything resolves ultimately into 
changes that it produces in other things or undergoes 
through them. With different things these changes 
are different, and so we attribute to each definite prop- 
erties. And, but that such analysis seems inexhausti- 
ble, we might arrive at length, as in thought we do ar- 
rive, at the bare position [or being] of this or that 
without anything to distinguish one thing from an- 
other. Into such a caput mortuum material substance 
always has, and, we may safely say, always will, tend 



2.^:^2 Theism 



o 



''thing" gets itself attended to, not by virtue 
of its bare existence, but by virtue of what 
it accomplishes. The atom is not inert 
''substance," but a center of force. Mat- 
ter in its constitution is dynamic. Will 
is the only fountain of power of which we 
have knowlege. Will belongs to persons. 
"God hath spoken once ; twice have I heard 
this; that power belongeth unto God." 

The argument of this chapter conducts to 
but a single attribute of the deity — his uni- 
te resolve itself. We cannot with propriety call it real 
or actual, for real and actual, as Lotze has pointed out, 
are predicates, and that is just what substance can never 
be. The changes which constitute the whole of our 
direct experience of things can, then, in no way be ex- 
plained by this bare potentiality of everything and ac- 
tuality of nothing. Science generalizes these changes 
into a system of laws; but an unchangeable, indeter- 
minate substratum will not account for determinate 
laws of change, nor they for it. The only conception 
that is of any avail here is that of determinate sub- 
stances or things, and this at once brings the category 
of causality to the fore, and enables us, instead of 
saying. No causality without substantiality, to say. No 
substantiality without causality. This change of front 



A Theistic Argument Restated. 233 

versal causal efficiency. I have developed 
partially the metaphysic of nature. The 
metaphysic of ethics and the philosophy of 
religion and the theory of knowledge are 
the necessary complements of this presen- 
tation: from all these sources may be con- 
structed a prof ounder system of natural the- 
ology than the past has produced, in which 
God shall appear as the only Perfect Person. 

philosophy owes to Leibnitz, and has seen no reason 
to abandon since, A world of such determinate 
things, in orderly interaction, may well lead our 
thought forward to a Supreme Principle that main- 
tains it all. But such an omnitudo realitaiis^ or self- 
subsistent Being, is the very polar opposite to matter, 
the equivocal substance of Descartes that only gives 
content to the empty extent of space; and to matter, 
the phenomenal substance of Kant that only adds per- 
manence to the empty extent of time. . , . We 
may conclude, therefore, that this category of substance 
is not an element in experience, whether individual or 
universal. It answers to nothing real, but is simply a 
logical residuum, to arrecpov. So long and so far as we 
can determine we have form; and form is essentially 
causal. The residuum at which for the time we halt is 
matter, the determinable, but as yety for us, undeter- 
mined." — <* Naturalism and Agnosticism: the Gifford 
Lectures Delivered before the University of Aberdeen 
in the years 1896-1898," II» 192-195. 



CHAPTER XIII 



OF THE KNOWLEDGE OF " THINGS 



? ? 



Tfee Organ- Any one who should accidentally prick his 
hand with a needle or a thorn would proba- 
bly agree without hesitation that the result- 
ing pain was wholly an experience or sen- 
sation of his own. He might make no dis- 
tinction between body and mind, and would 
regard any injury to the organism as pro- 
ducing what he would doubtless describe as 
a bodily pain. Without stopping at present 
to inquire whether this description would be 
scientifically exact, we may be sure that no 
one would think for a moment of ascribing 
any experience of pain to the needle or the 
thorn ; nor would he suppose there was in 
the one or the other any change correspond- 
ing to the experience of pain in the injured 
member. Drawing a broad line of distinc- 
tion between the self, considered uncritical- 
ly as made up of body and mind, and the 
world beyond and independent of the body, 
(^34) 



Of the Knowledge of Things 235 

the painful experience would be regarded 
as belonging wholly on the self-side of the 
line, and as attaching in no sense to any- 
thing on the world-side of the line. All 
persons would agree without debate that all 
our experiences through the organic sense — 
if this name may be applied to the nervous 
apparatus, diffused throughout the body, by 
which we are informed of injury to the or- 
ganism — are wholly subjective^ that is, they 
belong to us, and not to the object which 
produces the wound. 

We may, however, within the general or- 
ganic sense, distinguish specifically the sense The Sense 
of temper attire , Suppose one were thought- ^ ®"iper- 
lessly or ignorantly to pick up a glowing 
coal of fire . Is the coal hot ? or is the thought- 
less person, who has taken it into his hand, 
hot? Perchance in the other hand he may 
hold a lump of ice. Is the ice cold? or is 
the holder cold? To be sure, the physicist 
might reply that neither is cold; that, in- 
deed, there is no such thing as cold, since 



236 Theism 



cold is only the comparative absence of heat. 
All bodies possess some heat, not excepting 
ice. To satisfy the physicist we may agree 
that the lump of ice extracts a certain amount 
of heat from the hand while in contact with 
it, this being evidenced by the fact that the 
ice partially melts. But still the query may 
be put, Is the ice cold? or has it only im- 
parted a sensation of coldness to me, lower- 
ing the temperature of my body through the 
extraction of a portion of its animal heat? 
Undoubtedly the latter is the true answer to 
the question. If one will reflect for a mo- 
ment, he will find himself obliged to con- 
cede that the glowing coal, in the one case, 
produces a sensation of heat in the one hold- 
ing it, and the lump of ice, in the other case, 
produces a sensation of cold. The fire is 
not hot; the ice is not cold; these are only 
organic sensations of temperature produced 
in me while I am in contact with the fire or 
the ice. The case is not quite so plain as 
the one first adduced; indeed, it is much 



Of the Knowledge of Things 237 

more opposed to our habitual ways of think- 
ing and speaking than the example of the 
needle or the thorn; but, on the whole, per- 
haps all will agree that our experiences 
through the sense of temperature are en- 
tirely subjective. And, if the reader has 
journeyed with me so far, it is hoped that 
he will not desert the company, even though 
the road should lead through a strange ter- 
ritory, in which things are no more what 
they have always seemed to be. 

Let me now venture a step further, and subjectivi- 
select one of the senses numbered among ty of Taste 
those commonly designated the ^'five senses" 
of man. If one should allow a lump of su- 
gar slowly to dissolve in the juices of the 
mouth, can it be scientifically maintained 
that the sugar has any change or property 
like our experience of sweetness ? No doubt 
it may be held that the sugar has properties 
which enable it to impart to us the sensation 
of sweetness. But that is not now the ques- 
tion. Unquestionably nobody in his right 



2*38 Theism 



mind would undertake the correction of the 
common forms of speech, descriptive of this 
and similar experiences through the senses, 
on the ground of their lack of conformity to 
scientific truth. This would be as quixotic 
as an attempted modification of the current 
phraseology concerning the rising and the 
setting of the sun. But all of these admis- 
sions are beside the main issue. The sugar 
may indeed be a cause, but the effect is the 
sensation of sweetness in him who tastes the 
sugar. And so it is with all the tastes. Every 
taste is a subjective experience ; and we have 
no ground for believing or conjecturing that 
the objective cause of this subjective expe- 
rience resembles, in any degree or after any 
manner, the effect produced in us. In fact, 
unless we are prepared to admit that sugar 
possesses consciousness, we know that this 
cause must be totally different. It would 
be just as true for the man who is under the 
influence of whisky to say that the whisk}- 
is drunk as it would be for one who is under 



Of the Knowledge of Things 239 

the influence of sugar to say that the sugar 
is sweet. If whisky makes one drunk, just 
as certainly sugar makes one sweet; both 
are subjective states produced by introduc- 
ing a foreign substance into the organism. 
If it should be held that sugar is sweet in 
itself, while whisky only produces drunken- 
ness in him who drinks it, a pertinent inquiry 
would arise , What is the state of the case when 
the two are mixed and taken together? Of 
course to the mind unaccustomed to scien- 
tific discrimination and philosophic reflection 
all this seems absurd enough. But the more 
acute and thorough the analysis, the more 
profound will become the conviction that 
not only the organic sense and the se^ise of 
tem-perature^ but also the sense of taste ^ yield 
only subjective experiences or states. 

If, now, we direct our attention to the The sense 
sense of sfnell^ we shall find it in precisely ^ ^^ 
the same class with the sense of taste. Odors, 
no less than tastes, are effects produced in 
us ; and if there were no noses, there would 



240 Theism 



be no smells. The external physical condi- 
tions for the production of a sensation of 
smell would exist exactly as they did when 
men were endowed with noses, but both the 
physiological condition or stimulus and the 
psychical reaction necessary to the existence 
of an odor w^ould be absent. Any body 
that is smelled gives off infinitesimal parti- 
cles, and when these gaseous exhalations 
fall upon the extremities of the olfactory 
nerves in the nose, the nerves are irritated, 
and, transmitting the irritation to the brain, 
produce in the possessor of that brain a sen- 
sation of smell. The nose and the nerves are 
an integral and essential part of the mech- 
anism necessary for producing an odor. 
Without them the odor fails to come into 
being. The external body emitting gaseous 
particles may be regarded as the source or 
fountain of this whole movement, no doubt; 
but if this beginning were not complement- 
ed by a nose, with olfactory nerves, no odor 
would ever result. Similarly, if man pos- 



Of the Knowledge of Things 241 

sessed no other sense than that of smell, life 
would be reduced to a series of smells or 
succession of odors ; no sights or sounds or 
tastes would diversify human experience. 
All variety would consist in differences of 
smell. 

Perhaps, now, before passing to the high- TiieMecii- 
er senses, it might be well to inquire into the ^gg^^jy 
mechanism of the body which enables it to 
transmit organic pains, differences of tem- 
perature, tastes, odors, and, as we shall 
see, sights, sounds, and touches. And as I 
have managed so far in this chapter to get 
along without the obscuring technicalities 
of physics, physiology, and psychology — 
the three sciences which, taken together, so 
supplement each other as to give a complete 
account of the phenomena under investi- 
gation — so I may attempt to compass the 
outlines of nervous physiology in the same 
manner. If we examine the body we find 
it subject to the same laws of physics and 
chemistry which obtain in those portions of 
16 



242 Theism 



matter with which we have no such intimate 
The Body union. And yet the body is infinitely more 

aainter- ^q ^g than any other lump of matter, inor- 
mediary 

game or organic, weighing a hundred and 

twenty-five or fifty pounds. Philosophers 
have talked of a tertium quid^ a third some- 
thing — neither matter nor mind, but yet both 
— which should serve as a vehicle of com- 
munication between the mind and the body. 
Rejecting this conception as unsupported by 
evidence, we may yet hold that the body is 
the true tertium quid^ which serves as the 
vehicle of communication between the mind 
and that external world which seems to exist 
independently of both the mind and the body. 
There is the I, the Ego, the Self; there is 
the body which is not, on the one hand, the 
I or the Ego, nor yet, on the other hand, is 
it the external world in exactly the same 
sense as other matter is; and there is the 
external world, not only external to the mind, 
but also to the body: the body is the true in- 
termediary between the mind and the world. 



Of the Knowledge of Things 24 



Inspecting the body closely, we discover Sensor aad 

Motor 
Nerves 



in it two distinct sets of nerves serving dif- 
ferent and, in some sense, opposed purposes. 
One set of these nerves is called sensor, af- 
ferent, or incarrying; the other set is called 
motor, efferent, or outcarrying. Along the 
lines of the former the external world deliv- 
ers itself upon the mind; along the lines of 
the latter the mind delivers itself upon the 
external world. Along the sensor nerves 
travel the sensations ; along the motor nerves 
travel the volitions. Sensation and will — 
these are the poles of human experience; 
their products are the materials with which 
the intellect does its work. From all parts 
of the body in whose surface are located 
what are commonly called the peripheral 
extremities of the sensor nerves, these lines 
of communication stretch to the ganglionic 
centers and thence to headquarters in the 
brain. From the brain to all parts of the 
body proceed the motor nerves, by which 
the movements of the muscles and members 



244 Theism 



of the body, and of the body itself, are con- 
TheBody trolled. The body may thus be fairly lik- 
a Bridge ened to a great bridge having two roadways. 
At one terminus is the mind; at the other 
the world of matter. Along one roadway 
all the passengers are traveling in the same 
direction — from the mind to the world. Vo- 
litions lake the motor roadway, control the 
bodily movements, and so project new fac- 
tors into the world's progress: palaces, 
warehouses, manufactories, and churches; 
pictures, statues, epics, and operas; ships, 
railways, and canals — these are some of the 
results. Along the other roadway all the 
passengers travel in the same direction, too ; 
but it is in the opposite one — from the world 
to the mind. All the vibrations which be- 
come sensations take the sensor roadway 
and a thousand messages of every variety 
and import are delivered to the waiting mind 
within, which is so marvelously endowed that 
it is able to assort and interpret them all. 
More of the wonderful functions of these 



Of the Knowledge of Things 245 

motor and sensor nerves will be brought 
out as we proceed. 

I may now take up the higher sense of The Sense 
hearing. If there were no ears, would there ** ®* ^ 
be any sounds ? Paradoxical as it may seem, 
this question must certainly be answered in 
the negative. If you were to ask the farm- 
er, as he passes through field or wood at 
break of day, Where is the music ? without 
hesitation he would answer, In the throats 
of the birds. But suppose one of the sweet 
songsters should be captured and placed un- 
der the exhausted receiver of an air pump. 
We might indulge the further supposition 
that the bird could support life for a short 
time in this situation. The vocal organs 
might be in perfect condition; the appro- 
priate motions might be made with the ut- 
most precision; and yet we know that no 
sound would be heard. The atmospheric 
vibrations are physically requisite to the 
transmission of sound — are part of the nec- 
essary machinery for its creation, to speak 



Theism 



more accurately ; and since there is a vacuum 
about the bird, no sound is heard, that is, 
no sound is made. But suppose the bird to 
be singing again in the forest. The atmos- 
phere properly supplements the movements 
of the vocal organs of the songster. But 
the person walking in the forest is deaf! 
It makes no difference whether the deafness 
results from the accumulation of foreign 
substances in the external orifices of the ear 
or from the internal paralysis of the audito- 
ry nerve. In either case a part of the ma- 
chinery necessary to the production of 
sound breaks down. Not only must the 
bird use its vocal organs ; not only must 
the atmosphere do its work of transmit- 
ting motion; but there must be impact 
upon the tympanum of a perfect ear and 
consequent vibrations produced in the au- 
ditory nerve. 

But again, we suppose the atmospheric 
waves breaking upon a responsive tympa- 
num and the auditory nerve correspondingly 



Of the Knowledge of Things 247 

vibrating— at last there is a sound* Where wiiereis 
is it? In the throat of the bird? No ! In tuesotuid? 
the atmosphere ? No ! In the tympanum 
of the ear? No I In the auditory nerve? 
No ! In the brain ? No ! It is neither in 
the bird, nor in the surrounding atmosphere? 
nor in anj^ portion of the body of him who 
hears— for all these are matter^ and brain^ 
as much as the atmosphere, is incapable of 
being the seat of sound. Where, then, is 
the sound? In the mind I Sounds are 
mental phenomena* They are elements of 
a consciousness, and without consciousness 
they have no conceivable existence, what- 
ever may be the physical and physiological 
motions and changes which prepare for them . 
A sound external to the sphere of a con- 
sciousness would be as unintelligible as a 
toothache which nobody should have. How 
is the passage effected from the body 
to the mind; how are nerve vibrations 
or brain changes transmuted into phe- 
nomena of consciousness? Ah, there, if 



248 Theism 



natural realism or dualism be true, is one 
of the ultimate, inexplicable facts. The 
passage, it must be allovv^ed, is effected, 
since we have the experience in conscious- 
ness, and the cause is supposed to be mat- 
ter in motion: the mechanical conception 
of the world admits no other. The trans- 
mutation, since the dualistic hypothesis re- 
quires it, takes place. How, no one has 
ever yet told. Du Bois-Reymond says : ' ' If 
we possessed an absolutely perfect knowl- 
edge of the body, including the brain and 
all changes in it, the psychical state known 
as sensation would be as hicomprehensible 
as now. For the very highest knowledge 
we could get would reveal to us only matter 
in motion, and the connection between any 
motions of any atoms in my brain, and such 
unique, undeniable facts as that I feel pain, 
smell a rose, see red, is thoroughly zncom- 
frehensibhy^ Professor Tyndall asserts: 

1 Lecture on " The Limits of the Knowledge of 
Nature." 



Of the Knowledge of Things 249 

*' The passage from the physics of the brain 
to the corresponding facts of consciousness 
is unthinkable.^^ ^ And Professor Huxley 
says; '^How it is that anything so remark- 
able as a state of consciousness comes about 
as the result of irritating nervous tissue is 
just as unaccountable as the appearance of 
the Djin when Aladdin rubbed his lamp."^ 
*' Incomprehensible/' ''unthinkable," ''un- 
accountable/' are the terms applied by these 
eminent physicists to the most commonplace 
facts of daily and hourly experience when 
their explanation is sought in the terms of a 
science which assumes the dualism of mat- 
ter and mind. The contradictory exclusive- 
ness of thought and extension, having been 
put into mind and matter at the beginning 
by Cartesian definition, it ought to excite no 
surprise that at the frontiers of physics and 
psychology they refuse to interpenetrate. 
Since the facts are undeniable, the only 

1^^ Fragments of Science," p. 121. 
«" Lay Sermons." 



2^0 Theism 



lustration 



scientific course open to those who discover 
or allow the '* incomprehensible," the ''un- 
thinkable/' and the ''unaccountable/' is to 
revise the Cartesian definitions whence this 
signal of '^no thoroughfare" arises/ 
AFresiiii- If there is yet a lingering skepticism in 
the mind of the reader, let the illustration be 
varied. One may hear himself speak or 
sing. When I both sing and hear myself 
sing, when I am both the utterer and the re- 
cipient, is the sound in my mouth or in my 
ear? I must consent at once that there is 
not in my mouth or in any of vsxy vocal or- 
gans anything like a sensation of sound. 
Vibrations of my own auditory nerves are 
in this case produced by the motions of my 
own vocal organs. And, as we have seen, 
no more in the vibrating nerves of hearing 
than in the moving organs of speech exists 
the resulting sound, but only in the mind. 
In so simple a matter as the communica- 

^See some general remarks in the ** Preface'* of this 
work, pp. ix-xi and xii, xiii. 



Of the Knowledge of Things 251 

tion of a thought by one person to another. Education 
there are at least five distinct steps or proc- 
esses. These stages arranged in chrono- 
logical order, and named according to the 
sciences in which their description properly 
falls, are, (i) psychical, (2) physiological, 
(3) physical, and then (4) physiological, 
and (5) psychical again. To communicate, 
I must first have a thought— an experience 
of the psychical order. If my thinker stops, 
my talker must also stand still. But I must 
further so control my vocal organs as to 
form the articulate sounds linguistically ex- 
pressive of the thought. The thought, so to 
speak, has now passed out of the mind and 
has been committed to the body. This is a 
fact of the physiological order. The move- 
ments of the vocal organs in turn produce 
atmospheric vibrations . The thought passes 
out of the body and is committed to the cus- 
tody of the atmosphere. We have at this 
stage literally ^'winged words." This is a 
fact of the purely physical order. The at- 



52 Theism 



mospheric waves produce their appropriate 
effect in the auditory nerves of the listener. 
The thought is translated from the air into a 
human body once more, and a new fact of 
the physiological order is produced. Final- 
ly, the mind of the auditor becomes the re- 
cipient of the thought which originated in 
the mind of the speaker, or rather is moved 
to produce it afresh out of its own resources ; 
and the series terminates as it began with a 
fact of the psychical order. Hence minds 
never come into direct contact wdth one an- 
other; and education, so far from being the 
mere shoveling of knowledge from one mind 
into another, as a cart might have placed in 
it a load of coals, is a process of intellectual 
quickening in which one mind enables an- 
other to repeat independently the processes 
of thought. 
The Sense As sensations of sound are generally de- 
pendent upon the vibrations of the atmos- 
phere, though there may be other transmit- 
ting media, so sensations of light are in gen- 



of Sigfht 



Of the Knowledge of Things 253 

eral dependent upon the vibrations of the 
luminiferous ether, which is the specific 
stimulus for the optic nerve. These vibra- 
tions range from four hundred and fifty-one 
billions per second^ producing the sensation 
of red, to seven hundred and eighty-five 
billions per second, producing the sensation 
of violet. The external, physical basis of 
color is clearly the different rates of vibra- 
tion in the luminiferous ether ; and the physi- 
ological basis is most probably the differen- 
tiation of the optic nerve into special fibers, 
responsive to different rates of vibration in 
the ethereal medium. Hence, physics teach- 
es us that bodies have no color of their own, 
color resulting only from those constituents 
of white light which are not absorbed but 
reflected. But these reflected rays are but 
different rates of vibration in the ether, and 
these vibrations are the causes of vibrations 
in the fibers of the optic nerve, and these 
nervous vibrations produce sensations of 
color in our consciousness. Colors, there- 



;54 Theism 



tions 



fore, like sounds, tastes, and odors, are 
wholly subjective. 
nitistra- But this subjectivity may be made more 

apparent in several ways. Such is the spe- 
cific energy of the several nerves of taste, 
sound, and sight, that no matter how any 
one of them may be stimulated, each always 
gives its own appropriate response. The 
mind always experiences a sensation of 
sound whenever the auditory nerve is stim- 
ulated, no matter whether the stimulus be 
the normal one of atmospheric vibrations or 
the extraordinary ones of mechanical pres- 
sure or the electric current. Similarly, elec- 
trical stimulus and mechanical pressure so 
affect the optic nerve as to produce sensa- 
tions of light. The violent concussion of a 
sudden fall causes the unfortunate person 
**to see stars"; and whenever the optic 
nerve is severed in a surgical operation, the 
patient perceives a flash of light. Thus 
clearly neither the external, physical stimu- 
lus, nor the internal, physiological stimulus 



Of the Knowledge of Things 255 

is light or color. The physical or extra- 
organic excitant is the vibrations of the lu- 
miniferous ether, and the physiological or 
intra-organic excitant is molecular motion 
in the optic nerve transmitted to the brain. 
This brain change is the final element in the 
physical and physiological series. And it 
makes no difference how this brain change is 
produced — by vibrations of the ether, by elec- 
tricity, by mechanical pressure, or by scision 
— in any case the mind reacts with a sensa- 
tion of color. Hence, colors are purely sub- 
jective. It is a common experience with per- 
sons who have had an arm or a leg ampu- 
tated to feel, for a limited time afterwards, 
pain in the amputated member. This is eas- 
ily accounted for. When the nerve termini 
in the ^' stump " are irritated, the mind inter- 
prets the resulting sensations as if they had 
originated in the natural nerve terminations 
in the missing member. Itis the brain change, 
irrespective of its cause or source, which is 
the final condition of the psychical reaction. 



256 



Theism 



Music and Let US not, however, despise the music 
^ and pictures of the world because they are 
our sensations. ^' Sound and color are no 
worse," says Lotze, ''because they are sim- 
ply otir sensations. They constitute in fact 
the exact end which nature was aiming at 
with its waves of ether and air, but which 
it could not accomplish by itself alone. To 
reach this end it needed soul, so that there 
might be realized through the action of the 
soul in sensation the beauty of shimmering 
light and of ringing sound." 

Secondary It is now evident that heat, cold, tastes, 

Properties odors, sounds, and colors are all effects pro- 
duced in us — are, in a word, subjective. 
These constitute a very large section of what 
we commonly regard as the external world, 
and are usually designated by metaphysicians 
the secondary ^roferties of Tnatter. So far 
realists and idealists are practically agreed. 

Toucii The touch is the only sense which has 

been supposed to give immediate and com- 
plete information of the so-called primary 



Of the Knowledge of Things 257 

qualities of external bodies— properties al- 
leged to exist in the bodies precisely as they 
do in our cognition* But the distinction of 
primary and secondary qualities is untena- 
ble ; and the same analysis we have applied 
to the other senses will convince us that touch- 
es are also dependent on nerve vibrations and 
brain changes, and are simply our sensations.^ 
Of touch, and of so-called primary qualities, 
more will be said in a later chapter. 

Within the range of the phenomena of 
sensation we have been discussing, however, 
there is sufficient ground for concluding the 
existence of independent reality. 

The ultimate grounds of objectivity are mtiittate 

not to be found in any supposed immediate ^^®^^^s ^^ 

objectivity 
recognition in consciousness of anything 

material whatsoever ; but rather in the direct 
mental perception and distinction of two op- 
posed series of purely mental experiences, 
which fall, of course, wholly within the limits 

1 Compare Bradley, "Appearance and Reality," 
Chapter I., pp. 11-18. 

17 



258 Theism 

of consciousness, (i) The mind discrimi- 
nates voluntary and involuntary^ or self-de- 
-pendent and self-independent series of expe- 
riences in consciousness — e. g'^, there is an 
essential difference between memories and 
sounds, though both are only facts of con- 
sciousness. Over the quality or the intensity 
of the sound I can exercise no direct control ; 
the memory image I can ordinarily call up or 
banish at pleasure. ( 2 ) Mind originates ef- 
fects, which report themselves back through 
sense, as when I write this sentence. The 
first and last members of the series are 
distinctly in consciousness, and the thought 
built into both identifies the last with the 
first, or certifies the dependence of the 
last on the first. What went forth as 
thought and will only, comes back as sen- 
sation, with the same thought built into it, 
and I know that I have projected myself into 
an independent region, unknown to me ex- 
cept as I gradually learn that I can operate 
upon it according to stable laws, and that it 



Of the Knowledge of Things 259 

in turn, producing effects according to law, 
can project influences within the sphere of 
my consciousness. In this sense, only, is 
there anything that maybe styled immediate 
knowledge of a non-ego. Subject and object 
exist, and can only exist, within the unitary 
experience of a common consciousness. (3) 
Mind finds certain stable and uniform series 
of experiences which repeat themselves with 
insignificant variations in consciousness un- 
der similar conditions, as when I take the 
same walk on every afternoon, and behold 
the same houses, trees, etc., in the same or- 
der and with the same characteristics. (4) 
Other minds report identical experiences, 
and reality is recognized by the agreeing 
testimony of a society or community of 
minds. 

These to me are sufficient proofs, and Honegroistic 
among the only possible proofs, of the exist- ^^^-^^^ 
ence of nonegoistic reality- — /. ^., reality in- 
dependent of me in its origin and character, 
though displaying itself within the limits, and 



26o Theism 



in the terms, of my consciousness. The na- 
ture of that reahty still remains to be deter- 
mined upon other grounds, and, in general, 
the solution of Hermann Lotze is satisfactory 
to my mind. None of these experiences car- 
ry us directly outside of the mind itself. The 
doctrine, however, is essentially realism, cer- 
tainly notpure idealism ; though of course the 
stubborn Scotch would not permit our classi- 
fication with themselves. If asked to define 
A"TMiig'» a 'Hhing" as a reality which, on this sys- 
tem, no one of the senses ever reaches as 
an external object, I should answer in the 
words of Professor Ladd, of Yale Universi- 
ty: *'The same psychical subject which re- 
acts upon the stimulation of the nervous ele- 
ments, in the form of various quantitatively 
and qualitatively different sensation-com- 
plexes [all of which are purely mental] con- 
structs by its synthesizing activity, in the de- 
velopment of its own life, all the so-called 
^objects of sense.' " ^ 

1" Outlines of Physiological Psychology," p. 360. 



Defined 



Of the Knowledge of Things 261 

What the nature of that reality is beyond 
(i) its necessary production by or depend- 
ence on deity, and (2) its uniform effects in 
us, according to law and independently of 
our wills, I need not further inquire until a lat- 
er chapter on the " Theory of Knowledge." 

The physicist flexes, melts, vaporizes a inteuectu- 

body; the chemist analyzes it into its ele- ormu- 
•^ -^ lationof 

ments. The element may be subjected to theLawof 
further treatment. When sodium is warmed, ^^^^® 
the white, silvery mass becomes liquid, and, 
on increasing the heat and excluding the 
air, this liquid passes off in a violet vapor, 
which, under a still more intense heat, glovv^s 
with a yellow light. On condensing the va- 
por, the white metal reappears. If the metal 
is thrown into water and becomes sodium 
hydroxide, its original features may still 
be recovered. These continuous, uniform, 
permanent activities, transitions backward 
and forward, according to law, and others 
like them, constitute all we know about so- 



262 



Th 



etsm 



Weight 



Time and 
Space 



dium through the senses: the term always 
remains an empty word for all in whom it 
does not arouse such a group of coordinated 
sense-impressions. The senses inform us 
of the qualities and their changes ; the intel- 
lect seizes the law of the changes ; and these 
are two very essential elements in our recog- 
nition of an individual thing. 

Sometimes '^weight" is taken as a direct 
proof of the immediately perceived objectiv- 
ity of matter, but ( i ) weight is not a property 
of a body in se^ but is a relation which it sus- 
tains to the mass of the earth, variable with 
its translation to other masses, like the moon, 
the sun, Jupiter, etc.; and (2) when per-r 
ceived by us it is a state of the tension of our 
own muscles, which, of course, resolves it-r 
self into our sensations. 

Our limits forbid the consideration of the 
notions of time and space, whose full treats 
ment belongs to treatises on metaphys- 
ics. Even Newton speaks of an absolute 
time, a conception which Immanuel Kant 



Of the Knowledge of Things 263 

could not entirely shake off, and which is 
sometimes seriously entertained in our own 
day. When we declare that the accelera- 
tion of a freely falling body is 9.810 meters 
a second, we mean that the velocity of the 
body with respect to the center of the earth 
is 9.810 meters greater when the earth has 
completed an additional 86,400th fraction of 
its rotation — a fact determined by the earth's 
relation to other heavenly bodies; though 
even astronomy, it must be remembered, 
does not supply an absolute timekeeper. It 
is quite impossible to see what intelligible 
meaning can be assigned to the notion of the 
** lapse" or '^ flow" of time, be it called "ab- 
solute" or what not, in a void freed of mo- 
tions, sensations, and existence itself. This 
absolute time would be crystallized into the 
hard and fast stationariness of so-called ab- 
solute space itself. 

At the close of an inquiry like the preced- a General 
ing, it might be held desirable, if it be pos- ^'*™'*^ 



264 Theism 



sible, to frame a general formula which 
should exhibit the relations of physics, phys- 
iology, and psychology, as these sciences 
are connected in the foregoing scheme of 
reality — a formula which should at once se- 
cure the unity of their facts in the field of 
reality, and define their boundaries, or de- 
limit their frontiers, in the field of investiga- 
tion. To this end, suppose we designate 
the elements of experience when regarded 
as '' bodies" or " things " by the letters a^ 
b, c, etc.; when regarded as nerve vibra- 
tions and brain changes by the letters, y, k, 
/, etc.; and, finally, when regarded as facts 
of consciousness (or psychoses) by the let- 
ters 5, /, u^ etc. In these terms maybe ex- 
hibited generally the truth of the following 
propositions : 
Proposi- I, Since a^ b^ c^ etc., manifest themselves 

as 5, /, u^ etc., throughy, i, /, etc., the mate- 
rials of these three sciences, physics, phys- 
iology, and psychology, are so far not differ- 
ent but identical ; the several sciences arising 



tiOXLl 



Of the Knowledge of Things 265 

as the uniform elements of experience are 
treated from different points of view. 

2. The fundamental and immediately Proposi- 
known series is 5, /, u^ etc., in whose terms 
alone either a, h^ c^ etc., ory, k^ /, etc., can 
be known, (i) Wheny, k^ /, etc., are as- 
signed an existence independent of 5, /, u^ 
etc., it seems as if s, t^ u, etc., were the ef- 
fects ofy, k, /, etc., and we become victims 
of an illusion in which it appears that brain 
changes are the causes of mental states, and 
physiological psychology strikes us as ma- 
terialistic. (2) When a^ h^ c, etc., are as- 
signed an existence independent of 5, /, u^ 
etc., it seems as if matter were wholly in- 
commensurable with mind, and we are vic- 
timized by the illusion of the Cartesian du- 
alism of thought and extension- — the illusion 
of mutually exclusive mind and matter. But 
since we can never have an experience ex- 
cept in terms of 5, zf, u^ etc., it is manifest that 
the difficulties connected with the interaction 
of soul and body are wholly of our own de- 



266 Theism 



tions 



vising in falsely constructing independent 
material series of ^, 3, c^ etc., or/, k^ /, etc. ; 
and disappear when we persistently master 
and dissipate the foregoing illusions. 
Proposi- 3. When we are dealing with the rela- 

tions of elements a, b^ c^ etc., among them- 
selves, in the science of physics, it is evi- 
dent that we may disregard their identity 
withy, ^, /, etc., as brain changes, or with 
5, /, u^ etc., as facts of consciousness; 
though, as a matter of fact they are thus 
identical, through elementsy, ^, /, etc., with 
elements 5, /, u^ etc. For purposes of physi- 
cal inquiry it is possible to pursue the inves- 
tigation of a, ^, r, etc., in their mutual rela- 
tions, by means, let us say, of the multiplied 
formulas and equations of dynamics, all the 
while entirely ignoring the fact that the 
changes occurring among ^, 3, ^, etc., are 
not independent, but are all recorded in 5, 
/, u^ etc., by means of y, ^, /, etc. When 
this method leads to the assertion of a false 
independence of a^ b^ c^ etc. (or of y, k^ /, 



Of the Knowledge of Things 267 

etc.), the illusions described in proposition 
2 arise. 

4. If we study the changes oij\k^ /, etc., Proposi- 
on their own account, we may still regard ^^^^ 
them as connected with the changes \na, b, 
c,^ etc.; but we may leave wholly out of 
consideration the changes in 5, /, u^ etc., ex- 
cept as these are subordinated to the pur- 
pose of discovering changes in/, k^ /, etc. 
That is to say, in the study of the physiolo- 
gy of nerve and brain we still look back to 
physics, but we commonly ignore the in- 
terests of psychology as such. 

5. If we deliberately study/, k^ /, etc., in Proposi- 
relation to 5, /, u^ etc., instead of in their ^ 
dependence on a^ 3, c^ etc., it is evident that 

we are investigating the same phenomena in 
another interest and from the other side, re- 
sulting in the science of physiological psy- 
chology. 

6. If psychology is correctly defined as Proposi- 
the science of the facts of consciousness as 
such^ it is evident that its province is defined 



268 Theism 



by the words ''as such," since ''facts of 
consciousness" include the whole of expe- 
rience and hence the sphere of science gen- 
erally. But in psychology 5, /, u^ etc., come 
under consideration for their own sake and 
in their own relations, laws, changes, and 
ultimate implications. 

This imperfect and provisional sketch will 
have served its purpose if it makes clear that 
despite the duality of subject and object 
within the sphere of consciousness, there is 
no dualism of mind and matter as mutually 
exclusive thought and extension ; but, on 
the contrary, a simple identity of elements 
of one experience, whether studied on the 
one side in physics and physiology, or on 
the other in psychology. 



CHAPTER XIV 

PROFESSOR HUXLEY AND BISHOP BERKELEY 

Of the three eminent scientific authorities was Eux 
— Du Bois-Reymond, Tyndall, and Huxley 1^^^^^' 
— cited in the preceding chapter as stand- 
ing in amazement gazing across the un- 
bridged chasm between matter and mind, 
it is certain that Mr. Huxley, at least, was 
not unaware of the right scientific and phil- 
osophical solution of the difficulty. There 
is, perhaps, no epithet, save his self-chosen 
name of agnostic, that has been more gen- 
erally applied to Professor Huxley than that 
of materialist. And this despite the fact 
that he has been at great pains on several 
occasions to explain that, if terms are used 
in their ultimate and exact connotation, he 
repudiated the accusation. What has lent 
most sanction to this materialistic charge is 
doubtless the fact that Mr. Huxley deliber- 
ately and uniformhT- preferred a consistently 

(269) 



270 Theis7n 



materialistic phraseology for his scientific 
treatises, as being, he declared, least liable 
to misunderstanding and in most general 
use. '' In itself, it is of little moment wheth- 
er we express the phenomena of matter in 
terms of spirit," he says, ''or the phenom- 
ena of spirit in terms of matter; . . . but 
with a view to the progress of science, the 
materialistic terminology is in every way to 
be preferred." However grievous an error 
this might have been for a professed philos- 
opher, seeking to comprehend reality as a 
whole and in its ultimate terms, at present 
I raise no question on this point as a mat- 
ter of mere scientific custom or conven- 
ience. As to the practical possibility of re- 
writing the whole body of science in ''terms 
of spirit," one may well doubt. Certainly 
Professor Huxley neither had nor felt any 
special call to undertake the prodigious task, 
or even to inaugurate it. Better is it, possi- 
bly, to leave the scientific description of the 
processes and results of sense-perception to 



Huxley and Berkeley 2^1 

psychologj^ and to continue in physics our 
common modes of speech, as Copernican as- 
tronomers still talk of the rising and setting 
of the sun. But Huxley was not led into mis- 
taking the phenomenal language of empirical 
science for a mirror of truth and reality, as 
many passages of his works, presently to be 
quoted, abundantly testify. Without these 
express disclaimers, the philosophical incom- 
patibility of agnosticism — of which term Mr. 
Huxley was the coiner — and materialism, 
as an ultimate explanation of reality, might 
have led candid minds to withhold judgment ; 
in view of the explicit denials, it seems to 
me to have been a species of refined and ex- 
cruciating torture to have gone on repeating 
this charge to the close of Huxley's life. I 
am clearly of opinion that Mr. Huxley cannot 
be classed as a materialist, and am glad to 
have this position doubly confirmed, first, by 
Mr. W. L. Courtney, the editor of The Fort- 
nightly Review^ who gives the estimate of 
Huxley as a philosopher in his August num- 



272 Theism 



ber for 1895 ; and again by a materialistic 
critic of Huxley, Mr. G. G. Greenwood, in 
an article on ^^ Professor Huxley on Hume 
and Berkeley," published in The Westmin- 
ster Review for July, 1895. 
A Decisive But before examining the criticisms of 
Passagre _ these two reviewers, it may be well to cite 
at least one decisive passage from Mr. Hux- 
ley's own writings : '^ I understand the main 
tenet of materialism to be that there is noth- 
ing in the universe but matter and force; 
and that all the phenomena of nature are 
explicable by deduction from the properties 
assignable to these two primitive factors. 
That great champion of materialism whom 
Mr. Lilly appears to consider to be an au- 
thority in physical science. Dr. Biichner, 
embodies this article of faith on his title- 
page. Kraft und Stoff — force and matter — 
are paraded as the Alpha and Omega of ex- 
istence. This I apprehend is the funda- 
mental article of the faith materialistic; and 
whosoever does not hold it is condemned by 



Huxley and Berkeley 273 

the more zealous of the persuasion (as I have 
some reason to know) to the Inferno ap- 
pointed for fools or hypocrites. But all this 
I heartily disbelieve ; and at the risk of be- 
ing charged with wearisome repetition of an 
old story, I will briefly give my reason for 
persisting in my infidelity. In the first place, 
as I have already hinted, it seems to me 
pretty plain that there is a third thing in the 
universe, to wit, consciousness, which in the 
hardness of my head or heart I cannot see 
to be matter, or force, or any conceivable 
modification of either, however intimately 
the manifestation of the phenomena of con- 
sciousness may be connected with the phe- 
nomena known as matter and force." ^ 

Let us now take the Westminster reviewer Huxley's 
first. Says he : *' Professor Huxley, address- weaUsm 
ing the ^ untutored if noble savage of *' com- 
mon sense," ' says [p. 308 of the essay on 
Hume and Berkeley], 'You thought that 
your sensations were properties of external 

1" Evolution and Ethics," pp. 129, 130. 
18 



274 Theism 



things, and had an existence outside of your- 
self. You thought that you knew more about 
material than you do about immaterial ex- 
istences ' ; and upon both these points the 
ignorance of the noble savage is held to be 
demonstrated." 
Mr. Green- This is entirely too idealistic for the ma- 
wood»s terialistic critic ; to it he at once proceeds to 

Criticism ... . . ^ 

make the usual materialistic rejoinder: ''I 
have always considered that sound, e. g., is 
an effect produced upon the brain by vibra- 
tion through the apparatus of the ear, as smell 
is an effect produced upon the brain by ex- 
ternal substances acting through processes 
so well described by Professor Huxley in the 
essay on Sensation and the Sensiferous Or- 
gans, I am happy, therefore, to think that 
I steered well clear of the absurd error of 
supposing that my sensations had an exist- 
ence outside of myself." Steered clear, in- 
deed ! As if brain and body, ear and nose, 
and their connecting apparatus of nerves, 
were not as strictly ^' outside of myself" as 



Huxley and Berkeley 275 

vibrations of air and all other ^'external 
substances." Brain can no more be a sub- 
ject of sound than can air or ear. Sound is 
no more an effect produced in a brain by 
vibrations than it is an effect produced in a 
fiddle bv a bow. 

Materialistic Mr. Greenwood now pro- Euxiey 

ceeds to identify the Huxleyan doctrine with and Berke- 
ley 
the Berkeleyan. Can it be that the shades 

of Huxley and good Bishop Berkeley are 
now clasping hands in the invisible world, 
and shaking their sides in uncontrollable 
laughter as they point the finger of scorn at 
the poor, deluded materialists? Mr. Green- 
wood quotes from Berkeley^ a passage which 
he declares has always been his despair. 
Let us read the passage: ''It is acknowl- 
edged as the received principles that exten- 
sion, motion, in a word, all sensible quali- 
ties, have need of a support, as not being 
able to subsist by themselves. But the ob- 
jects perceived by sense are allowed to be 

1" Principles of Human Knowledge," §91. 



276 Theis7n 



nothing but combinations of those qualities, 
and consequently cannot subsist by them- 
selves. Thus far it is agreed on all hands. 
So that in denying the things perceived by 
sense an existence independent of a sub- 
stance or support wherein they may exist, 
we detract nothing from the received opin- 
ion of their reality, and are guilty of no in- 
novation in that respect. All the difference 
is that according to us the unthinking beings 
perceived by sense have no existence dis- 
tinct from being perceived, and therefore 
cannot exist in any other substance than 
those unextended^ indivisible^ substances or 
spirits^ which act, think, and perceive 
them." 

Without stopping to criticise the exact 
form of this brilliant analysis of Berkeley's, 
though personally I prefer another state- 
ment, let us cling to our sole present pur- 
pose of noting how Mr. Greenwood pro- 
ceeds to identify the Huxleyan doctrine with 
precisely this fundamental analysis of Berke- 



Huxley and Berkeley 277 

ley's. Quoting again the essay on Sensa- 
tion and the Sensiferous Organs, Mr, Green- 
wood finds that Huxley regards sensations 
as *' immaterial entities." After considering 
the processes of the olfactory sense, Mr. 
Huxley writes: ** Attend as closely to the 
sensations of muskiness or any other odor as 
we will, no trace of extension, resistance, or 
motion is discernible in them. They have 
no attribute in common with those which we 
ascribe to matter; they are, in the strictest 
sense of the words, immaterial entities." 
Later Huxley adds: *'An immaterial sub- 
stance is perfectly conceivable." Here our 
materialistic reviewer asserts Huxley's com- 
plete identity with Berkeley, and joins the 
battle. Listen to Mr. Greenwood: *'Now The issue 
here it is that I venture to join issue. I as- ^^^^^ 
sert that no man can conceive a * substance' 
which, being immaterial, has no extension, 
and therefore no form. // is Berkeley^ s ' un- 
extended^ indivisible sfirit.^ No idea can 
toe fofttied of it in the hufnan mind. It is, 



,y8 Theism 



in the words of Calverly, ^ a thing imagina- 
tion boggles at,' [Note here Mr. Green- 
wood's absurd confusion of imagination and 
conception as tests of reality — a distinction 
carefully observed by Huxley in the lan- 
guage following.] Professor Huxley ad- 
mits that he ' cannot conceive four dimen- 
sions in space,' though he has known men 
' who seemed to have no difSculty either in 
conceiving them, or, at any rate, in imagine 
ing how they could conceive them,^ I trust, 
therefore, he will be tolerant of a poor ' com- 
mon-sense philosopher' [/. e,^ in this case 
a confessed materialist] who finds it utterty 
impossible to conceive an immaterial sub- 
stance. ... I confess that hitherto I 
had imagined [!] that a sensation could 
have no conceivable [ ?] existence apart from 
the brain any more than motion can have a 
conceivable existence apart from the thing 
which is moved; and I confess that I had 
conceived the brain to be material." 

On this junible of materialistic incoheren- 



Huxley and Berkeley 279 



cies it were well to let the curtain drop. i«r. Green- 
But this sentence of Mr. Greenwood's cli- ^^^^'^ 

Conclusion 

maxes the charge against Huxley, carrying 
him as an idealist far beyond Berkeley: 
*^ Berkeley admitted that we can have no 
idea or notion of a * spirit' ; yet here is Pro- 
fessor Huxley hinting that we are very poor 
creatures indeed if we are unable to con- 
ceive an 'immaterial substance.' " 

I pass now to the other reviewer, Editor Editor 
Courtney, in the Fortnightly . He takes up 
the question of the materialistic nomencla- 
ture adopted by Huxley, to which I have ad- 
verted, and declares: '^^ Shall we use the 
materialistic notation, or shall we employ 
that which has become familiar to us, part- 
ly through the work of Descartes, partly 
through the ingenius and unconquerable 
analysis of Bishop Berkeley? And now we 
approach one of those points on which Pro- 
fessor Huxley speaks with a conviction 
which is, to say the least, surprising. No 
one has seen more clearly than he how un- 



28o Theis7n 



answerable is the analysis of Berkeley. No 
one has explained with greater lucidity the 
irresistible character of that ultimate cer- 
tainty [ the cogito ergo sunt ] to which 
Descartes was led in his famous ' Dis- 
course.' Whatever else may be doubt- 
ful, there is one thing on which rests no 
shadow of doubt — the consciousness that 
'Je ^ense,^ the reality of which is not only 
evidenced in every part of our knowledge, 
but is also the most fundamental fact of 
which we are aware. Everything can be 
translated into the terms of consciousness, 
being, in ultimate analysis, nothing but con- 
scious states. Nevertheless, although Pro- 
fessor Huxley has seen this with his usual 
perspicacity — witness his article on Des- 
cartes and his paper on Bishop Berkeley, 
in the first and sixth volumes of his collect- 
ed works — he yet tells us, not only that he 
prefers, but that it is better for us all, to ac- 
cept the materialistic notation rather than the 
spiritualistic." 



Huxley and Berkeley 281 

For the natural sciences, perhaps the ma- TheMate- 

terialistic notation is inevitable ; but for the ^^^^^ 

Notation 

moral sciences it is intolerable. In the first 
instance it is an accommodation ; in the last, 
it is a falsehood. In the first, it is appar- 
ently a necessary concession to inveterate 
prejudices and long confirmed illusions; in 
the last, it is a sacrifice of the most certain 
truths and the most precious possessions 
vouchsafed to humanity. Here Huxley Huxley on 
himself was driven to distinctions in favor ^^"^® 
of the science of ethics which Mr. Court- 
ney well points out: *'At the end, for in- 
stance, of his essay On the Physical Basis 
of Life^ he quotes Hume's well-known 
words, that anything which does not con- 
tain abstract reasoning concerning quantity 
or number, or else experimental reasoning 
concerning matters of fact and existence, 
may safely be committed to the flames, be- 
cause it is sure to be but sophistry and illu- 
sion. He [Huxley] adds the extremely sig- 
nificant note that many critics of this pas*' 



282 Theism 



sage seem to forget that the subject-matter 
of ethics consists of matters of fact and ex- 
istence. Undoubtedly it does, but not of 
merely physical facts, nor yet of merely 
material or natural existence. It may, or 
may not, be more convenient or helpful to 
represent everything in accordance with a 
materialistic notation, from the point of view 
of the progress of knowledge, but what are 
we to do when the data of our science ut- 
terly refuse to be thus represented? How 
can the man who combats the cosmic proc- 
ess, and carves out for himself a moral code 
in the teeth of all that nature tells him [as 
Huxley teaches^], be represented by mere- 

1 " Let us understand, once for all, that the ethical 
progress of society depends, not on imitating the cos- 
mic process, still less in running away from it, but in 
combating it. It may seem an audacious proposal thus 
to pit the microcosm against the macrocosm and to set 
man to subdue nature to his higher ends, but I venture 
to think that the great intellectual difference between 
the ancient times with which we have been occupied 
and our day, lies in the solid foundation we have ac- 



Huxley and Berkeley 2S3 

ly materialistic formulae ? ... Is it possi- 
ble that if Professor Huxley had carried out 
to their logical development the thoughts in- 
volved in his Romanes Lecture, he would 
have supplemented, let us say. The Physical 
Basis of Lifehy an ethical theory reposing 
on very different foundations?" 

After all, it may be here conceded that Froatief 
. .11 -1 ofMmd 

there arises practically no question about ^m Nature 

dealing with the natural sciences in terms of 
the materialistic notation, and with the mor- 
al sciences in terms of the spiritualistic no- 
tation. It is only when we approach that 
mysterious frontier where mind and nature 
meet, and across which each has to pass its 
energies to exert its influence upon the oth- 
er, that confusion, not to say contradiction, 
inevitably arises, and has arisen throughout 
the entire history of philosophy- — at least 
since the time of Descartes. So far as I 

quired for the hope that such an enterprise may meet 
with a certain measure of success." — " Evolution and 
Ethics," p. 83. 



2S4 Thets7n 



have been able to analyze the phenomena 
and to note the literature of the subject, the 
contradiction of materialism and spiritual- 
ism uniformly emerges the moment one un- 
dertakes to lodge any one fact — say a sensa- 
tion — simultaneously in the material and the 
mental series. It belongs in one or the oth- 
er. It cannot belong in both, for, by defi- 
nition, each is exclusive of the other. If 
sound is a phenomenon of brain, it is not a 
fact of mind, and materialism is true. If 
sound is a fact of mind, it is not a phenom- 
enon of brain, and spiritualism is true. If 
we undertake to treat it as both a phenom- 
enon of brain and a fact of mind, ex kyfoth- 
esi we fall into contradictions. For since 
all our knowledge, whether of brains (of 
other persons) or of sensations, falls within 
our consciousness, to attempt to treat a sen- 
sation twice, first as a fact of consciousness 
and then as an activity of brain, is really an 
impossible effort to treat the same identical 
phenomenon (or experience) from a double 



Huxley and Berkeley 285 

standpoint — first from that of our conscious- 
ness, and then from that of some impossi- 
ble vantage ground, falsely supposed to have 
been gained outside of our consciousness, 
whose impregnable limits can be as easily 
broken through as a man can lift himself 
over a fence by his boot straps, or jump out 
of his ov/n skin. Now, I strongly suspect, 
without being able at this moment to verify 
the supposition (if it is verifiable), that Pro- 
fessor Huxley's clinging throughout to a 
single notation for all departments of inves- 
tigation sprang from his clear perception 
that contradiction is ultimately and inevita- 
bly involved in the employment of both no- 
tations. Consistency depended on a choice 
of one to the exclusion of the other; con- 
tradiction and scientific suicide followed fast 
on the foolhardy attempt to employ both. 
He chose the phenomenally sufficient but 
ontologically false notation, contenting him- 
self with frequent clear recognitions in his 
writings of this ontological falsehood. 



286 



Theism 



* * Modern 
Realism 
Exam-: 
ined'* 



Ladd's 
Criticism 



While a teacher -I had placed in the libra- 
ry of Vanderbilt University an English work 
entitled ''Modern Realism Examined," by 
the Rev. T. M. Herbert, a dissenting minis- 
ter and a professor in an Independent acad- 
emy or seminary. It is one of the most 
solid and brilliant philosophical perform- 
ances that have come under my notice. So 
far as I know, its main positions have never 
been turned. They are essentially such as 
have been indicated above. I heartily com- 
mend the volume to critical readers, believ- 
ing that they will find Huxley and Herbert 
not very wide apart. 

The preceding has been written in full 
view of the fact that even such an authority 
as Professor Ladd, of Yale, charges Hux- 
ley^ with contradictory philosophical stand- 
points. For Dr. Ladd's attainments and 
critical acumen I have the utmost respect ; 
but I venture the opinion that these alleged 
contradictions largely, if not wholl}^ disap- 



^In '* Philosophy of Mind," pp. 11-13. 



Huxley and Berkeley 287 

pear when we keep clear the distinction be- 
tween the ordinary scientific, and the strict- 
ly philosophical, modes of speech. Even 
Huxley's materialistic critic, Mr. Green- 
wood, is satisfied with such a sentence as 
this, culled from Mr. Huxley's writings: 
*'In ultimate analysis it appears that a sen- 
sation is the equivalent in terms of con- 
sciousness for a mode of motion of the "tnat- 
ter of the sensoriuTU,^^ Mr. Greenwood 
italicizes the last words, and adds *Uhat this 
is quite conceivable to the ordinary mind." 
To the materialistic mind it is no doubt en- 
tirely satisfactory. For Mr. Greenwood 
takes ontologically the italicized words, 
which, if Mr. Huxley is to be believed con- 
cerning his own habits of expression, were 
written phenomenally. If Mr. Huxley is 
understood as expressing himself ontolog- 
ically in such sentences as the one quoted 
above, we have indeed a correct statement 
of the materialistic position, with which Mr. 
Huxley is so often charged, but which, ac- 



288 Theism 



cording to the general analogy of his writ- 
ings, and in many express passages, he dis- 
tinctly repudiated. If it be asserted that a 
sensation is the real and ontological equiva- 
lent of a real and ontological mode of mo- 
tion, there emerges at once the irreconcila- 
ble contradiction between materialism and 
spiritualism, briefly alluded to above, to 
which the entire history of modern philoso- 
phy is one continuous witness. 

Huxley's It may not be inadmissible, even in a work 

Burial -^^^^ this, to cite in conclusion the editorial 

utterance of the London Lancet^ which thus 
speaks of the circumstances of Mr. Huxley's 
burial: ''One humble man asked if the 
ground was consecrated ground. The re- 
ply was that it was so, and the feeling of the 
reverent mourners was that henceforth it 
would be more consecrated than before. 
The service was read with much simple 
force by the Rev. John Llewelyn Davies, 
now Rector of Kirkby Monsdale, formerly 



Huxley and Berkeley 289 

Vicar of Christ Church, Marylebone. Nev- 
er was the momentous fifteenth chapter of 
the first epistle to the Corinthians read with 
more acceptance than over the great apostle 
of science, who was more religious than he 
would admit, or perhaps knew, and who, 
it is said, wished, a few days before his 
death, to be buried with the service of the 
Church of England. We scarcely regard 
this wish as one of the inconsistencies of a 
great man. Like other great men, with all 
the boldness of his thought, he knew the 
sharp limitation of his own knowledge. No 
deep student of his philosophy can charge 
him with irreverence or fail to see in his 
writing the conception that there is in the 
universe a being whose ' intelligence was as 
far beyond his own as that was beyond a 
black beetle's,' 'endowed with powers of 
influencing the course of nature as much 
greater than his as his is greater than a 
snail's.'" 
19 



CHAPTER XV 

THE THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE: IDEALISTIC 
REALISM 

It is not difficult, of course, to discover 
Plato and ^^^ elements of a fairly definite theory of 
Aristotle knowledge in the writings of Plato and Aris- 
st.Anffus- totle. And the Church father, St. Augus- 
^^^ tine, has quite as much significance as a 

philosopher as a theologian. In compari- 
son with the ''father of modern philoso- 
phy," Fenelon said that he would sooner 
trust Augustine than Descartes in questions 
of pure philosophy; and Nourisson affirms 
that it is beyond all question that Augustine 
made use of the method, and put in prac- 
tice the principles, which Descartes would 
one day employ in the reconstruction of phi- 
losophy.^ Professor Ladd does not scruple 
to declare that Augustine ''rises superior 
to Aristotle and all antiquity" in respect 

"^Prog-rks de la Pensee Humaiiie, 

(290) 



The Theory of Knowledge 291 

of the criteria of knowledge, the func- 
tion of philosophical doubt, and the ultimate 
grounds of certainty. Augustine's final doc- 
trine is that all reality is implicate in the 
being, knowing, and willing of the self-con- 
scious subject. It may be said that most of 
the philosophical works of Descartes have Descartes 
their chief interest in the construction of a 
theory of knowledge ; Spinoza's unification spinoza 
of ''substances" was a necessary advance 
upon Cartesianism in the channels marked 
out by its own positions ; Locke and Leib- Locke and 
nitz, from their opposed standpoints, con- ^®^^^^ 
tributed variant materials — variant, not only 
from each other, but from their immediate 
predecessors; Berkeley and Hume worked Berkeley 
out some principles and problems to their ^ ""'^ 
last issues in theistic idealism, on the one 
hand, and sensational nihilism, on the oth- 
er; while the latter aroused Immanuel Kant, Kant 
who had a strain of Scottish metaphysical 
genius in his blood, and set the great Ger- 
man at work in earnest on the construction 



292 



Theism 



and establishment of a critical theory of 
knowledge, to which all of his celebrated 
Critiqites make their contribution, the '^Cri- 
tique of Pure Reason," particularly, running 
sharply and clearly the dividing line between 
the rational and the empirical elements in 
even the simplest and most elementary act 
of knowledge. 

Such is a rapid outline of the history of 
epistemological speculation down to the be- 
ginning of the nineteenth century. Since 
Tiie Later then, in the writings of Fichte, Schelling, 
Hegel, and the rest of the Germans, the 
theory of knowledge has maintained its 
place and importance as the very heart of 
philosophical method and doctrine, in which 
have centered the idealistic and realistic 
controversies of our times. 

The system of thought and reality and 
their relations, set forth at large in the writ- 
ings of Lotze, I prefer, for myself, to desig- 
nate objective idealism, or idealistic real- 
ism. By the subjective idealists it would 



Germans 



OT)jective 
Idealism 



The Theory of Kuovjledge 293 

be denied the name of idealism altogether 
and classed as a realistic philosophy; by 
materialists it would be utterly repudiated 
as idealistic airiness or moonshine ; but it is 
perhaps none the worse as doctrine approx- 
imating truth that it should be subjected to 
this double fire from the opposition camps 
of a crude and crass materialism and of an 
unguarded and indefensible idealism. 

I have sought to show in Chapter unsopMs- 
XIII. the true nature of the products ^^^*®^ 
of sense-perception, according to the osqpMcai 
consentient testimony of physics, phys- ^^^^^^ 
iology, and psychology. This is perhaps 
as good an avenue as any other along 
which to approach in an elementary and 
expository way the problems of the theory 
of knowledge. For the unsophisticated 
realism of everyday life knowledge pre- 
sents no problems. Odors, tastes, temper- 
atures, sounds, colors, touches, all exist 
externally and independently, having pre- 
cisely the same kind of existence apart 



294 Theis7n 



from our consciousness as in it or with it. 
The world of reaHty is double over against 
the world of our sensibility, and the latter 
is but a duplicate, a copy, a reproduction of 
the former. How this could be brought 
about presents no difficulty to the unsophis- 
ticated realism of common sense. It hap- 
pens to everybody every day; it is perfectly 
familiar and transparent. There is no 
problem. Such a person declares himself 
unhesitatingly a realist; and that ends the 
matter. The carpet is as truly objectively 
colored as it is objectively extended; and 
the philosophical realist would be stigma- 
tized as daft who should violently disrupt 
these two qualities of the carpet, and tell 
our unsophisticated friend that color is a 
^'secondary" quality of carpets — existing 
only in the beholder, and only by sense- 
deception, not by sense-perception, in the 
carpet — while the extension, which seems 
to be the very basis and condition of the 
color, the beholder immediately perceiving 



The Theory of Knowledge 295 

colored extension or extended color, is a 
'' primary " quality, existing apart from the 
color in the object itself. How this exten- 
sion gets itself recognized in our sensibility 
also by any other process than that which 
realizes the secondary qualities, our philo- 
sophical realist might not tarry to explain to 
his unsophisticated friend. Or, it may be 
that the philosopher — a realist, be it remem- 
bered — propounds to the man of common 
sense some such question as this: ''How AQuesUwn 
does this brilliantly lighted and gorgeously 
furnished room look when there is nobody 
in it?" Perhaps both the philosopher and 
his untutored friend would alike have to 
be reasoned with before they discovered 
the arrant nonsense of the question, whose 
equivalent is, ''How does the brilliantly light- 
ed and gorgeously furnished room look, 
when it doesn't look at all?" — /. ^., when 
there is nobody to see it. But the man of 
common sense would unhesitatingly answer, 
deeming any other reply nonsensical, that 



296 Theism 



*'it looks to the last detail in the absence 
of all persons precisely as it does when it's 
crowded with a great company." But our 
realistic philosopher takes his obstinate and 
dogmatic friend in hand after some such 
fashion as this: " My dear sir, a moment's 
reflection must convince you that you can't 
possibly mean what you say. The colors of 
the portraits, of the fresco of the ceiling, of 
the wall paper, of the carpets, of the uphol- 
stery, of the flowers; the perfume of the 
latter as well ; the sweet tones of the music 
box, and the singing of the canaries — all 
these are 'secondary' qualities, having 
their genesis in your sensibility and their 
locus in your personal consciousness : when 
you leave the room they all disappear with 
your absence ! The room is then neither 
light nor dark, neither hot nor cold, neither 
vocal nor silent, neither colored nor color- 
less; these, my dear sir, are only categories 
of the pure sensibility, that have no possible 
application to, or connection with, ontolog- 



The Theory of Knowledge 297 

ical realities." And so our common-sense 
realist departs dazed, for he had fondly im- 
agined his opinions identical with those of 
philosophical realism, and here is a philo- 
sophical realist advancing notions as crazy 
as those of any idealist who ever lived. 

This distinction, in the formal classifica- Primary 
tion of '^ primary " and '' secondary " qual- ^ 
ities, dates back, I believe, to one Mr. John Qualities 
Locke, an English philosopher of note. 
Since his time it has become the common 
property of British philosophy, particularly 
of the Scottish school, most widely and emi- 
nently represented in America by Sir Wil- Sirw. 
liam Hamilton, through whom it has been 
for a generation or two a commonplace of 
philosophical instruction. One of the earli- 
est shocks received by this school of philo- 
sophical thought — which holds that there 
are some qualities which exist after an iden- 
tical manner both in the objects themselves 

and in our sensibility or apprehension — was 

Bishop 

in the publication of Bishop Berkeley's Berkeley 



98 Tkeisfn 



"New Theor}' of Vision," an epoch-mak- 
ing and epoch-marking work in the most 
decisive and far-reaching import of the 
terms. He demonstrated once for all, irref- 
utably and beyond cavil, in particular that 
we have no perception of the third dimen- 
sion of objects by sight, and in general how 
largely the element of judgment enters into 
our seemingly most simple and ultimate 
sense-perceptions, and how largely percep- 
tion is an acquisition of adult experience 
under the laws of habit. Had Berkelev 
wrought out no other philosophical achieve- 
ment than this, his importance for experi- 
mental psychology would still have been 
like that of Sir Isaac Newton for physics, 
or that of Charles Darwin for zo6log}^ By 
a subtle and exhaustive analysis of one of 
the processes of sense-perception, supposed 
to be unquestionablv original and immediate 
in its apprehension of objective reality, he 
shook the very foundations of duplicating 
realism, and that bv a scentific rather than 



The Theory of Knowledge 299 

a speculative exposition. Similarly in our 
day the physics and physiology of the 
whole area of sense-perception, as well as 
its psychology, in large part, have been 
brought within the range of science as such, 
and the tedious speculative logomachies of 
"hypothetical realism" and '' cosmothetic 
idealism," and all that, with which the 
pages of Sir W. Hamilton abound, have 
simply been superseded and excluded. All 
such stuff, carefully labeled, has been rele- 
gated to the philosophical museums, where 
the interest is chiefly paleontological. 

The disruption of an object, according to common 
the common realism of the schools, into ^^^^^^m 
primary and secondary qualities, provides a 
*' thing" as the center and base of union of 
the former, and the processes of a personal 
consciousness as the condition of the synthe- 
sis of the several forms of sensation — tem- 
perature, odor, taste, smell, sound, light, 
and color — which constitute the latter. 
But "touches," despite their dependence 



300 TheisTn 



on the same organism of nerve conduction 
and brain change, are inconsistently lifted 
out of the class of secondary qualities and 
by some at least supposed to yield an imme- 
diate, face-to-face knowledge of objective- 
ly extended things. This contention is in- 
valid. Touch can no more accomplish the 
feat than the other senses, the reports of all 
alike being mediated by precisely the same 
bodily apparatus, and provoking similar 
psychical reactions by which they obtain 
their recognized and fixed values for con- 
sciousness. Further, the reports of all 
the senses alike have precisely the same 
phenomenal reality within the sphere of a 
personal consciousness, and precisely the 
same ontological ideality so far as they are 
supposed lumpishly to inhere in an insen- 
sate '' substance," existing independently 
of all conscious apprehension. 

It would be a poverty-stricken kind of 
object at best which would be left to philo- 
sophical realism, even if its contention with 



The Theory of Knowledge 301 

regard to a partial sensible apprehension of 
self-subsisting material reality were grant- 
ed ; and so of late some of its advocates have 
accepted as the proper designation of their 
doctrine, '^transfigured realism." The real- xrans- 

ismof the schools is '' transfig^ured,'' not only ^^§^^®<l 

. . ReaUsm 

by this stripping of qualities, to which psy- 
chology admittedly subjects the alleged ma- 
terial " thing," but, from the other side, by a 
physics which reduces its '' substance" to 
vortex atoms; Lord Kelvin, the most dis- Lord 
tinguished British physicist of our times, ^^^^^ 
having adopted, in his well-known theory, 
the demonstration of Helmholtz that vortex 
rings in a perfect, i. ^., frictionless, fluid 
would be conserved forever. Since such 
a homogeneous and imponderable fluid is 
something far different from matter as or- 
dinarily understood, Lord Kelvin's defini- 
tion may be said to reduce matter to ^' non- 
matter in motion." Other physicists, of 
the purely mathematical type, reject as 
too gross even this ethereal conception of 



.^02 Theis7n 



o 



matter. So ''transfigured" is this realism, 
indeed, that the naive everyday realism of 
the common people w^ould disown it as ut- 
terly failing to represent their so-called im- 
mediate perception of an external and ex- 
tended material world, and as being as un- 
intelligible as idealism itself. 

Piiysics But passing from these elementary facts 

and 

Physiology ^^^ principles, it may be urged that any 

adequate view of the physics and physiology 
of sense-perception still demands (i) for 
physics a world of ethers^ and atoms, of vi- 
brations and motions, substitutes for the ap- 
parent world of sense; and (2) for physi- 

II use the plural advisedly. From Lord Kelvin's 
"primordial medium," or ultimate ether, the proximate 
ethers of light and electricity are supposed to be 
formed. Of luminiferous ether Lord Kelvin says: 
^^That is the only substance ive are confide 71 1 of in dy- 
namics. One thing we are sure of, and that is the 
reality a?id stihstantiality of the luminiferous etherT — 
Quoted from his *' Popular Lectures and Addresses," 
I. 310, in Ward's " Naturalism and Agnosticism," I. 
113, 114. 



Of the Theo7'y of Knowledge 303 

ology a realm of transmitting nerves and 
brain changes. 

( I ) As to the former it may be said in a Physics 
word that they are conceived, and neces- 
sarily conceived, as falling fully under the 
laws of sense-apprehension, if man were en- 
dowed with a more numerous or a more deli- 
cate apparatus of sense. It would carry us 
too far afield to enter here into a detailed 
metaphysical criticism of the physical doc- 
trines concerning ^'ethers" and ''atoms" 
and '^ vortexes" and ''centers of force" 
and such like : suffice it to say that whatever 
may be the physical existences and motions 
supposed to be necessary for the explana- 
tion of what actually falls within the range of 
man's sensitive life, all of them, so far as they 
are not merely abstract and hypothetical, 
and do not transcend the properties of mat- 
ter as assigned by ordinary physical defini- 
tion or conception, are conceived after the 
analogy of that phenomenal life, dependent 
upon a personal consciousness for their real- 



304 Theism 



ization. Thus the instruments of more precise 
measurement and of more minute or more 
distant obser^^ation are, in their several di- 
rections, but mechanical extensions of man's 
powers of sense-perception; and if they 
could even endov/ man with new senses, as 
well as extend his present powers indefinitely, 
the law of the sensible apprehension of phe- 
nomenal reality would not be transcended. 
At the same time, it must not be overlooked, 
as hinted above, that the constitution of bod- 
ies , as taught by modern physics , is something 
very different from that of which the natural 
realist supposes himself to be immediately 
aware. Of matter, so familiar and intelligi- 
ble to the everyday realist, the physicists 
find it impossible to give a generally satisfac- 
tory account and definition. Man}- severely 
mathematical physicists, rejecting Lord Kel- 
vin's construction of matteras speculative, re- 
gard their equations merely as an analytical 
and descriptive apparatus, and decline all 
proposed definitions of the constitution of 



Of the Theory of Knowledge 305 

matter and the nature of force as baseless and 
useless, if not ignorant, speculations. In the 
basal dynamic equations, four quantities are 
so related that if three are given the fourth 
can be calculated. Their relations are treated 
not as causal but as mathematical. Kirchoff 
defines the function of mathematical physics 
to be ^' to describe in the exactest and simplest 
manner such motions as occur in nature." 
Professor E. Mach, of the University of Vi- 
enna, observes: *^It is said, description 
leaves the sense of causality unsatisfied. 
In fact, many imagine they understand mo- 
tions better when they picture to themselves 
the pulling forces ; and yet the accelerations^ 
the facts, accomplish more, without super- 
fluous additions. . . . The more proper 
course is to regard the abstract deter7nina- 
tive elcinents of a fact as interdependent in 
a purely logical way, as the mathematician 
or geometer does."^ The common text- 

1" Popular Scientific Lectures," pp. 253, 254, from 
an address *'On the Principle of Comparison in Phjs- 
20 



3o6 Theism 



books on physics resort to all manner of 
shifts to avoid the fundamental difficulty of 
giving a right and final scientific conception 
of matter and force/ 
Physiology (2) As to the latter — transmitting nerves 
and changing brains — it must not be forgot- 
ten that these also belong to the realm of 
merely phenomenal reality. Indeed, the 
whole of my body makes good its existence 
in my consciousness in precisely the same 
way and under exactly the same laws as does 
the most unrelated and most distant object. 
This was in fact the last ditch of expiring 
natural realism 5 as represented by such writ- 
ers as Dr. Noah Porter and others, when 
surrendering entirely the doctrine of any im- 

ics" delivered before the General Session of the Ger- 
man Association of Naturalists and Physicians at Vi- 
enna, September, 1894. 

*This sentence is based upon the examination of a 
considerable number of such text-books in common use 
in the colleges and universities of America and En- 
gland; but it would be perhaps both inconsiderate and 
unnecessary to name and cite them here. 



Oflhe Theory of Knowledge 307 

mediate sensible apprehension of an exter- 
nal world — that is, external to the body as 
well as to the mind — they setup the conten- 
tion that there is an immediate mental ap- 
prehension of the organism as stimulated, as 
if somehow the material body, as nerve or 
brain, did succeed in projecting itself di- 
rectly within the realm of conscious life and 
personality. But a pain in my great toe is 
as much an event outside of my proper self 
as a change in the sun ninety-two millions 
five hundred thousand miles away. For ac- 
cepting as sufficiently accurate the statement 
of Helmholtz that the nervous current trav- 
els at about the rate of one hundred and 
twenty feet a second, it would follow in the 
case of a man six feet high that in the event 
of injury to his great toe it would be, rough- 
ly speaking, about one-twentieth of a second 
before the nervous telegraph would convey 
the intelligence to headquarters in the brain. 
Thus the transactions and events of any part 
of my organism, belonging as they do to the 



3o8 Theism 



sphere of phenomenal reality, are dependent 
upon the same conditions for getting them- 
selves recognized as elements of my con- 
scious life as are changes in the sun or any 
other heavenly body. No part of my body 
is I. My brain is as much external to me 
as my outer skin, and has as little real, and 
less apparent, recognition in consciousness 
as an objective and extended thing. Be- 
sides these reports, one may in the clinic 
obtain sense-knowledge of the brains and 
nerves of other people as the dissecting knife 
is applied; but it is needless to add that all 
information gained in this way falls under 
the universal laws of sensational experience. 
At no point is the unity of experience split 
in twain, and by no element it contains is 
this experience dissevered from the con- 
scious person who has it. When we add to 
all this the proof of the merely phenomenal 
reality, and the ontological ideality, of space 
— a doctrine which I conceive to be of very 
easy demonstration — the defenses of object- 



The Theory of Knowledge 309 

ive idealism seem fairly complete and con- 
clusive. 

Here seems to be as good a point as any TheMa- 

at which to expose the very common and ^ , _^ 

^ -^ Paralogism 

very popular materialistic paralogism. ^' If I 
could only once get sight of a soul," says 
the smart young medical student, ' ' if I could 
just dissect one out of a human body, how- 
ever small, and how^ever great the magnify- 
ing power of the microscope necessary to 
render it visible, I should be convinced." 
Indeed ! The very conditions imposed by 
this brisk young man for the proof of the 
existence of the soul would, if satisfied, 
constitute an immediate demonstration that 
there are no such things as souls. For if a 
soul could consent to become visible, tangi- 
ble, audible, and the rest, it would immedi- 
ately sink into the reahn of merely phenom- 
enal existence and promptly forfeit its rank 
as an ontological reality. Mind conscious- 
ly exists foi itself; but can never submit it- 
self to the direct sensible inspection of an- 



3IO 



Theism 



The Cate- 
gforles of 
ReaHty 



other mind. The most important and far- 
reaching result of objective idealism, or 

Ontoiogicai idealistic realism, is \h2X Personality ^ wheth- 
er divine or human, is 07ice for all made the 

nomenal -^ 

Reality abiding f lace of all ontological reality^ while 
the realm of -perfectly definite -phenomenal 
reality, tmiversally and unchangingly or- 
dered according to law which is independent 
of finite persons^ becomes the theater of the 
activities of the world, of spirits, and the 
means of cornmunication between -persons^ 
divine and human, God^ 9nan^ and the 
world thus fall into intelligible relations; 
the world is a true universe shot through 
with p>urpose ; and p)hilosophy ^ though many 
riddles and difiiculties still remain^ appyrox- 
imately accomp)lishes its task of comp>rehend' 
ing reality as a whole. 

The categories of reality — the ontologic- 
ally valid categories — have their roots in 
personality and personal experience. The 
same is true, indeed, of the phenomenal cat- 
egories, which fix simple and ultimateyJz^/s, 



The Theory of Knowledge 311 

as facts of observation can only be fixed, 
namely, by the elements of experience as it 
is; but the consideration of these need not 
detain us here * ( i ) The supposed self-sub- 
sisting unity of ^ things," which to meta- 
physical criticism presents so many perplexi- 
ties; (2) their so-called substantial perma- 
nence; (3) the alleged material connections 
and operations of causes and effects; and 
(4) design or purpose in nature—all are but 
the reflections or projections ( i ) of the unity 
of consciousness; (2) of the knowledge of 
personal identity, possible only to a being 
possessed of memory and expectation ; ( 3 ) of 
the exercise of will; and (4) of the conscious 
employment of purpose, in the personal ex« 
perience of man* But all this stops short of 
the ultimate explanation of reality. In one 
comprehensive word: Experience, being 
one, necessarily unifies all its elements, 
and on this ground phenomena are united 
in one continuously and completely inter- 
acting universe, without the possibility of a 



312 Theism 



second ; a universe which finds its unity, its 
permanence, its causality, and its purpose in 
a Person — the everliving God. All the onto- 
loglcally valid categories of reality find their 
true and exhaustive interpretation only as 
they are carried completely through and be- 
yond the v^orld of the phenomenal, and find 
their final lodgment and rest in the bosom of 
a unitary, self-identical, volitional, and con- 
sciously purposeful Intelligence, that is, a 
Person. ''Only a Self can be such an Ideal- 
Real," says Professor Ladd, ''as this cog- 
nized system of real beings and actual trans- 
actions is known to be."^ If , however, the 
categories of being and cause, or of substance 
and sufficient reason, if those names be pre- 
ferred, are lodged in supposed unitary and 
isolated "things" themselves, and the cate- 
gory of purpose is reduced to " law," or de- 
nied and abandoned, materialism and athe- 
ism follow as a matter of course. And here 
may be cited Professor Bowne's very brief 

1 " Philosophy of Knowledge," p. 590. 



The Theory of Knowledge 31 



but very conclusive '' natural history of athe- 
ism" : 

*^ So long as matter was regarded as inert, Natural 

causation had to be soug^ht outside: but by ^^^°^° 

^ . Atheism 

the dynamic theor}^ of matter, causation was 

provided in matter itself. A principle of or- 
der was next found in the notion of law, and 
nothing more seemed needed. Matter fur- 
nished the being, force furnished the cau- 
sation, and law provided the order. These 
three together formed the one Nature or sys- 
tem of the world, and beyond this there was 
nothing. Matter and force are already seen 
to do much, and are daily doing more. No 
one can set a limit to their possibilities. The 
reign of law is fast becoming all-embracing, 
and the more law the less God."^ 

The category of causality, truly interpret- caixsaiity 
ed, carries us directly from the human to andDesiga 
the divine will, as has been shown at length 
in a preceding chapter: like Noah's dove 
flying over the expanse of waters, the prin- 

1" Theory of Thought and Knov/ledge,'* pp. no, m. 



3H 



Th 



'letsin 



SuDstance 
Psycholog- 
ically Con- 
sidered 



ciple of sufncient reason finds no resting 
place in all the realm of phenomenal reality. 
The category of design, it is freely admit- 
ted by all, if it exist at all in nature, carries 
us by the same long flight into the bosom of 
God, Of the category of substance I must 
treat a little more particularly. 

Psychologically and phenomenally, the 
common doctrine of this category has some 
such genesis as this. If it be accepted that 
all our senses are modifications of touch, it 
is literally true that some of our senses are 
more like touch than others. In any case, it 
may be said that the more touch-like senses 
are habitually employed to verify the reports 
of the less touch-like : thus taste is sometimes 
used to verify smell, and touch itself fre- 
quently to verify sight. Indeed, the com- 
mon notion of *^ substance'' is rationally 
explained by the constant relations be- 
tween these two senses of sight and touch. 
Through sight we are momentarily, in all 
our experiences, annexing to its proper re- 



The Theory of Knowledge 315 

port the properties of extension and solidity 
strictly afforded (in a phenomenal way) by 
the sense of touch, confident that they can 
be verified by direct appeal to that sense. 
Thus if a fresco is so perfect as to give us 
the impression of actual projection from a 
wall or ceiling, we correct the report of 
sight by placing our hand on the object and 
discovering that it is a plane surface. Thus 
through touch we largely acquire our ulti- 
mate notions of the externality, extension, 
solidity, and permanence of objects, which 
are so much more ^'tangible" than the re- 
ports given by other senses that they finally 
harden into the idea of an inner core which 
gives support to the less tangible or more eva- 
nescent qualities. Thus, forgetting or over- 
looking that experiences through touch are 
as much experiences of the sensibility as 
those of odor, color, or sound, dependent 
for their transmission on a similar nervous 
apparatus, we come to assign a fictitious on- 
tological value to this sense which it does 



3i6 Theism 



not possess, and the psychological genesis of 
the category of substance is evident. 
Confusion Further, in the writings of at least some 
natural realists there is a strange confusion 
lurking in their doctrine of substance and 
attributes. Sometimes '^ substance" is rep- 
resented as unknown and unknowable, the 
hidden and hypothetical substrate in which 
all attributes, which alone may be known, in- 
here, but itself altogether destitute of quali- 
ties. Then again the *' primary" qualities 
of matter, so called, are bundled together 
as themselves constituting the ''substance " 
— which then becomes extended, solid, and 
permanent — and thus ''substance" becomes 
the known support and basis of the affec- 
tions of our sensibility. Such confusion is 
easily and fully accounted for if the psy- 
chological account of the genesis of this no- 
tion given above is accepted as essentially 
true. Besides, this whole notion of "inher- 
ence'' of attributes Is opaque: it explains 
nothing, not even how itself is possible. On 



The Theory of Knowledge 317 

the contrary, all modern physics and physi- 
ology unite in teaching that the *' quality," 
so far from '^inhering" in a " substance," 
is an ^'effect" produced in and discernible 
by a consciousness, and thus finds its true 
explanation according to the category of 
causality. 

On the metaphysical side, since, as we Substance 

have seen, all the catepfories have their root ^^^^^^^S" 

^ ^ icaUyCon 

in personality, i, ^., in the experience of sidered 
persons, the '' substance" of matter is but 
a shadowy projection and illegitimate trans- 
fer into the '' things" of the external world 
of our knowledge of personal identity, 
conditioned by memory and expectation. 
*^ Substance" thus projected into ''mat- 
ter" is easily shown to involve materialistic 
and atheistic consequences, since it surely - 
reaches a doctrine of self-subsisting being 
short of personality, i. ^., short of God. 
Descartes started with his doctrine of the 
two substances; but Spinoza immediately 
disclosed the contradiction of his position, 



3i8 Theism 



since the very notion of substance is that 
which so exists that it needs nothing else 
for its existence, and he passed through 
nature to God. If it be said that Descartes 
added to his definition of the two '^ sub- 
stances " that they were dependent on God 
alone for existence, it may be asked, aside 
from the inconsistency of this definition, 
What is gained by interpolating this hypo- 
thetical and unknown substance between 
phenomena and God, who is their sufficient 
cause and explanation ? What rational de- 
mand for ''support" or source do the phe- 
nomena make that stops short of Personality 
or that is not satisfied thereby? Or what 
need has the deity for this intermediary of 
'' substance," so inaccessible that it has nev- 
er revealed itself to sense, and so dark and 
dense that it has never been irradiated by the 
light of reason? What, indeed, does '' sub- 
stance ' ' lodged in matter explain ? And who 
has been able to explain '' substance " ? But 
in our modern realistic metaphysics " sub- 



The Theo7y of Knowledge 319 

stance" is that unknown core of matter 
which supports without being supported, 
which it is as impossible to bring within 
the sphere of experience as the Kantian 
'' thing in itself." What sort of a dead pad 
or inflexible buffer is this which many insist 
on interposing between that rich and varied 
experience of reality which unfolds itself in 
human consciousness and the God who is its 
sufficient Source and Cause? Mind you it 
is from phenomenal experiences that proc- 
ess is taken to this unphenomenal or hyper- 
phenomenal self-explaining and self-subsist- 
ent substance, supporting all things without 
needing any support itself. Now, how does 
this hyperphenomenal " substance," lodged 
in matter as a hard and qualityless core, 
help us to understand phenomenal reality? 
How can it ''support" anything? And 
how can it be without supports? If the 
deity supports it, why should he support a 
support instead of directly supporting what 
needs his support? How can ''substance" 



320 Theism 



Rational 



be the immutable subject of change? Self- 
sufficiency and immutability are attributes 
which we usually employ in quite a differ- 
ent connection. 
Reality We are forced to conclude that phenome- 

nal reality is rational through and through. 
It stands in an immediately reasonable and 
demonstrable relation w^ith Personality, in 
origin, process, and apprehended result — an 
object through which the rays of reason shoot 
from circumference to center and from cen- 
ter to circumference again, until it stands 
transparent and complete in the open eye of 
the soul. There is no irrational, irreducible, 
lumpish remainder, no Aristotelian "mat- 
ter" distinct from "form,"^ no Kantian 
^^ thing in itself " or '' noumenon " distinct 
from its ''phenomena," no Cartesian or 
Hamiltonian " substance" distinct from its 
'' attributes." " The impossibility of hav- 
ing the consciousness of any object which 
cannot be combined with the consciousness 



1 If Aristotle so taught. 



The Theory of Knowledge 321 

of self is a proof that the world is a rational 
system. ' ^ 

Suppose we adopt for a moment the fun- 
damental realistic thesis of the ontological 
reality of matter, and trace it to its conse- 
quences. For this purpose let us take the 
account given by Professor Paulsen, of the Paaisen 
University of Berlin, himself an idealist — 
not so strict and safe and guarded, indeed, 
as Professor Bowne, but able to do full 
justice to the opposing system: '' Reality 
as such is body; its attributes are extension 
and impenetrability ; its primary and essen- 
tial form of activity is motion. These prin- 
ciples can and must explain all processes in 
reality, in particular also the so-called states 
of consciousness. . . . Experience dis- 
closes the fact that psychical processes oc- 
cur only in most intimate connection with 
physical processes. . . . Hence it fol- 

1 <* Christianity and Idealism," bv John Watson, 
LL.D., Professor of Moral Philosophy in Queen's 
University, Kingston, Canada. 
21 



322 Theism 



lows that science must seek the cause of 
the former states in the peculiar quality of 
these bodies. Psychical processes are to 
be regarded as functions of the nervous 
system. . . . To explain thought by 
means of a soul is just like the explanation 
which the learned doctors of the school in 
Moliere's play give for the fact that opium 
puts one to sleep: it has dormative powers. 
Science, materialism continues, differs from 
the prescientific mode of thought in this, 
that it explains phenomena, not by means 
of essences and powers, but by means of 
other antecedent and simultaneous phenom- 
ena. Explanation in natural science means 
to state the law according to which a given 
phenomenon is connected with other phe- 
nomena, so that the entrance of the one 
may be foreseen from the appearance of 
the others. . . . Science has the same 
task to perform in relation to states of con- 
sciousness. . . . The antecedent and 
concomitant phenomena are, as experience 



The Theory of Knowledge 323 

shows, physiological processes in the brain 
and nervous system. Accordingly, it is the 
business of science to substitute for the 
pseudo-science * psychology,' and its pre- 
scientific principles, * soul ' and 'psychic 
forces' the natural-scientific explanation. 
Scientific psychology is physiology. This 
fact may be proved logically as follows. 
The highest principle of all modern natural 
science is the principle of the conservation 
of energy. The sum of real motion and of 
motive force is constant. Motion is trans- 
ferred and transformed, mass motion is 
turned into molecular motion, active energy 
is transformed into molecular motion, active 
energy is transformed into potential energy, 
but it is preserved without loss, and may be 
recovered from it. . . . Movements 
are introduced into the nervous system from 
without; air waves proceeding from a sound- 
ing bell strike the auditory nerve and arouse 
a physiological process in it that may be 
shown to be carried to the central organ by 



324 Theism 



means of the nerve-fibers. We are not able 
as yet to pursue this process to its end, but 
we may assume that it does not altogether 
vanish. Simultaneously, as we know from 
another source, a sensation occurs: a sound 
is heard. We conclude: the sensation is 
nothing but the nervous process produced 
in the central organ by the peripheral ex- 
citation." ^ 
Sensations This account of Paulsen's, the reader 
^ " will readily perceive, is nothing but a de- 
tailed application to psychology of the 
general principles set forth in Professor 
Bowne's '' natural history of atheism." In 
Paulsen's account, sensations, on the one 
hand, and volitions, on the other (as indi- 
cated in another example, which it is un- 
necessary to quote), are recognized as 
members of the physical and physiological 
series which plays through man — the stream 
entering, so to speak, at one hole, and 

1 Friedrich Paulsen's *< Introduction to Philosophy," 
pp. 60-63, extracts. 



The Theory of Knowledge 325 



emerging at another — thus giving them the 
same value as matter and its forces. But 
some of the materialists heap yet great- 
er indignities on sensations and volitions. 
Since it cannot yet be shown that the sen- 
sations as such consume energy, or that 
volitions as known in consciousness create 
any, they are, under the law of the conser- 
vation of energy, denied even a bona fide 
place in the material series. Volitions and 
sensations are not even *' phenomenal" : 
they are '' epiphenomenal," a mere useless 
side product of the human organism, having 
no more value in the scientific market than 
the slag issuing from the furnace has in 
comparison with the precious metals freely 
taken in the markets of commerce. Facts 
of consciousness are but the shadows cast 
by the moving train of material realities. 
When we stand face to face with such thor- 
oughgoing issues as these, we need not won- 
der that one of the ablest and most brilliant 
of recent historians of philosophy does not 



326 Theism 



hesitate to declare of the idealism of Bishop 
Berkeley himself that it is ''the only meta- 
physic that may be successfully opposed to 
materialism."^ 
The Com- J have been led into dwelling at such 

mon to All 

length on the idealistic side of what seems 

to me to be the true philosophical system, 
that I have left little space for an adequate 
development of the objective element, which, 
however, has been previously treated at 
the close of Chapter XIII. Before sum- 
ming up in the words of Professor Bowne, 
however, I must be permitted to add that 
there is, in the system, no place left for 
the aberrations and delusions of the in- 
dividual as against the catholic convic- 
tions of the race, even in the sphere of 
phenomenal reality. It is the common to all^ 
and not the -peculiaj' to me^ which verifies 
itself as an objective member of the system 
of phenomenal reality. As Professor How- 

1 Alfred Weber, Professor in Strasburg, " History of 
Philosophy;' p. 397- 



The Theory of Knowledge 327 

ison, of the University of California, has 
recently written: ^* There is no conceiva- 
ble criterion by which an experience could 
be discriminated as objective, except the 
consenting judgment of a total society of 
minds." 

For myself I am satisfied with the phrase ideaUstic 
'^objective idealism" or ''idealistic realism" ^^^^^^ 
as the correct designation of the system 
of philosophy which as a whole commends 
itself to my mind as true and conformed to 
the reality of the universe. But, in conclu- 
sion, let us listen to Professor Bowne: 

''The difference between this idealism and Bowno 
the traditional conception of idealism is also 
manifest. The common thought of ideal- 
ism is that it denies the system of experi= 
ence altogether as something common to all^ 
and reduces the external world to an atom- 
istic and discontinuous set of impressions 
in scattered minds. . . . We have at 
length become accustomed to the idea of 
universality in the phenomenal, and are 



328 Theism 



gradually growing able to distinguish be- 
tween phenomenality and illusion. This 
makes it possible to maintain at once the 
subjectivity and the universality of the 
world; that is, that it exists only for mind 
and not in itself, and yet that it exists for 
all minds. . . . But however this may 
be, it is plain that one may believe in the 
subjective existence of the world of things 
without thereby making it a particular delu- 
sion of his own, and may also believe in 
the universality of the world, or in its ex- 
istence for all, without admitting its extra- 
mental existence. Such an idealism would 
differ from realism only on the one point 
of this extra-mental existence. Both alike 
would have an orderly and universal sys- 
tem of objects, and both would be equally 
far from conceiving this system as an indi- 
vidual delusion. . . . Let us say, then, 
that the world is essentially a going forth of 
divine causality under the forms of space 
and time, and in accordance with a rational 



The Theory of Knowledge 329 

plan. The outcome of this activity is the 
phenomenal world, which is neither outside 
nor inside of God in a spatial sense, but 
which exists in unpicturable dependence 
upon the divine will; as our thoughts are 
neither outside nor inside of the mind in a 
spatial sense, but depend upon the mind as 
their cause and subject. This world, being 
independent of us, has all the continuity, 
uniformity, and objectivity which an extra- 
mental system could have; and, as distinct 
from individual delusion, is real and univer- 
sal. Indeed, it is hard to say what this 
view should be called. In distinction from 
the idealism [nihilism] of sensationalism, it 
is realism. It is realistic, also, in affirming 
an objective cosmic system independent of 
finite thinking. It is idealistic, on the other 
hand, in maintaining that this system is es- 
sentially phenomenal, and exists only in and 
for, as well as through, intelligence. Over 
against the human reason whereby nature 
exists for us is a supreme reason, through 



33^ Theism 



and in which nature has its real exist- 
ence/'^ 

If one finds himself halting between ideal- 
istic realism and the common dualistic real- 
ism, he may well remind himself, at this point, 
that the interaction of mind and body, which 
is an insoluble mysterj^ and downright con- 
tradiction in the latter system, presents no 
difficulty in the former. Surely the doctrine 
which easily and naturally solves the hith- 
erto inexplicable problem which Descartes 
bequeathed to modern philosophy has a 
high claim to truth, which cannot be lightly 
set aside by the candid inquirer. 

1" Theory of Thought and Knowledge,'' pp. 327- 
343, extracts. 



CHAPTER XVI 

A PRESCRIPTION FOR MODERN MATERIALISM 

That the ground of the world-process is Berkeley 
objective, spiritual, personal, and that apart 
from minds phenomena could have no ex- 
istence, are elements alike of sound Lotzean 
and of sound Berkeleyan doctrine. Berke- 
ley and Lotze reach essentially the same ob- 
jective idealism by different routes. They 
approach the same object from opposite di- 
rections, indeed, but land at the same desti- 
nation. Berkeley, by analysis of the proc- 
ess of perception, reveals the subjective sen- 
sation of objective origin — its manifesta- 
tion permeated by law of which there is no 
subjective control — which by rational con- 
struction becomes knowledge; Lotze, by 
solution of the problem of the causality in- 
volved in change and the universal connec- 
tion of things according to law, reduces 
matter to phenomenal reality and finds its 
existence in the energizing of the Infinite 

(330 



332 Theism 



and its locus in human consciousness. 
Berkeley's doctrine is psychological; 
Lotze's metaphysical. But they are es- 
sentially complementary, not contradicto- 
ry. One starts from minds and the other 
from things, but both alike reach the phe- 
nomenality of matter and the true ontolog- 
ical reality of spirit. The Lotzean doctrine 
naturally emphasizes the ceaseless energiz- 
ing of the Infinite according to law, while 
the Berkeleyan doctrine just as naturally 
emphasizes conscious percipiency of the 
phenomena thus projected within the sphere 
of intelligence; but both alike, and in per- 
fect harmony, deny the existence of phe- 
nomenal reality apart from mind. Berke- 
ley is thus subjective and psychological, 
while Lotze is objective and ontological; 
but united they afford the broadest and 
deepest basis for idealistic realism. It is 
doubtless true that Berkeley has not put the 
emphasis as decidedly upon the universal 
and unchanging elements of experience as 



Modern Materialism 333 

has Lotze; certainly he has not done it 
with the vigor and vividness with which 
Professor Bowne performs this task in his 
^'Theory of Thought and Knowledge." 
But, even if this thought is relatively ob- 
scure in Berkeley, his subjective view-point 
is sufficiently explanatory of it, and Lotze' s 
objective view-point supplies most naturally 
the exact correction which it needs. 

It is high time for philosophy to enter constmct- 

upon its constructive and universalizinsf 
^ ^ losophy 

stage. Instead of emphasizing insignificant 
differences — especially when their source 
is sufiiciently evident — it is the business of 
modern philosophy to search for essential 
identities, and to rejoice over them as over 
great spoil. I do not question the rigidly 
scientific accuracy of Professor Bowne 's 
method in constantly finding the ultimate 
explanation of phenomena in their meta- 
physical causes, in passing from the induc- 
tive to the productive plane, and from phe- 
nomenal reality to ontological reality as its 



334 Theis7n 



only sufficient ground. But, if such a book 
as I am seeking to describe is to be written 
as a breakwater against the flood of materi- 
alism that is inundating the modern scien- 
tific world, it must make the approach from 
the more obvious but equally true psycho- 
logical side, as well as from the profounder 
metaphysical side; and the distinct effort 
must be deliberately put forth to dissipate 
the ordinary scientific prejudices and super- 
stitions, and to make connections with the 
average scientific ways of looking at things. 
Now, such an historian of philosophy as 
Albert Weber has recognized the analysis of 
Berkeley as the only antidote that can be 
successfully opposed to materialism, and 
such a scientist as Huxley has conceded the 
impregnability of Berkeley's position. But 
Berkeley and Lotze in their different ways 
reach scarcely distinguishable conclusions, 
and it thus becomes pedagogically expedi- 
ent — or, as we should say in theology, apolo- 
getically expedient — to unite rather than di- 



Modern Materialism 335 

vide them ; to treat Berkely as the psycholog- 
ical complement of Lotze, and Lotze as the 
metaphysical complement of Berkeley, and 
thus to build on the broadest and deepest 
foundations the wall that shall withstand the 
oncoming assault of a deadly materialism, 
fatal alike to knowledge, to morals, and to 
religion. The psychological analysis of the 
process of perception is much more simple 
and more immediately convincing than the 
metaphysical proof of the merely phenome- 
nal reality of things. Both have been suffi- 
ciently considered in preceding chapters. 
If the materialist is to be convinced and con- 
verted, I believe the psychological is the 
natural avenue of approach, as it certainly 
is the natural, if not necessary, introduction 

to the metaphysical argument. But, psy- 
chology and metaphysics united, the har- 
monized conclusions of Berkeley and Lotze 
seem invincible; and thus are the weapons 
formed to our hand for the achievement of 
a victory for which the whole modern world 



33^ Theis7n 



^'groaneth and travaileth in pain together 
until now." 
Finite Of the finite j two conceptions are possible. 

It may be a form of energizing on the part 
of the Infinite, or it may be a real creation. 
In the first case its existence is phenomenal; 
in the second, ontological. In the first case 
we have ''things " ; in the second, persons. 
In neither case can the finite be identified 
with the Infinite, and pantheism is excluded. 
The decision between the two views is 
reached on the basis of the facts of experi- 
ence. If any finite being exists capable of 
acting from itself and for itself, it has in 
that fact the certain test and mark of reality 
as distinguished from phenomenality. This 
mark occurs only in human spirits or per- 
sons. If it be asked w^hy the Infinite may 
not "posit'' or create impersonal as well as 
personal agents, the answer is that identity 
and causality are found only in the per- 
sonal, while analysis reveals that the imper- 
sonal has not even subjectivity, and is sim- 



Modern MaterialisTn 337 

ply the phenomenal process of an energy 
not its own. Hence, while things are but 
the energizing of the Infinite, persons are 
created, posited — not made out of some pre- 
existing material, but caused to be. This 
distinction, on the general basis of Lotzean 
metaphysics, is clear and satisfactory. Per- 
sons possess, as Bowne puts it, ^^ontolog- 
ical otherness to the Infinite." Human be- 
ings are lifted out of the order of inductive 
into that of productive causality, out of the 
category of phenomenal conditions of re- 
sults into that of real causes. Nature is not 
a closed system. Man by his free and real 
agency projects results into the natural se- 
ries which nature could never have reached 
independently. This free causality of man 
in nature which produces its results, not by 
the disruption of law and continuity, but by 
the knowledge of law and obedience to it, 
may be used as a help to a proper under- 
standing of the like free and causal relation 
of the Creator to the world. 
22 



338 Theis7n 



God and If the concession of ontological reality to 

^^^^^ persons is real, it must be identical in kind, 

though of course not in degree, with the 
ontological reality of the Infinite ; and, apart 
from the orderly energizing of the Infinite 
according to law which constitutes the con- 
stant world of things, they — God and man 
— must sustain similar relations to that world 
of things existing in its orderliness. Man, 
within the limits of his dependence on the 
Infinite, must be truly a creative first cause 
whose orderly intelligence and efficient will 
produce otherwise nonexistent phenomena 
first in his own body, phenomenal like other 
matter though it be, next in the fixed and 
actual order of the independent phenome- 
nal world, and finally in the consciousness 
of his fellows, through the mediation of 
their bodies — thus finally certifying to them 
his existence as a rational and causal being, 
that is, a person. When a rational person 
writes a book, he conveys to a reader of 
that book not only a phenomenal manifes- 



Moderfi Materialism 339 

tation of the thinghood of the book in the 
black characters upon the white paper, but 
a rational manifestation of his personality, 
because the phenomena are the bearers of 
a message, invisible, indeed, but with a 
meaning in it which evinces the very or- 
ganism of reason itself. Of this message 
neither the world nor the Infinite is the 
author, but the writer of the book; without 
whose agency it could never have projected 
itself into our consciousness. Within that 
orderly and rational sphere of phenomenal 
manifestation which we call the universe, as 
summing up the many in the one, and as 
the ceaseless energizing of the Infinite ac- 
cording to law, there are smaller but definite- 
ly marked circles of phenomenal manifesta- 
tion= — as architecture, manufactures, spoken 
and written language — which harmonize, in- 
deed, with the whole of which they form a 
part, but which evince also in themselves an 
independent organism of reason and a source 
of power or efficiency directed by reason; 



340 



Theism 



and at the center of each of these minor 
circles there is a person, a human spirit. 
'' No man hath seen God at any time," nor 
hath any man looked upon his fellow. But 
the evidence for the existence of man — a 
finite, but free and rational spirit — as I must 
put it in this connection, is of the same kind 
and, as far as I can see, of the same cogen- 
cy with the evidence for the existence of 
God. As against the atheist and material- 
ist I must add that the argument for the ex- 
istence of God is of the same kind and the 
same cogency as the argument for the ex- 
istence of man. 



IOT)EX 



Abelard, his motto quot- 
ed, 53. 

Agassiz, Louis, quoted^ 160. 

Agnosticism, of Hamilton 
and Mansel, 6. 

Albertus Magnus, men- 
tioned, 15. 

Anaxagoras, quoted, loi, 
102. 

Anselm, author of onto- 
logical argument, 14; 
his theological impor- 
tance, 15; his argument 
stated, 16, 17; his Pros- 
logian mentioned, 17; 
his argument translat- 
ed, 17, 18; his motto 
quoted, 53. 

Aquinas, Thomas, men- 
tioned, 15. 

Argyll, duke of, on the 
flight of birds, 20T. 

Aristotle, his general the- 
istic doctrine, 107-109; 
a further allusion to, 
146; creative energy of, 
155; his doctrine of the 
four causes in Physics 
and Metaphysics, 156- 
158; scholasticism based 
on, 158; two branches 
of his teleology, 159. 



Atheism, natural history 
of, 313. 

Atoms, manufactured ar- 
ticles, Herschel and 
Maxwell on, 104 (foot- 
note), 197. 

Augustine, St,, philosoph- 
ical significance of, 290. 

Bacon, Lord, on final 
causes, 154, 155. 

Bain, Alexander, his Log- 
ic quoted on chance, 

173, 174- 

Bee, its construction of a 
cell, 201-203. 

Berkeley, Bishop, his rela- 
tion to Huxley, 269-289; 
his New Theory of Vi- 
sion, 297, 298; his rela- 
tion to Lotze, 331-336. 

Bibliotheca Sacra, 1851, 
quoted, 17, 18. 

Birds, flight of, duke of 
Argyll on, 201. 

Body, mechanism of, 241, 
242; an intermediary, 
242; a bridge, 244. 

Bowne, Borden P., rejects 
Anselm's argument, 28; 
accepts his conclusion, 
31, 33 ; on teleology, 193, 

(34O 



342 



Index 



194; quoted on natural 
history of atheism, 313; 
on idealism, 327-330 ; his 
method, 333, 334. 

Calderwood, Hekry, his 
** Philosophy of the In- 
finite,^' 6; his ^' Moral 
Philosophy" quoted, 6, 
39, 40 (footnote), III- 
113, 120, 122, 123, 131- 
135; controverted on 
necessary and possible 
proofs, 6— 11; his meth- 
od accepted, 12, 13. 

Carpenter, Dr. W. B., on 
mind as the source of 
power, 139. 

Categories of reality, 310- 
313; of causality and 
design, 313, 314; of sub- 
stance, 314-319. 

Causa transiens, 215. 

Cause, true nature of as 
personal, 129-131; Cal- 
derwood's statement 
concerning, 131 -135; 
Sir John Herschel on, 
136; other authorities 
enumerated, 137-139; 
Winchell's analysis of, 
140-147; value of the 
doctrine for theism, 149 ; 
efficient, final, formal, 



and material, 158; defi- 
nition of final, 175; true 

doctrine of, 178. 
Chalmers, Dr. Thomas, his 

fatal concession,io5-io7. 
Chance, defined, 170; Mc- 

Cosh, !MiIl, and Bain 

on, 171-174. 
Change, not due to a single 

cause, 207; intellectual 

formulation of law of, 

261, 262. 
Chicks, Two, Fable of, 88- 

90. 
Cicero, on final causes in 

de Natura Deorum, 154. 
Clarke, Dr. Samuel, his 

Demonstration of the 

Being and Attributes of 

God, 121. 
Cocker, Dr. B. F., his The- 

istic Conception of the 

World quoted, 139, 140. 
Cogito ergo sum, 51-53. 
Comte, A., positivism of, 

219. 
Concursus Dei, 226-228. 
Consensus, Gentium, 81; 

of all sciences, 97. 
Cooke, Josiah Parsons, on 

the freezing of water, 

198-200. 
Copernicus, mentioned, 5. 
Cosmological argument, 



Index 



343 



syllogism of, 92, 93 ; ma- 
jor premise, 93; minor, 
94; logic, 95, 96; Kant 
on, 124, 125; Locke on, 
125, 126; Lotze on, 126, 
127; worth and width 
of, 127* 

Courtney, W. L., on Hux- 
ley in the Fortnightly 
Review, 271, 279-283. 

Cudworth, Ralph, his In- 
tellectual System of the 
Universe quoted, 40, 41 
(footnote). 

Darwin, Charles, on tel- 
eology, 194-196. 

Dei, concursus, 226-228. 

Descartes, Rend, his argu- 
ment not identical with 
Anselm's, 32, 33; his 
Principles of Philoso- 
phy described and quot- 
ed, 32, 33, 34 (footnote), 
42, 43 (footnote) ; Medi- 
tations quoted , 34-36 
(footnote), 42 (footnote), 
45 (footnote), 62 (foot- 
note) ; original collected 
Latin edition of Works 
described, 36 (footnote); 
supported by Ueber- 
weg, Noird, Calder- 
wood, Cudworth, Leib- 



nitz in holding idea of 
infinite as positive, 37- 
425 his Discourse on 

Method described, 42- 
44; quoted, 43 (foot- 
note), 44, 50 (footnote), 
51 (footnote), 52 (foot- 
note), 61 (footnote) ; his 
four principles of phi- 
losophy, 45, 46-59; his 
greatness, 46-50; his ar- 
gument analyzed, 60, 
61-63; his use of the 
ontological argument, 
60, 63-76; his argument 
estimated, 74-78. 
Design, nature of argu- 
ment from, 150, 163; 
Kant*s statement and 
estimate of, 150-153, 163, 
164; the Scriptures on, 
153; Socrates, Cicero, 
Bacon, Aristotle, Kep- 
ler, Agassiz, Ueberweg, 
and Schleiermacher on, 
153-161; scientific mis- 
conception of, 162; at- 
tacks of Hume and Mill 
on, 165; its harmony 
with efficiency, 167-182; 
in effect proof of intel- 
ligence in cause, 183- 
192 ; additional instances 
of, 193-203. 



344 



Index 



Diman, J. Lewis, his The- 
istic Argument, quoted 
on First Cause and In- 
finite Regress, 116-119. 

Doubt, Cartesian, 53. 

DuBois-Reymond, on in- 
comprehensibility of 
sensation, 248. 

Duns Scotus, mentioned, 
15. 

Education, process of, 251, 

252. 
Elements, chemical, 102. 
Erdmann, his History of 

Philosophy quoted on 

Descartes, 64. 
Eternity, of the universe, 

96-99; of matter, 99- 

iio; a scientific disproof 

of, 124. 
Euclid, mentioned, 5. 
Evolution, bearings of on 

teleology, 184, 185. 

Fable of two chicks, 88- 
90. 

Finite persons, 336-340. 

First Cause, a self-exist- 
ent, doctrine of, 120, 
i2i;Dimanon, 116-119; 
Kant on, 118, 119; Spen- 
cer on, 119. 

Fischer, Kuno, mentioned, 



42, 60; his Descartes 
and his School quoted, 
66, 67-72, 74. 

Flint, Robert, his Theism 
and Antitheistic Theo- 
ries, 16, 29 (footnote); 
on Anselm, 16; his po- 
sition further noticed, 
29 (footnote). 

Formula, general, of rela- 
tions of physics, physi- 
ology, and psychology, 
263-268. 

Ganot, his Physics cited, 

200 (footnote). 
Gaunilo, his Liber pro In- 
sipiente described, 18, 
19. 
General formula of rela- 
tions of physics, physi- 
ology, and psychology, 
263, 268. 
God, universality of idea 
of, I, 2; a large conclu- 
sion, 2, 3; knowledge of 
not innate, 7; not intu- 
itive, 8-10 ; the only pei- 
fect Person, 233. 
Greenwood, G. G.,on Hux- 
ley in the Westminster 
Review, 272-279, 287. 
Grove, Prof., on causation, 
139. 



Index 



345 



Hamilton, Sir W., ag- 
nosticism of, 6; contro- 
verted by Calderwood 
on doctrine of cause, 
132-134; on primary 
and secondary qualities, 
297. 

Harmony, preestablished, 
224, 225; hypothetical, 
226. 

Hartmann, E. von, on ele- 
ments of final causes, 
175; on unconscious in- 
telligence, 183; on the 
human eye, 188-191. 

Hearing, sense of, 245-250. 

Hegel, G. W. F., accepts 
Anselm's argument, 15, 
16. 

Herbert, Thomas Martin, 
his Realistic Assump- 
tions of Modern Sci- 
ences quoted, 181, 182; 
the book commended, 
286. 

Herschel, Sir John, quoted 
on atoms, loi ; on nature 
of cause, 135, 136. 

Homology and teleology, 

159. 

Howison, Professor, quot- 
ed, 327. 

Hume, David, his attack 
on doctrine of causality, 



128; results of his skep- 
ticism on course of phi- 
losophy, 129; in pro- 
founder doctrine of 
causality, 129-131; his 
denial of final causes, 
165, 186. 
Huxley, Thomas H., on 
evolution and teleolo- 
gy, 184; on unaccount- 
ability of sensations, 
249; his relation to Bish- 
op Berkeley, 269-289, 
334; was he a materi- 
alist.^ 269; quoted on 
materialistic nomencla- 
ture, 270; his Evolution 
and Ethics quoted, 272, 
273, 282, 283 (footnote); 
on Hume, 281 ; burial 
of, 288, 289, 

Idealism, objective, 292. 

Infinite, Caldervi^ood's Phi- 
losophy of, 6; source 
of knov^rledge of, 37; 
idea of, not negative, 
37; so teach Descartes, 
Ueberweg, Noire, Cal- 
derwood, Cudworth, 
Leibnitz, 37-42; tran- 
scendent and imma- 
nent, 229; the absolute 
person, 229. 



34^ 



Index 



Infinite regress, 110-119; 
Calderwood's position 
on, 111-113; satisfies 
neither observation nor 
reason, 113-115; further 
refutation of, 115, 116; 
Di man's conclusive 
statement^ 116-119: 
Spencer's agreement, 
119; rests on a fictitious 
universal, 207. 

Instinct, argument from, 
84; defined, 85; animal 
and human, 85-87 ; how 
related to environment, 
87-90; of the bee, 201- 
203. 

Interaction, of soul and 
body, 319-222* 

Iverach, James^ quoted, 
loi (footnote)j 102, 103 
(footnote). 

Janet, Paul, on final 
cause, 176, 177, 1 78. 

Kant, Immakuel, refutes 
ontological argument, 
14, 28, 29 (footnote); 
quoted by Diman, 117- 
119; on the cosmolog- 
ical argument, 124, 125; 
estimxate of the design 
argument, 150, 153; his 



rejection of, 153 (foot- 
note) ; on Aristotle's 
logic, 156; summary of 
design argument, 163, 
164, 

Kelvin, Lord, on vortex 
atoms, 30I) 302 (foot- 
note), 304; on the lu- 
miniferous ether, 302 
(footnote). 

Kepler, J., quoted, 159. 

Knowledge, of God, not 
innate, 7; nor intuitive, 
S-io : of God and of man 
one, 12, 340, 

Knowledge.Theory of, 290; 
Plato, Aristotle, Augus- 
tine, Descartes, Spinoza, 
Locke, Leibnitz, Berke- 
ley, Hume, Kant, and 
the later Germans on, 
290-292. 

Ladd, George T., his Out- 
lines of Physiological 
Psychology quoted, 260; 
his criticism of Hux- 
ley, 2S6: his estimate of 
St. Augustine, 290; his 
Philosophy of Knowl- 
edge quoted, 312. 

Leibnitz, G. W., his doc- 
trine of a positive infi- 



Index 



347 



nite quoted, 41, 42 ; men- 
tioned, 43; his preestab- 
lished harmony, 224. 
225; his failure, 225. 
Liber pro Insipiente, Gau- 
nilo's described, 18, 19. 

Locke, John, his use of 
cosmological reason- 
ing, 125, 126; on passive 
power, 208; on primary 
and secondary quali- 
ties, 297* 

Lotze, Hermann, rejects 

Anselm^s reasoning, 28 ; 
accepts Anselm^s con- 
clusion, 16, 30, 31 ; on 
revelation, 78-80; on 
creation, 94 (footnote); 
on limits of cosmo- 
logical argument, 126, 
127; on sound and col- 
or, 256; his relation to 
Berkeley, 331-336, 

Mach, E., quoted, 305, 
Man, a religious animal, 
83; proofs of his exist- 
ence as a person, 338- 

340- 

Mansel, Dean, his agnos- 
ticism, 6. 

Materialistic paralogism, 
309. 



Matter, eternity of, 99-1 10 ; 
scientific disproof of, 
124. 

Matter and Force, possible 
conceptions o f their 
relations, 145; Calder- 
wood on, 122, 123. 

Maxwell, J. Clerk, quoted 
on atoms, 104, 105 (foot- 
note). 

McCosh, Jas., quoted, 171. 

Mill, J. S., on final causes, 
165 ; on chance, his Log- 
ic quoted, 171, 172; on 
the human eye, 186, 187. 

Motor Nerves, 243, 244. 

Miiller, Max, his transla- 
tion of Kant's Critique 
of Pure Reason quoted, 

38, 39) 150-153, 163, 164. 

Natural history of athe- 
ism, 313. 
Nerves, sensor and motor, 

243-245. 

Newton, Sir Isaac, his 
Prind^ia referred to, 3, 
4; mentioned, 5, 43, 22I0 

Noire, Ludwig, quoted on 
idea of the infinite, 38, 

39, 76. 

Norton, Prof., on the na- 
ture of force, 139. 

Objective Idealism, 292. 



348 



Inde. 



Objectivity, ultimate 
grounds of, 257-259. 

Occasionalism, its special 
value, 218-220; its in- 
sufficiency, 222. 

Ontological argument, 
Anselm author of, 14; 
history of, 15, 16; Kant's 
rejection of, 14, 28, 29 
(footnote) ; attitude of 
Thomas Aquinas, Al- 
bertus Magnus, Duns 
Scotus, Hegel, Shedd, 
Flint, and Lotze to- 
ward, 15, 16, 28, 26 
(footnote); Shedd's de- 
fense of, 19-22; Shel- 
don's estimate of, 24; its 
fallacy, 18, 19; refuta- 
tion of, 25-27; Bowne's 
rejection of, 28. 

Organic sense, 234, 235. 

Ovi^en, Richard, on evolu- 
tion and teleology, 185. 

Pantheism, nature of, 230. 
Paralogism, materialistic, 

309. 

Paulsen, Friedrich, his In- 
troductory to Philoso- 
phy quoted on material- 
ism, 321-324. 

Pearson, Bishop, quoted, 7, 
8, 9, 10. 



Persons, finite, 336-340. 

Philosophy and science, 
interaction of, 148, 149. 

Physics, physiology, and 
psychology, general 
formula of relation of, 
263-268. 

Physiology, physics, and 
psychology, general 
formula of relation of, 
263-268. 

Plato, mentioned, 146. 

Porter, Noah, on final 
causes, 177; on the or- 
ganism as stimulated, 
306, 307. 

Preestablished Harmony, 
224. 

Primary qualities, 297. 

Properties, secondary, 256, 
257-297. 

Propositions, six, on rela- 
tions of physics, physi- 
ology, and psychology, 
263-268. 

Psychology, physiology, 
and physics, general 
formula of relation of, 
263-268. 

Qualities, primary and 
secondary, 297-299. 

Rationality, in nature, 
160. 



Index 



349 



Realism, Platonic and Ar- 
istotelic, loo (footnote); 
common, 299; transfig- 
ured, 301. 

Reality, ontological and 
phenomenal, 310; cate- 
gories of, 310-312; ra- 
tional, 320. 

Revelation, Descartes's ex- 
position of, 77, 78 ; Lotze 
on, 78-80. 

SCHLEIERMACHER, F., his 

Dialektic quoted, 161. 

Schopenhauer, reduces all 
force to will, 138; on 
unconscious intelli- 
gence, 183. 

Schwegler, Albert, his 
History of Philosophy 
cited, 5 (footnote); 
quoted on Descartes, 
46 (footnote). 

Secondary properties, 256, 

257. 
Sense, organic, 234, 235; of 
temperature, 235-237; 
of taste, 237-239; of 
smell, 230-241 ; of hear- 
ing, 245-249; of sight, 
252-255; of touch, 256, 

257- 
Sensor nerves, 243. 

Septuagint, chronology of, 1 



97, 98; E. B. Tylor on, 
98 (footnote). 

Shedd, Dr. W. G. T., ac- 
cepts ontological argu- 
ment, 16; supplies a 
translation of, 17, 18; 
his History of Chris- 
tian Doctrine quoted, 
17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22; 
refutation of, 22-27 ; 
final remark on, 29 
(footnote). 

Sheldon, Dr. H. C, his 
History of Christian 
Doctrine quoted, 24. 

Sight, sense of, 252-255. 

Smell, sense of, 239-241. 

Socrates, on the human 
organs, 153, 154. 

Soul and body, interaction 
of, 219-222. 

Space and time, 262, 263. 

Spencer, Herbert, his doc- 
trine of the unknowa- 
ble, 6; his First Princi- 
ples quoted on the 
First Cause, 119; and on 
the nature of force, 138. 

Spinoza, Benedict, his pan- 
theism, 9. 

Stuckenberg, J. H., his In- 
troduction to the Study 
of Philosophy quoted, 
128. 



350 



Index 



Substance, 230-232; Dr. 
James Ward on, 231- 
233 (footnote). 

Summers, Dr. T. O., his 
Systematic Theology 
cited, 13 (footnote); his 
reply to Dr. Chalmers, 
no. 

Taste, sense of, 237-239. 

Teleology, Aristotle on, 
156-158; relation to ho- 
mology, 159; Kepler, 
Agassiz, Ueberweg, and 
Schleiermacher on,i59- 
161 ; scientific miscon- 
ception of, 162; nature 
of the argument from, 
163, Kant's summary 
of, 163, 164; Bowne on, 
193, 194; Darwin's con- 
cessions concerning, 
194-196. 

Temperature, sense of, 
235-237. 

Things, isolated existence 
of, denied, 228; results 
of affirming, 230 ; knowl- 
edge of, 234-268; de- 
fined, 260. 

Tillottson, Archbishop, 
quoted, 192. 

Time and space, 262, 263. 

Touch, sense of, 256, 257. 



Transfigured realism, 301. 

Tylor, E. B., on chronol- 
ogy of the Septuagint, 
98 (footnote). 

Tyndall, John, on heat, 
200 (footnote); on un- 
thinkability of passage 
from brain to sensation, 
249. 

UEBERWEG,FRIEDRICH,his 

History of Philosophy 
cited, 5 '(footnote); 157 
(footnote) ; quoted on 
idea of the infinite, 38; 
his Logic quoted, 161. 

Ultimate grounds of ob- 
jectivity, 257-259. 

Unconditioned, the, and 
uncaused, 206. 

Universe, eternity of, 96- 

99. 
Unknowable, Spencer's 
doctrine of, 6. 

Valentine, his Natural 
Theology quoted, 168, 
169. 

Wallace, Alfred Rus- 
sell, on matter, force, 
and will, 138 ;accepts dy- 
namical conception of 
matter, 145; on evolu- 
tion and teleology, 185. 



Index 



351 



Ward, Dr. James, his Nat- 
uralism and Agnosti- 
cism quoted on sub- 
stance, 231-233 (foot- 
note). 

Water, freezing of, 197- 
200. 

Watson, Professor John, 
h i s Christianity and 
Idealism quoted, 320, 
321. 

Weber, Alfred, his History 
of Philosophy quoted 
on Descartes, 65; on 
Berkeley, 326, 334. 

Weight, nature of, 262. 

Winchell, Alexander, on 



the conception of intel- 
ligent power, 138; his 
analysis of the concep- 
tion of causality, 140- 
142 ; justification of, 142, 
143; his Reconciliation 
of Science and Re- 
ligion quoted, 143, 144, 
145, 147- 

Xenophanes, his doctrine, 

5 (footnote). 
Xenophon, his Memora- 
bilia quoted, 153. 

ZoLLNER, on Schopenhau- 
er and Wallace, 139. 



THE END 



MAR 4 1907 



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: Dec. 2004 

PreservationTechnologies 

A WORLD LEADER IN PAPER PRESERVATION 

1 1 1 Thomson Park Drive 
Cranberry Township. PA 16066 
(724)779-2111 



p" 

'2.-*-" 



